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WHAT THE MODERN MAN SHOULD NOT BELIEVE

UNDER the heading, "What The Modern Man Can Believe," there appeared in the November *Atlantic Monthly* an article by Rufus M. Jones, the principal thesis of which was: We must readjust faith to discovered facts. The present article is an examination of that thesis. The pivotal point of Mr. Jones' thesis is that what he terms the "Copernican Revolution" necessitates a complete re-evaluation of the traditional faith. "Every aspect of our religious faith must be rethought, reconstructed, and adjusted to the demonstrated facts which this Copernican Revolution forces upon our minds." Consequently, the whole urgency of Mr. Jones' argumentation is based upon the supposition of this "Copernican Revolution, which came in the dawn of the Renaissance, [and] was one of the most staggering blows at the dominant faith of the western world that has ever been leveled

against it in the long undeclared warfare between science and religion."

It is the uncritical acceptance of such suppositions that has caused a sort of " Iron Curtain " to fall upon the Middle Ages, that has caused many moderns to reject the ancient faith before they have even heard it. Because of them the modern man dares not seek the truth farther back than the Renaissance. But now the precarious position of western civilization has sent serious thinkers on a desperate inventory of wisdom through the ages. In this search for whatever is solid and durable, whatever may prove a guarantee of survival, it is more necessary than ever to rend now this " Iron Curtain," to be willing to face the facts even at the price of cherished illusions. There is nothing to fear from the truth. So let one not be afraid to look, for once, at the Middle Ages as they really were, and the ancient faith, as it really is. Today it is no longer a mere academic luxury but a vital duty in the interests of man's heritage of wisdom, to re-examine the picture of the medieval world as Mr. Jones so persuasively draws it. One must indeed, as Mr. Jones urges, be prepared to sacrifice beguiling fantasies for uncompromising facts, which, if they exact a readjustment of one's beliefs, are nonetheless a salutary revision in the direction of a truth which is full of hope, ever new and ever living. Since Mr. Jones is engaged in the serious task of evaluating the basis of one's approach to God, his reconstruction of medieval thought should be approached, not as a well-written and imaginative essay, but with the studious intent of uncompromisingly winnowing the wheat from the chaff.

Upon what concept of the universe did the so-called " Copernican Revolution " come stealing in at the dawn of the Renaissance? In Mr. Jones' words, " Slowly, through centuries of imaginative thinking and speculation, . . . it had become a settled conclusion that the earth was the center around which everything else in the visible universe revolved. This earth-center for which everything else was created was thus obviously the focus of interest and attention of whatever divine beings

there were above it." But are we quite sure that in the Middle Ages the earth was the center of the universe and the focus of divine interest? What did Aristotle, whose thought was predominant in the pre-Copernican world, have to say about the matter? "They [the Pythagoreans] hold that the most important part of the world [universe], which is the centre, should be most strictly guarded, and they name it, or rather the fire which occupies that place, the 'Guard-house of Zeus,' as if the word 'centre' were quite unequivocal, and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the same with that of the thing or the natural centre. But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heavens as analogous to that of animals, in which the centre of the animal and that of the body are different. For this reason they have no need to be so disturbed about the world, or to call in a guard for its centre: rather let them look for the centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and where nature has set it. That centre will be something primary and precious; but to the mere position we should give the last place rather than the first." [1]

Obviously for Aristotle the earth, no matter what its mathematical position may be, is neither the real center of the universe, nor is it "the focus of interest and attention of whatever divine beings there were above it." His distinction between the real center and the mathematical center, quite evident when it is pointed out, seems to have escaped the moderns. When modern astronomers such as Sir James Jeans assume that we should be thoroughly frightened and humbled at the knowledge that we are not the mathematical center of the universe, they do not seem to realize that this bogey-man was exorcised by Aristotle some two thousand years ago. If the discovery that the earth is not the mathematical center of the universe can create such a revolution in our thought, it is we who are naive, not the Greeks. As Aristotle suggested to the Pythagoreans, "let them rather look for the centre in the

[1] *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York, 1941), "On The Heavens," 293b, pp. 428, 429.

other sense and tell us what it is like and where nature has set it." This the moderns have conspicuously failed to do.

St. Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of Aristotle's medieval commentators, further clarifies his position: "And therefore, in the whole universe. . . . the earth, which is contained by all the rest of the universe as existing locally in the middle of the universe, is the most material and ignoble of bodies. . ." [2] Thus the opinion of the foremost Greek and medieval scholars as to the importance of the earth in the configuration of the universe is quite the opposite of that which Mr. Jones attributes to them. Actually, the errors we attribute to the Greeks are our own errors, while the clairvoyance we attribute to ourselves is that of the Greeks. In effect, although Aristotle considered the earth as being situated in the mathematical center of the universe, he did not for that reason consider either the earth or man as the *real* center of the universe. The real center of the universe was the cause of its form and its motion, ultimately the First Mover, God, Who, in the words of Dante: ". . . moves the sun and the other stars."

The moderns, on the other hand, although they do not consider the earth the mathematical center of the universe—which is, after all, secondary—nevertheless make the earth and man the *real* center of the universe. For the ultimate modern conception of the universe has no pretension of representing it other than as it appears *to man*.[3] In the final analysis, then, an anthropocentric universe is not the universe of the Greeks, but the universe of the moderns.

There was another great discovery in the "revolution" which is said to have invalidated the ancient faith when "Columbus found another 'side' to the world, and Magellan

[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentaria in Libros Aristotelis de Coelo et Mundo* (Rome, 1936), Lib. II, lectio 20, p. 202.

[3] "Human thought creates an ever-changing picture of the universe. . . . Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. . . . He (man) will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison." Albert Einstein and Leopold Enfeld, *The Evolution of Physics* (New York, 1942), pp. 9, 33.

—or at least his men—sailed around the world and proved that it was a globe." Mr. Jones is some 1800 years late in his chronology. To quote the Encyclopaedia Britannica: "The spherical form was asserted by Pythagoras, and Aristotle used arguments in its favor similar to those used today, viz., the circular shadow cast on the moon during an eclipse; and the alteration in the appearance of the heavens as one passes from place to place on the surface. . . . The spherical form did not, however, become generally believed until after explorers had actually sailed around the earth; though this argument is not intrinsically so conclusive as any of the first three given." [4]

How wide-spread was this knowledge of the sphericity of the earth in medieval and pre-Copernican times? Probably the most definitive work available on the scientific knowledge which Columbus had at his disposal is the Pulitzer Prize-winning *Admiral of the Ocean Sea,* by Samuel Eliot Morison (incidentally, an Atlantic Monthly Press book.) Professor Morison has nothing but scorn for those who perpetuate the legend of medieval ignorance of the sphericity of the earth. ". . . Of all the vulgar errors connected with Columbus, the most persistent and the most absurd is that he had to convince people 'the world was round.' Every educated man in his day believed the world to be a sphere, every European university so taught geography, and seamen, though they might doubt the practical possibility of sailing 'down under' or holding on when you got there, knew perfectly well from seeing ships

[4] "Earth," *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago, 1947), Vol. 7, p. 830. The arguments of Aristotle referred to may be found in his work, *On The Heavens*: "The evidence of the senses further corroborates this [the sphericity of the earth]. How else would eclipses of the moon show segments shaped as we see them? As it is, the shapes which the moon itself shows each month are of every kind—straight, gibbous and concave—but in eclipses the outline is always curved: and since it is the interposition of the earth that makes the eclipse, the form of this line will be caused by the form of the earth's surface, which is therefore spherical. Again, our observations of the stars make it evident, not only that the earth is circular, but also that it is a circle of no great size. For quite a small change of position to south or north causes a manifest alteration of the horizon." *Op. cit.*, 297b, p. 436.

'hull down' and 'raising' mountains as they approached, that the surface of the globe was curved." [5]

When the Royal Commission sat in the Dominican College of St. Stephen in Salamanca, what was the thesis which Columbus had to substantiate in order to win royal backing? What was it that the Commission found "could not possibly be true?" "Obviously the thing that 'could not possibly be true' was the Admiral's theory of a narrow ocean between Spain and the Indies. It was not true. Yet owing to the feelings of Diego de Deza, perhaps also of Talavera, that there might be something in Columbus' project nevertheless, the commission postponed rendering a report. What, then, becomes of the celebrated sessions of the University of Salamanca, before whose professors of mathematics, geography, and astronomy Columbus argued his case and was turned down because he could not convince them that the world was round? That is pure moonshine. Washington Irving, scenting his opportunity for a picturesque and moving scene, took a fictitious account of this nonexistent university council published 130 years after the event, elaborated on it, and let his imagination go completely. The result is that wonderful chapter where 'an obscure navigator, a member of no learned society, destitute of all the trappings and circumstances which sometimes give oracular authority to dullness, and depending on the mere force of natural genius,' sustains his thesis of a spherical globe against 'pedantic bigotry' of flat-earth churchmen, fortified by texts from the Bible, Lactantius and Saint Augustine, until he began to feel nervous about the Inquisition." [6]

Thanks to legends such as this Mr. Jones can write: "In the face of steady opposition on the part of the historic Church the 'revolution' of thought became established, and came to be part of the natural air men and school children breathed." That such legends have become a part of the natural (?) air that modern men and especially school children breathe is

[5] Samuel Eliot Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (Abridged edition; Boston, 1942), p. 33.

[6] Samuel Eliot Morison, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 89.

undeniable. But as to how healthy they are, Professor Morison is not here in agreement with Mr. Jones: " A gripping drama as Irving tells it, this has become one of the most popular Columbian myths. . . . Yet the whole story is misleading and mischievous nonsense. . . . The issue was the width of the ocean; and therein the opposition was right." [7]

An examination of Columbus' " revolutionary " arguments reveals, on the contrary, how closely he was basing himself on the findings of Aristotle and—at least indirectly—of St. Thomas Aquinas. " Multitudes of persons are still unaware of the utter transformation of religious faith involved in this scientific revoluton," writes Mr. Jones. " The earth has become a tiny body of matter, revolving about a sun, itself the center of nothing but a cold dead moon." Quite breath-taking, unless one knows that Aristotle's conclusions (c. 350 B. C.) as to the smallness of the earth were one of Columbus' strongest arguments for the possiblity of sailing west to China.

In effect, after demonstrating the sphericity of the earth, Aristotle continues on, in his *On The Heavens*, to demonstrate the smallness of the earth in relation to the other heavenly bodies. " Again, our observations of the stars make it evident, not only that the earth is circular, but also that it is a circle of no great size. For quite a small change of position to south or north causes a manifest alteration of the horizon. There is much change, I mean, in the stars which are overhead, and the stars seen are different, as one moves northward or southward. Indeed there are some stars seen in Egypt and in the neighborhood of Cyprus which are not seen in the northerly regions; and stars, which in the north are never beyond the range of observation, in those regions rise and set. All of which goes to show not only that the earth is circular in shape, but also that it is a sphere of no great size: for otherwise the effect of so slight a change of place would not be so quickly apparent. Hence one should not be too sure of the incredibility of the view of those who conceive that there is continuity between the

[7] *Loc. cit.*

parts about the Pillars of Hercules [straights of Gibraltar] and the parts about India, and that in this way the ocean is one. As further evidence in favor of this they quote the case of elephants, a species occurring in each of these extreme regions, suggesting that the common characteristic of these extremes is explained by their continuity. Also those mathematicians who try to calculate the size of the earth's circumference arrive at the figure of 400,000 stades. This indicates not only that the earth's mass is spherical in shape, but also that as compared with the stars it is not of great size." [8]

Although this calculation which Aristotle gives of the earth's circumference—and which appears to be the first recorded—has since been corrected to about half, the fact of the earth's relative smallness in comparison to other heavenly bodies, was quite clear to him and the Middle Ages some 2000 years before Sir James Jeans. Within 75 years of Aristotle's death, Eratosthenes made a calculation of a degree of latitude—which is the fundamental problem involved in gaining an approximate estimate of the earth's circumference—basing himself upon the distance between Alexandria and Syene, and he arrived at a circumference of 250,000 stades, which by Prof. Morison's figures, is only some 200 miles off the correct distance of 24,902 miles. Since that time, it has simply been a matter of measuring a degree with greater accuracy and allowing for the spheroidal rather than perfectly spheric shape of the earth, a possibility, incidentally, allowed for by Aristotle. (" Either then the earth is spherical or it is at least naturally spherical. And it is right to call anything that which nature intends it to be, and which belongs to it, rather than that which it is by constraint and contrary to nature.")

The smaller the earth, the shorter the distance between any two points. To convince his prospective backers that the distance west by sea from Spain to China and India was short, Columbus utilized to the utmost his knowledge of Aristotle's statements derived from the smallness of the earth. Very con-

[8] *Op. cit.*, 297b, 298a.

veniently also, Aristotle had specifically mentioned the distance between Spain (the Pillars of Hercules) and India as being joined by one ocean—a theory consecrated in Columbus' title of "Admiral of the Ocean Sea." Apparently, however, Columbus got his Aristotle second-hand, from sources such as Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly's *Imago Mundi*. There he pounced upon such statements as "Aristotle [says] between the end of Spain and the beginning of India is a small sea navigable in a few days." [9] But the original statement of Aristotle is a prudently qualified one, as St. Thomas Aquinas brings out in his 13th century commentary: "From this fact [the manifest alteration of the horizon for quite a small change of position], as Aristotle says, it is apparent that the quantity of the circumference of the earth is not great. For if it were of great quantity, there would not immediately appear in such a short distance a change in the appearance of the stars. And therefore those do not seem to be putting forth absolutely incredible statements who wish to unite, on the basis of likeness and nearness, the place situated farthest to the west, which is called the Pillars of Hercules (which Hercules set up in sign of his victory) and the place which is the Indian sea farthest to the east; and they say that there is one sea, which they call the Ocean, which is continuous with both places. And the likeness of both places they conjecture from the elephants, which are found in both places but not in the intervening regions. This is indeed a sign of the likeness of both places, but *not of their propinquity*." [10] However, in his anxiety to establish the shortness of the sea, Columbus would no doubt have preferred Pierre d'Ailly's version to the original.

Was Columbus also indebted to St. Thomas Aquinas? At least indirectly. For Aristotle owed the acceptance and the study of his doctrines—which included demonstrations of the sphericity of the earth and the smallness of its circumference—in great part to the courageous defense by St. Thomas when

[9] Samuel Eliot Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
[10] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

a Master of the University of Paris. At that time, Aristotle's physical and metaphysical works, but newly arrived from Spain, were the subject of much suspicion because of the Arabic glosses, particularly those of Averroes, which accompanied them. St. Thomas defended them, even at the price of his own temporary condemnation at the hands of the Archbishops of Paris and Canterbury, and it is thus no doubt due in great part to him, as well as to Aristotle, that the proofs of sphericity of the globe and the approximate size of the earth were well known to educated men in Columbus' day. Diego de Deza, of the Royal Commission, later Archbishop of Seville, of whom Prof. Morison writes, " Columbus found in him one of his warmest and most useful advocates in Spain," and whom Columbus picked to settle his claims with the Crown in his latter days, was, like St. Thomas, a Dominican, and was nurtured in his doctrines.

But there is an even more striking *rapprochement* between Columbus and St. Thomas. Necessarily involved in the calculation of the distance from Spain to Japan and China, was the calculation of the length of a degree. Which calculation did Columbus choose? " Eratosthenes around 200 B. C. made a guess at it [the degree] that was very nearly correct: 59.5 nautical miles instead of 60. Columbus, however, preferred the computation of Alfragan. That medieval Moslem geographer found the degree to be 56 2/3 Arabic miles." [11] It would seem to be more than a coincidence that in his 13th century commentary upon Aristotle's *On The Heavens*, the contemporary astronomer whose calculation of a degree St. Thomas cites, should likewise be Alfragan. Commenting upon Aristotle's tentative figure of the calculation of the earth's circumference, St. Thomas writes: " He [Aristotle] states that those mathematicians who have attempted to reason on the magnitude of the circumference of the earth, say that it reaches 400,000 stades. . . . According to this the circumference of the earth will be 50,000 miles. But according to a more diligent consider-

[11] Samuel Eliot Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

ation of modern astrologers, the circumference of the earth is much less, i. e., 20,400, as Alfragan says. . . . This the astrologers were able to measure, considering the distance on the earth caused by a difference of one degree in the heavens; and they found that it was 500 stades according to Simplicius; or 56 2/3 miles according to Alfragan. Whence, multiplying this number by 360, which is the number of degrees in the heavens, they found the circumference of the earth to be of the aforesaid quantity. From this we can argue that the quantity of the earth is not only spherical, but also that it is not great in comparison to the magnitude of the other stars: for the astrologers prove the sun to be 170 times greater than the earth; although, because of its distance, it looks small to us." [12] This is a far cry from the ignorant medieval faith which Mr. Jones eloquently depicts for his readers. Far from minimizing the size of the sun in comparison to the earth, the medieval astronomers, some 400 years before the development of the telescope, actually gave it a diameter—if that is what is here meant —considerably larger than is today accepted (170 times larger than that of earth, instead of 109).

To increase the feasibility of his project in the eyes of his backers, Columbus first shortened the sea route to the Indies by increasing the land mass of the globe as much as possible, then further cut down mileage by whittling down the length of a degree. The first was accomplished, as Prof. Morison indicates, by starting out with Ptolemy's calculation of 180 degrees of land—already twice too large—and arbitrarily lengthening it to 225 degrees. To this was added another 28 degrees for Marco Polo's discoveries, plus 30 degrees for the distance between China and Japan, and finally 9 degrees for the distance between Spain and the Canaries. This left only 68 degrees of open sea to cross. Japan " almost kissed the Azores." Columbus then, according to Prof Morison, whittled down Alfragan's calculation of the degree by assuming his 56 2/3 miles to be Roman rather than Arabic miles, thereby arriving

[12] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

at a calculation of 45 nautical miles instead of 66.2 nautical miles. But this is already contained in St. Thomas, who quotes Alfragan as giving the circumference of the earth as 20,400 miles—some twenty per cent short of the true figure.

Far from being ignorant bigots, the contemporaries of Columbus, as Prof. Morison points out, were more judicious than he in their calculations of the distance from Spain to Japan. Nobody could have sailed west to Asia in 1492. A spirit of faith and daring, rather than any " revolution " against the ideas of his time, led Columbus to embark on that " Ocean " lying, as Aristotle said, between the Pillars of Hercules and India, and to discover, with a timely good fortune worthy of his enterprise, a new continent, unknown both to his contemporaries and himself, precisely at the spot where he had calculated Asia to be. It was in a sense a hero's reward. The new continent appeared just in the nick of time to arrest the three little ships on a course which, if it had been possible, would assuredly have been fatal.

To " the greatest navigator of his age," the " ancient faith " was not a hindrance but an inspiration. Prof. Morison thus terminates his Prologue: " Yet, as the caravels sail on tropic seas to new and ever more wonderful islands, and to high mountain-crested coasts of terra firma. . . . I cannot forget the eternal faith that sent this man forth, to the benefit of all future ages. And so. . . . I venture to close my prologue by the prayer with which Columbus began his work: *Jesu cum Maria sit nobis in via.*" His *livres de chevet* were the work of two churchmen, the *Imago Mundi* of Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly and the *Historia Rerum* of Aeneas Sylvius, later Pope Pius II. A Dominican, Diego de Deza of the Royal Commission, became and remained his life-long supporter. A Franciscan, Fray Juan Perez, encouraged Columbus not to give up his project and obtained for him the audience with Isabella that was finally to prove definitive. Another Dominican, Bartolomé de Las Casas, wrote what Prof. Morison calls " the one book on the discovery of America that I should wish to preserve if all others were

destroyed." [13] The usual costume of Columbus when in Spain after his first two voyages was the coarse brown habit of a Minorite friar. Why? He " found his most loyal friends ashore among ecclesiastics, especially those in the monastic orders." [14] Where is the " utter transformation of religious faith " in all of this?

We have seen what Columbus owed to Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. What, then, did he owe to Copernicus? ". . . One day a man named Copernicus, on his dying bed, held in his trembling hand the book he had written which was in the end to prove that there was no solid substance to this slowly builded faith of the ages. At first the book made little impression, almost no popular impression. It was only a hypothesis in a book. The Church condemned it and Luther scoffed at it. But Galileo and Kepler slowly worked out scientific demonstrations which made the hypothesis indubitable. Columbus found another ' side ' to the world, and Magellan—or at least his men—sailed around the world and proved that it was a globe." Copernicus—Galileo—Kepler. The revolution is gaining ground. The triumphant finale: Columbus finds a new " side " to the world and Magellan and his men prove that it is a globe. Very dramatic. Unfortunately, when " Copernicus held in his trembling hand the book he had written," America had already been discovered *some 50 years before*. If " Copernican Revolution " there was, it had nothing to do with the discovery of America or the voyage of Magellan. It is no doubt only a coincidence that Mr. Jones' reversal of the chronological order should bear such favorable testimony to his thesis. But, as Aristotle says, we must honor truth before our friends (Eth. I, 1096a, 13.) So let us look at the facts.

When, on October 12, 1492, Columbus made his epoch-making landfall on what is now San Salvador, Nicholas Copernicus, a young man of nineteen, nephew and ward of Lucas Watzelrode, Bishop of Ermeland, was studying mathematics at

[13] Samuel Eliot Morison, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[14] *Op. cit.*, p. 505.

the University of Cracow (!). Further studies at Bologna convinced him of the strong and irrevocable position of the helio-centric theory, already proposed by Pythagoras, which was there freely discussed. Returning to become a canon of the Cathedral of Frauenburg, Copernicus obtained further leaves of absence to pursue his studies in Italy, becoming both a doctor of canon law and a doctor of medicine. While fulfilling his duties as canon of the cathedral, augmented when he became administrator of the diocese of Ermeland, and practising medicine gratis among the poor who came to him, Copernicus continued to work on his helio-centric treatise, which was virtually finished in manuscript form by 1530, some 25 years after the death of Columbus. Johan Albrecht Widmanstadt began to lecture in Rome upon a brief popular account written by Copernicus. Pope Clement VII approved, and Cardinal Schonberg transmitted to Copernicus a formal demand for full publication. Finally, in 1540, Copernicus' reluctance was overcome, and after a preliminary account published at Danzig, the complete exposition was sent to be published at Nuremberg.

The first printed copy of the *De Revolutione orbium coelestium* reached Frauenburg just in time to be laid on the author's death-bed (some 50 years after the discovery of America.) The dying Copernicus was thus spared the sorrow of knowing that his dedication of the work to Pope Paul III had been marred by the printer, Osiander, a Reformer, who out of deference to the opinions of Luther and Melancthon, interposed the word " Hypothesis " on the title-page as well as an unsigned preface of his own, in which he warned the reader not to expect anything certain of astronomy, nor to accept the hypothesis as true. In effect, whence came the opposition which Copernicus' " revolutionary " work, printed at the request of the Papacy and dedicated to a Pope, received on publication? From Luther and Melancthon, " revolutionary " spirits indeed. (Luther wrote pamphlet after pamphlet against the theory.) Who first thundered " the world is established and shall not be moved "? Not the historic Church but John Calvin. Who were Coper-

nicus' most determined opponents? The "revolutionary" Reformers.

Not until some 100 years after the discovery of America, does Galileo appear on the scene. Is he persecuted? In a letter to Kepler in 1597, Galileo explains that it is not the fear of prosecution, but the fear of ridicule, which deters him from pushing the Copernican theories (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*). Although Calvin might well have burned their author in Geneva, in the "historic Church" the Copernican theories remained unopposed in the 75 years following Copernicus' death. Whence came the change? Galileo had, alas, the unhappy faculty of producing antagonism where none had existed before. Because of his adamant insistence upon the absolute certitude of the Copernican doctrines, he was first warned in 1615, then forbidden in 1616 to hold the Copernican doctrine as absolute facts, since he had not in fact—as Huxley admits—demonstrated them. Although the Holy Office then qualified the doctrine of an immovable sun in the center of the universe and the diurnal rotation of the earth as "heretical," this was, as Von Gebler, Galileo's Protestant historian points out, not a declaration of the Church. ("The Church never condemned it at all. . . .") It still remained permissible to consider the Copernican doctrines as hypotheses, which was what they were.

The works of Copernicus were placed on the Index "until corrected," the correction consisting in holding the Copernican doctrines as hypotheses rather than absolute facts. The readiness to accept proof when forthcoming is apparent in a letter of Cardinal Bellarmine, the most influential member of the Sacred College, to Foscarini, Galileo's Carmelite defender: "I say that if a real proof be found that the sun is fixed and does not revolve around the earth, but the earth around the sun, then it will be necessary to proceed to the explanation of the passages in Scripture which appear to be contrary, and we should rather say that we have misunderstood these than pronounce that to be false which is demonstrated." [15] Certainly the "his-

[15] Cf. "Galileo," *Catholic Encyclopaedia* (New York, 1913), VI, 345.

toric Church " took a far more conciliatory attitude toward the Copernican doctrines, even after Galileo had drawn unfavorable attention to their seeming conflict with Scripture, than Luther and Melancthon of " new " faiths ever did. Galileo returned home not ill-pleased with the results of his trip to Rome, and continued his work in peace at Florence.[16]

In 1624, on a trip to Rome, he received a pension to further his studies from his old friend Urban VIII, who, as Cardinal Barberini, had opposed his condemnation. Far from being hounded by ecclesiastical censure, the enthusiastic reception which his works continued to receive, particularly from the Papal court, emboldened Galileo to publish in 1632, in violation of his pledge, his *Dialogo dei due massimi sistemi del mondo*, in which a follower of Corpernicus completely demolishes a follower of Ptolemy. In 1633, he was summoned to Rome, where he spent the grand total of 4 days in the buildings of the Inquisition, lodged in comfortable apartments.[17] Recanting, he was allowed to return again to Florence, after several months spent with his friend, Archbishop Piccolomini of Siena. It was then, during the next 8 years, that Galileo was to pursue the researches which were to be his greatest claim to fame: his treatises on mechanics. As to his part in the " Copernican Revolution," beyond the development of the telescope, which he did not invent, " to the theoretical perfection of the science, [Galileo] contributed little or nothing. . . . The most substantial part of his work consisted undoubtedly in his contributions toward the establishment of mechanics as a science." [18] Before he died he received the apostolic blessing of Pope Urban VIII and was honored by burial in the church of Santa Croce in Florence.

Copernicus' works continued to be permitted to be read by the learned and it vanished completely from the Index in 1758. In the meantime the 16th century attitude of the " historic

[16] Cf. " Galileo," *Encyclopaedia Britannica, ed. cit.*, IX, 979.
[17] Cf. *Encyclopaedia Britannica, loc. cit.*
[18] Cf. *Encyclopaedia Britannica, loc. cit.*

Church " that Galileo's apodictic holding of the Copernican system, with its stationary sun, should remain as an hypothesis until proved, now corresponds to the most advanced scientific thinking of the present day.[19] The Copernican theory has gone from an hypothesis to a fact and back to an hypothesis again. The old " historic Church " with its policy of trying all things and holding fast to what is true, has a habit of being ever new. But what was the revolution of the Renaissance in its real sense? It was not, as has been seen, any " Copernican Revolution," since to the " historic Church " it does not really matter whether the sun moves around the earth or the earth around the sun, any more than it does to Bertrand Russell—as long as the ultimate motion come from God Who " moves the sun and the other stars." The revolution of the Renaissance was the transition from a God-centered to a man-centered universe.

Today, to borrow the words of St. Thomas Aquinas, men " have not sought out reasons and causes in order to apply them to what appears to the senses, but conversely have striven to reduce that which appears to the senses by a certain violence to reasons and opinions which they have preconceived." [20] In this endeavor to recreate the universe to his own image and likeness, man has never found the facts to fit his theories, which therefore go on varying from year to year, and with them modern religion. Why? " This [fitting of facts to preconceptions] is appropriate in those things which are made by men, whose principle is the human mind: but in those things which

[19] " Even on the most modern views, the question of absolute rotation (of the earth) presents difficulties. If all motion is relative, the difference between the hypothesis that the earth rotates and the hypothesis that the heavens revolve is purely verbal. . . . But if the heavens revolve, the stars move faster than light, which is considered impossible. It cannot be said that the modern answers to this difficulty are completely satisfying, but they are sufficiently satisfying to cause almost all physicists to accept the view that motion and space are purely relative. This, combined with the amalgamation of space and time into space-time, has considerably altered our view of the universe from that which resulted from the work of Galileo and Newton." (Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York, 1945), p. 540.)

[20] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

are made by divine art, it is necessary on the contrary to consider from the works that are seen the reasons for those works: just as an artisan from his own preconceived reasons puts together the house which he makes, but if anyone else sees the house after it is made, he should consider from the work that he sees the reasons for the work." [21] The house is already made; no theories of ours are going to change it.

It is time indeed for a revolution, time to return from preconceived notions, from a faith which consists in the "imaginative material by which . . . minds can live serenely and joyously in the realm of creative faith," from a science where "physical concepts are free creations of the human mind . . . [and one] cannot even imagine the possiblity or the meaning" of a comparison of them with reality, to a faith and a science in which the Creator is not man, but God. It is not medieval faith and science, but rather the modern conception of them which is the product of "centuries of imaginative thinking."

To speak of a "heaven as real and localized as Nineveh or Tyre . . . woven into the seamless fiber of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," is pure fabrication, as anyone who cares to consult Thomas Aquinas will immediately perceive. Speaking of the location of heaven, St. Thomas writes: "Incorporeal beings [souls] are not localized in any way known or customary to us, as when we say corporeal beings are properly in place; but they are rather localized after the manner which befits spiritual substances, which cannot be fully clear to us." [22] While it is a matter of Catholic Faith that souls go to heaven, the nature and locality of that heaven, other than that it essentially consists in the spiritual vision of God, and that it is not absolutely unrelated with the corporeal world, "cannot be fully clear to us." The only reason Mr. Jones can write, "Though the imaginative cooperation of many minds, it came to be a settled faith that there were nine concentric domes, turned respectively by the nine orders of angelic beings," is

[21] *Loc. cit.*

[22] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Suppl., q. 69, a. 1, ad 1.

because, for Mr. Jones, such popular opinions, such conjectures, are faith: that wherein "imagination can feel itself at home." But such popular imaginings were not faith for the Middle Ages, and as theories they were rejected by the greatest medival thinkers, such as St. Thomas. From the point of view of faith, it did not matter, as far as the interpretation of Scripture was concerned, whether the word "heaven" as used in Genesis, was taken in its physical sense at all.

Thus for St. Augustine, the scriptural statement that God made heaven and earth, meant that God made both the incorporeal and the corporeal creation, the angels and the material world.[23] For St. Thomas, as for St. Augustine, it made no difference, either to the Faith or to theory, whether there was, in the astronomical sense, one heaven, or three, or eight or nine. It was a diversity "more of words than of things."[24] For both of these two greatest Doctors of orthodox Christianity, whether the sun moved around the earth or the earth around the sun, had nothing whatever to do with their faith. "For the faith of which we speak, does not assent to anything, unless because it is revealed by God." "Thus, therefore, those who rightly have Christian faith, by their will assent to Christ in those things which truly pertain to his doctrine."[25]

It is only because the "faith" of which he speaks has not been faith at all, but human opinion, that Mr. Jones can write: "Each time that scientific thought has undergone revolution, there has been a widespread collapse of religious faith." The very criterion of divine faith is that it must be ever true, ever stable, "for the same God Who reveals mysteries and infuses faith, endowed the human mind with the light of reason, and God cannot deny Himself, nor ever contradict truth by truth."[26] Such a divine faith will always be in harmony with demonstrated facts. A "faith" that must be readjusted to

[23] St. Augustine, *The City of God*. Bk. IX, ch. 33.
[24] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, I, q. 68, a. 4, c.
[25] St. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 1; q. 11, a. 1.
[26] *Vatican Council, Sess. 3, cap. 4.*

new facts is certainly not divine, and therefore it is worthless. In Mr. Jones' context, to say that faith must be readjusted to facts, appears to mean no more than that one must constantly harmonize one's subjective imaginings about God with someone else's subjective theories about the universe. But these are neither faith nor science in the strict sense. A faith which is divine is perennially corroborated by any science which is demonstrated.

Although the possibilities of divergence between a " faith " which is imagination and a " science " which is the free creation of the human intellect are literally infinite, there is not now, as there was not then, any warfare between a science that is real and a religion that is true. The ancient faith, in its true and medieval sense of an adherence to Christ in those things which truly pertain to his doctrine, need not be abandoned. Quite the contrary. Now, more than ever, is the time to try it.

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EXISTENTIALISM AND EXISTENCE

[Second Installment]

Some Critical Remarks

The natural impulse of a Thomist, challenged by the innumerable analyses which the existentialists plead, is to oppose their conclusions point for point by force of that appeal to experience on which a realistic philosophy should rest. Such a course seems normal and natural; there was a time in the history of thought when it was effective. But existentialism, despite its protests against abstract dialectics, is a closed system, like psychoanalysis and scientism in general. Any overture of traditional principles, of examples from experience, and of the power of man's intellectual nature is greeted with the reproach that it is the fruit of a false philosophy which has not explored its own roots. Thomism, Jaspers [285] like Nicolai Hartmann [286] finds is mere systemism. The principle of sufficient reason, Heidegger argues, is premised on a view of being that cannot define reason and sufficiency. Metaphysics is considered an experience and thus powerless to account for experience. Far from beginning with experience, what the existentialists wish to do is to deduce it: *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit.*[287]

Existentialism builds its own system from the primitive experience of the naught. It describes the world as though it were nothing but the nothing that is man, projecting his structures of time and space from his own self in very much the manner of the Kantian *a priori* categories. Thus de Waelhens writes that Heidegger's essential doctrine is: "the structure of human existence determines and contains all the questions and all the answers which man validly can pose or answer. Beyond this it is impossible to go." [288] The same extreme

[285] *DP*, pp. 44-45.
[286] *Der philosophische Gedanke und seine Geschichte*, Berlin, 1936.
[287] *WM*, p. 26.
[288] *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

Kantianism appears in Jaspers' notion that to think is to struggle and in Sartre's account of man as fighting to define his essence. From these converging views, each of the existentialists has constructed a system as arbitrary as the system which he belittles. Such a system a realist cannot enter. He is blocked at the threshold. First principles, first facts, and first conditions are in question in the existentialist system and only when they are successfully defended does the door swing open or, rather, rot away. The realists today are in very much the position of Aristotle in the face of the ancient sophists. Hence their arguments must remain at the threshold of philosophy by showing that the existentialists deny the very experience on which they operate. Discussion of the finer points, philosophical and theological—for the existentialists raise theological issues—must await the solution of the more general problems. Cast in such a general form, some counter-arguments of existentialism are here suggested with a minimum expression, when occasion warrants, of the positive solutions to their problems and with a concluding section on the meaning of existentialism for the typical philosophical pattern in contemporary America.

What there is of positive value in existentialism is difficult to say. If there is anything in it that has not been said before, it is probably in the form of material for aesthetics and empirical psychology [289] rather than for a realistic philosophy. But no one could come, unmoved, through its critique of systemism, Hegelian (and this could include Marxism) and scientistic. This searching attack is especially apparent in Kierkegaard and Jaspers.

Kierkegaard did not, of course, foresee the great interest in history that, greatly abetted by Hegel, was to sweep western scholarship in the form of positivism, evolutionary biology, paleontology, ethnology, and other such inductive descriptions.

[289] For a comprehensive study of anguish, cf., Boutonier, J., *L'Angoisse*, Paris, 1945. It could be concluded that anguish is psychopathic more than normal, associated with that feeling of inadequacy which, broadly, is the definition of psychoneuroses.

He could not naturally have forecast the French sociologism of Durkheim and Levy-Bruehl, who preached and practiced the method that research into history and pre-history, from primitive societies on downward, is the only way of studying man, the social being. Nor did he personally anticipate the development of Freudian psychoanalysis which treats man, in sickness and in health—and according to Freud he is always sick—as though his present problems and perplexities could be unravelled by tracing them *genetically* to childhood, to prenatal life, to the biology of his parents, all the way back through the course of evolution to the lower forms from which man supposedly came. Kierkegaard did not foresee the high summer of the scientific method which in each generation believes itself to approximate closer and closer to the ultimate in matter but frankly admits that there can be no end to its atomizing.[290] As in purely historical research which, no matter how far back it reach, must always admit of a moment beyond that where it chooses to begin its descriptions, so in scientific method, the fundamental particles can always be divided, never reaching that state of simplicity which by the simplicity of itself could never be apprehended by quantitative techniques.

Kierkegaard did not anticipate all this. But though writing against approximation in a particular philosophy at a particular time, his critique really answered, before they were born, the discursive methods so prevalent since the last half of the nineteenth century. If all laws are statistical laws, then certainly the individual is truly meaningless. Moreover, by the very structure of science itself where a theory is prospective, aiming to predict, where in the thesis of C. I. Lewis [291] knowledge always bears on the future, the meaning of the present, the locus of thought and action, escapes science. Proposed since Bacon's classic phrases as a knowledge of the *here and now*, science really bears upon some other world. Knowledge cannot be *prospective* like scientific theory nor *retrospective*

[290] d'Abro, A., *The Evolution of Scientific Thought from Newton to Einstein*, New York, 1927, p. 420.

[291] *Op. cit.*

like the attitude toward scientific fact (for in the transitive notion of knowledge the fact must always occur ahead of the observation which registers it). Knowledge of the here and now is attained by inspection, which is but to translate the idea of abstraction. Only thus can knowledge be united with and distinct from the thing known. Existentialists, it will be seen, do not solve the problems which they raise. Indeed, it is difficult to see, to elaborate on Blondel's statement,[292] how any problems at all could even be raised on existentialist premises.

Perhaps the most striking defect of existentialism at first glance is its inability to appraise the premises on which it rests. Goedel showed, in accordance with Russell's thought, that scientific method must always remain heterological,[293] unable to give critical reinforcement to its own foundations and fated for this reason to rest on at least a small number of undefined terms. The result has become a kind of game among modern logicians like Carnap, Morris, Hilbert, and Russell himself to see how this number of undefined terms can be reduced to the fewest. The same begging of the question can be charged againts existentialism. It cannot describe the describer, the phenomenologist. Contrary to some impressions, one only repeats himself, he does not escape the vicious circle, by discussing language in terms of a metalanguage.[294] So in existentialism if truth must truly be lived to be known, if knowledge in speculative thought is merely academic (Kierkegaard), inauthentic (Heidegger), checkmated (Jaspers), and gratuitous (Sartre), then existentialism could never be elaborated into a philosophical corpus. Philosophy could never even attain to the status of a tautology if what is described is radically ineffable and thus not susceptible of any form of duality, necessary to judgment.

The existentialist is in the same corner as the modern scientist. Just as the observer is exempted from the laws which

[292] Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

[293] There can never be anything more than "approximations to . . . self-reflexivity." *Monatshefte fur Mathematik und Physik*, XXXVIII (1931), p. 167.

[294] K. Popper holds that the vicious circle is so escaped in "New Foundations for Logic," *Mind*, LVI (1947), pp. 233-234.

his science discloses and cannot, because he denies a reflective method, apply to his own self, so the existentialist is standing by as a spectator rather than an actor in the life he pretends to describe from within. Existentialism is but the analytic spirit which Descartes released into modern philosophy and which has flowed to its headwaters. That analytic spirit cannot apply to the analyst. If it did, the scientist would find himself analyzed away. His words would become meaningless and his mind a blank.

No one who tracks down the existentialist dialectic can fail to note the practical resort to concepts and principles that its theories must reject as untenable. Wahl has shown how much Kierkegaard took from the Hegel whom he opposed so vigorously.[295] In his analysis of bad faith, Sartre considers on a purely theoretical level what he has postulated as existence without essence and hence without any form of intelligibility.[296] On the existentialist premises, nothing in being could ever be known since the existentialist, when he writes philosophy, must separate himself from the object and thus, if existentialism is true, automatically invalidate what he says.

The principle of non-contradiction is constantly invoked. Without it, Aristotle said, man would be a plant, unable even to communicate. How could being be distinguished from nothing in the initial experience, unless the principle of non-contradiction were applied. The principles of causality and of sufficient reason have impelled the existentialists to seek the meaning of being and all of its modalities—the world, others, tools, liberty—to which they give an original and distinctive interpretation. Man, morality, time, love—all involve knowledge from sources other than those which the existentialist can legitimately tap. How differentiate time from *Mitsein*, liberty from a toothache, Mathieu from a typewriter, in such a way as to work back to their foundations?

As in scientism, the flank of existentialism is exposed to the explosive contradiction of viewing the familiar world as an illu-

[295] *Op. cit.*
[296] Lavelle, L., *De l'Etre*, p. 32.

sion, as Kant and Bergson argued, and then basing its entire polemic on terms and principles that trace their origins to ordinary lay experiences. Words and thoughts existentialists coin and maneuver with remarkable surety and deftness. Yet ultimately they are substitutes for experience as enjoyed by by the ordinary man. They are signs. The vocabulary and concepts of existentialism are thus taken from the common sense world which it theoretically must regard as meaningless and inauthentic.

Yet if the signs of a thing are not reliable, then the signatum itself escapes us. Existentialism ends by annihilating itself. What has been said of Heidegger can be said of all the existentialists, that they remain in experienced experience.[297] Thus, existentialism, when considered not in what it tries to represent but as that reality which knowledge enjoys entitatively—Thomistic psychology calls it a habitus of the mind—is impossible, therefore false. There can *be* no existentialist philosophy, so that one could stop at this point without discussing its truth. Moreover, that existentialists think out theories and write their thoughts for others indicates that they, like the scientist, rely on the validity of universal ideas which they so heatedly contest in an academic way.

De Waelhens has pointed out, against the method of Heidegger in particular, that pure description is impossible in knowledge relating to existence.[298] Perhaps one could move farther, challenging the validity of description in any form of knowledge as knowledge.[299] Knowledge can only be cast in terms of causes and reasons. Logic may well employ descriptions for its categories. It is not a science of the real but of the *ens rationis*. Description, like example, leads to knowledge by occasioning an abstraction. But real being can only be known in terms of causal analysis. The principle of causality prompts the existentialists, as it does everyone else, to seek

[297] Hofman, P., *Metaphysik oder verstehende Sinn-Wissenschaft?* Berlin, 1929, p. 57.

[298] *Op. cit.*, p. 319.

[299] Literature is of course exempted here since its aim is not knowledge, pure and simple.

grounds and relations. It leads them to what they propose as answers to the nature of being or human existence. Ask anyone who says that the sky is blue, an apparently pure description, why he makes such a statement. He will reply with a causal clause. He will say, " Because I see it with my eyes," " Because I measure it with my spectroscope," " Because it is the same color as my shirt." No judgment is immune from causal implication. If it were, it would not be knowledge. No meaningful statement is ever pure description. In the *Ode to the Nightingale* Keats speaks of charming " magic casements opening on the foam of faerylands forlorn." By this pure description he may appeal to the emotions, but he is not imparting meaningful knowledge. Description as such is not hierarchical. It is consistent but not causal, imaginative more than intellectual. In philosophy, it is a logical device.

In a similar light, de Waelhens proposes that phenomenology can always be made to support the idea with which the describer begins.[300] Hegel, who so heavily strained the method of phenomenology, is certainly consistent once his original identification of the logical and the ontal is admitted. Indeed, the world could be described in terms of will, emotions, images, organisms, evolution, de-volution, and any number of other viewpoints if description alone is emphasized. Philosophy then becomes a game where you choose an aspect of the real and see how far you can get with it. Gabriel Marcel with delicate sensibility to the problems of contemporary man, has developed an admirable " Christian " existentialism that stands in direct contrast to Sartre. But the acceptance of his phenomenological analyses, searching and inspiring though they be, confirms the faith and the facts which Marcel has already admitted as a Catholic and demands a more rigorous grounding than phenomenology can provide.[301] Since the individual as such is

[300] *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

[301] Marcel admits his postulational basis as a philosopher. " Ce moi préexistant, nous ne pouvons que le postuler, et si nous tentons de le caractèriser, ce sera toujours négativement, par voie d'exclusion." *Homo Viator*, p. 17. Cf. G. de Ruggiero, *Existentialism: Disintegration of Man's Soul*," New York, 1948, p. 77.

determined by matter, it is explainable how, in a description, it submits to an infinity of different interpretations, sharing as it does in matter's infinite community—a community that stretches not only through the possible members of the species individuated but to all possible material things. Phenomenology can be a prolegomenon to philosophy, mustering data and illustrating concepts. But it is not a study of causes. It is rather the occasion for the study, through the abstractions which it suggests.

Weighty and irreducible as the individual may be, it is not the fact where man's thinking career begins. To start thinking with the individual has been the trapdoor through which post-Cartesian philosophies have in their time always gone to death. Kant began his philosophy with an analytic. Hegel started formally with the individual. Pragmatism works from individual experiences and the sciences look to their fact-finding for induction. Indeed, this tendency antedates Descartes who, when he began philosophy with his own thought, was paralleling, if not continuing, the direction of Ockhamists and Scotists. Existentialism, the latest version of this general spirit, is the Cartesian *cogito* grown to its fullness or, better say, emptiness. It is more Cartesian than Descartes.

Existentialism is a philosophy of radical induction. It begins with an individual situation, working outward toward the general in thought and being. Thus the individual *ab initio* is alone with himself, uncared for, thrust against individual, irrelational situations, struggling through and for his freedom, fighting to define himself against a defeating darkness. Theologically, Keane begins with the individual, attempting to fan outward toward religion as a kind of psychological necessity.[302] To know God one must begin by being guilty. Alvarez has shown that the existentialist aim is in general to begin with man, moving to religion, and finding God at the end of the relation rather than posing and solving first the problem of God's existence.[303]

[302] Cf. C. Keane's *Meaning of Existence*, New York, 1947 (*passim*).

[303] Alvarez A., *El Tema de Dios en la Filosofia Existencial*, Madrid, 1945.

Przywara would call this the religion of " transcendence "; [304] he opposes it by showing the Catholic theology, not of finitude in endless striving, but of " God hitherward," the Incarnation.

Against the existentialist, it must be said that radical induction would make knowledge impossible. In such a view, knowledge would never begin. It must first find and identify the individual. Is this or that thing really an individual? Since the idea of a whole is not yet had, the " individual " in our first forage would be suspected of not being an individual but breakable into the real units with which induction must begin. The analysis into component parts proves successful. Yet in asking whether the parts are individuals, we are buffeted by the same problem as before. What, it may be asked, is the natural unit in matter? Proceeding on purely scientific premises without recognition of hylomorphism in atoms, the scientist discovers smaller units and calls them fundamental particles. Then refusing to call these subatomic units irreducible, he seeks to divide them. Without recourse to ideas outside pure scientific method, this movement results in an eternal chase after premises. No secure knowledge would be had until these forever fleeing premises could be coralled into an ultimate and irreducible thing that, since there is nothing more fundamental, is its own evidence. The movement toward fact in science is retrogressive rather than progressive in principle. Pressed onward, it would prevent knowledge from beginning. If radical induction is impossible and knowledge is a fact, then it is evident that the moment when knowledge begins the general and not the individual must be known. On the premises of scientism and existentialism, where the validity of the idea of being is denied, knowledge could not occur. Even scientific discovery does not disclose *absolute novelty*. That the scientist knows where he is, finding his way back to relate his new facts to previous knowledge, is a sign that he has been in the unknown territory beforehand, knowing it somehow in a vague and virtual way by the light of being that makes everything man's home.

[304] *Polarity*, London, 1935. Cf., for example, p. 27.

Aquinas, following Avicenna, held that being is the first idea which occurs to the intellect. The truth of this statement appears in the impossibility of knowledge on any other premise. Science would vanish if knowledge did not move from the more universal to the less. Otherwise it would forever be a blind jump from the unknown to known. Novelty would stand windowless and ever irrelational. Classification, a phase of every scientific enterprise, perhaps the chief and sole intention of empirical science, requires knowledge of the general class in terms of which the particulars are distributed. Setting up a general class from a limited number of observations on particulars violates the principle of causality, indeed the principle of identity. For knowledge not only to be true but also to be even possible, since the individual is meaningful only when related to its class, the general must be known first, not in temporal priority to knowledge of the existing particular but before this datum is known, consciously and reflexly by the intellect. The individual, as such, cannot be classified. It cannot be differentiated but only integrated. It is a member of a class rather than a class. Even in statistics which seems to deal with a sum of individuals, the statistician must apprehend the general first; he must see that they are all members of the same class before he can sum them up. That the existentialists classify—they speak of hope and despair, the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*, proper existence and improper modalities, various types of *Grenzsituationen*—indicates that in practice they too recognize the validity of the general fact and ultimately of the *ens primum cognitum*.

No one remembers his first idea. The fact that it involved the idea of being is not a matter of memory but rather of taking our certain knowledge, which criteriology defends, and asking how such knowledge is possible. The possibility of knowledge cannot be studied, as Kant projected and as the existentialists attempt, before knowledge is a fact. Potentiality cannot be known except in terms of actuality. Potentiality was picturesquely called by Santayana " a retrospective name for material fertility." [305] Knowledge must be discussed first as

[305] *The Realm of Matter*, London, 1930, p. 100.

the evident fact which it is and secondly in terms of its possibility. It is an absurdity to use knowledge to destroy knowledge; it would, by being used, survive its own suicide. Indeed, if there is any certain knowledge, God's existence can be argued from the fact that there must somehow be eternal knowledge. The existentialists, on the contrary, would make this *primum cognitum* a matter of memory. On this so-called category, the Kierkegaardian dialectic of repetition seems to depend.[306] The intensely personal and, in general, psychological cast to all the existentialists studied above would reduce knowledge to experience, denying that we can know except by continuity with the past—which memory provides. Their entire dialectic views man entirely in terms of history and of time, the field of memory, and never in terms of the trans-historical and supra-temporal which is the domain of intelligence. If memory is at work here, could man remember the nothing of his first experience? As a matter of fact, existentialism would argue toward an even closer physical compression of the past with the present than memory itself can afford. In the *Gleichursprunglichkeit*, the past, present, and future are united. The *Dasein* is simply *da*.

Whether this being which existentialism describes in terms of subjectivity, the *Dasein*, the *pour-soi*, is individual is another question. It is humanly impossible to know that a thing is without knowing what it is in some minimum fashion. Above all, this could never be reported to others. To know, however, *that it is* in the case of being is to grasp the grounds for a whole metaphysical development. John of St. Thomas, speaking of the *ens primum cognitum*, says that it is *almost* like knowing not what something is but whether it is;[307] *almost*, he puts it, for there is always some minimum of content if only in vague terms like *that which* is.

A parenthesis may be pardoned here to indicate that the statement *being is* does not form the meaningless tautology

[306] " . . . repetition, properly so-called, is recollected forwards." *Repetition*, p. 4. Kierkegaard has a two-fold division of memory somewhat like Bergson's.

[307] *Curs. Philos*, Turin, 1933, pp. 20 ff.

which existentialism and scientism paints it to be. What, let us ask with Heidegger, is the meaning of being? The answer brings us to the feet of God.

A piece of iron may be said to have meaning as far as it is, says, cast into the form of a hammer. The meaning of the hammer derives from the outside, from the use to which it is put by man. A dog may be said to have meaning for hunting, say, or for amusement, comfort, and companionship if he is a household pet. A dress has meaning as far as it can be worn and food in so far as it is edible. Trees give shade to man. Flowers and music beautify his life. In human society, the worker is often regarded by the capitalist as existing entirely for employment, and the worker in turn oftentimes accords little reality to the capitalist except as being his boss. But apart from their relationships to something outside themselves, do things have any meaning and reality?

Reflection shows that things do not acquire their meaning and reality from the outside. Being is efficacious of itself. It is not a blank check on which man writes his meaning and value but legal tender with fixed standards that he is bound to honor. Reality determines man more than man fashions his environment of being. If we grant, for a moment, that the hammer as such, derives its meaning from the outside (for it is a work of art not of nature), what can be said of the iron which composes the hammer? It has certain chemophysical properties. It has a fixed color, melting point, specific gravity, and the like. It could be said, in this connection, that the meaning of the iron for the scientist is derived from the outside. Language bears witness to this fact. We say: "Iron *has* certain properties." The physicist may now train particle-guns on the iron to break it down into smaller units of matter, explaining all the chemical appearance of the iron entirely in terms of these subatomic particles and processes. But now somewhere this division must come to an end. Otherwise, the iron, infinitely divided in itself, could not be anywhere and would be nothing. There must come a time and place where we stop saying that a thing *has* attributes and appearances by

virtue of something outside itself. There comes a time and place where instead of saying that a being *has* something, we simply say it *is* something.

To say that *being is* is to affirm a simple relationship that quantitative techniques cannot touch but that is available only to a spiritual, simple soul. Being is efficacious of itself. By this is meant that a thing does not derive all of its meaning and reality from the outside. It has something intrinsically. It *is* intrinsically and is hence not a mere phenomenon, determined, like prime matter, completely from the outside. Far from passivity, being is actual. Far from being wholly patterned from without it has a nature that resists change by reacting. To say that *being is* is *almost* tautological, but if for no other reason the fact that meaningful knowledge flows from such a judgment, as will be seen below, evinces the fecundity of this principle. Existence is so much associated with being that the two are united inseparably. *Ens est id quod est. Ens est id cujus actus est esse.* Just as, to avoid the nihilism of an infinite regression, we say that there is something somewhere in the hammer which does not derive its reality from the outside, so we say that there is a point where being and meaning are synonymous, where meaning, like being, must come from within. The meaning of being is that *it is.* What we mean by efficacity is that existence is not superadded to it like an attribute, the color to the iron. No matter what we may say about the hammer, the iron, and the electrons, we cannot doubt the fact that it is intrinsic in being *to be.* We do not make it what it is. It is in itself. Being therefore has meaning apart from man and man's devices. Its business, its nature, its meaning, its reality is to be. Heidegger missed his mark when he sought the meaning of being, *der Sinn von Sein. Sinn* and *Sein* really turn out to be the same thing. *Being is*—a principle so simple that the mind cannot err in the necessity of accepting it, so rich that it can integrate all knowledge.

The proof of God's existence depends on the judgment that *being is.* Heidegger makes capital, in his pillaging of the past, of what Leibniz called the principle of sufficient reason. This

principle may be stated thus: whatever it has a sufficient reason for itself. As a corollary, it follows that if a thing does not have within itself the sufficient reason for itself, then it must have that sufficient reason outside itself (principle of causality). This corollary is but an application of the principle of contradiction. The problem is to establish the principle: whatever is must have a sufficient reason for itself. Once this principle is accepted, God's existence can be proved at once. Let us return to the familiar dictum: *being is*. This is a statement of what is beyond and below the principle of inertia. It discovers and states a truth that is immediate—paraphrasing Kierkegaard it may be called the immediacy of a thing to itself—whereas mediacy characterizes the possessions by a thing which occur to it in obedience to inertia. *Being is*—this means that a reality, a thing of the nature of the simple, is not completely (inertially) determined from without. It is an immediacy, an intimacy, an inwardness, a thing in its own right and its own whatness. What is immediate is made by an immediate action, and made a thing must be if it is not pure immediacy but has an admixture of the mediate. If being must be made *immediately*, it is made without the *mediation* of a subject, *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*. Immediacies, in other words, no matter how strongly intermingled as finite beings are, with mediacy, ultimately require the existence of the pure immediacy which is God.

But what do we mean now by sufficient reason? Why must being have a sufficient reason? Is this, after all, simply a vote of confidence, as Heidegger seemed to think, that the universe is ultimately intelligible, explainable, reasonable? It is not thus at all. To say that things have a sufficient reason is like making the statement, being is. Reason is not used here in the sense of order and intelligibility. This would prejudice the question. The principle simply means that there are facts or combinations of facts which account for being's being on this side of nothingness. This reason may be internal or external or it may be, as it actually is, in the ultimate sense, a union of the two. What if being did not have a sufficient reason for standing out

from nothingness? If it had no such principle, then everything is indifferent in the universe. In such a case, being is the same as nothing. But obviously there must be a sufficient reason why being rebels at nothingness, why there is in what exists, an inward, as opposed to inertial, character. An indifferent universe confounds the two, being and nothing. Only the principle of sufficient reason can preserve their difference. Hence it is that the principle is like saying: being is.

Is there perhaps a reason *for* being, something more fundamental from which being itself is derived? If we examine finite being, this is so. Finite being does not explain itself. It has a reason outside of itself. But we cannot go on and on in this process *ad infinitum*. Somewhere we must come to a point where a being *is* its own sufficient reason and does not have to look outside of itself to be accounted for. For outside of being there is nothing, and if there was a time when nothing was, then nothing could ever be. This being with its own sufficient reason is God.

It is an artefact, veneered by a word, to hold that the substance of man is his existence, or that existence precedes essence. What is the *das*, *l'être*, which both Heidegger and Sartre acknowledge *to be*. Perhaps the existentialists have come to the idea of being which is close to that of traditional metaphysics (or at least identify the *ens primum cognitum*) and then have mistaken the gold that they had mined for false appearances. Perhaps as in Hegel, the vagueness of transcendental being becomes for the existentialists a synonym with nothing, confusing the denotation and connotation of concepts. Vagueness in such a view ends in vanishing, and the commonest predicate of reality becomes nothingness. But what is vague is still not nothing any more than by dividing matter man will eventually annihilate it. John Dewey's thought seems also to have a slight but forgotten consciousness of the *ens primum cognitum* in his notion of a problem:

> There is a troubled, perplexed, trying situation, where the difficulty is, as it were, spread throughout the entire situation, infect-

ing it as a whole. If we knew just what the difficulty was and where it lay, the job of reflection would be much easier than it is.[308]

What is a problem is pre-reflective, vague, and indeterminate. But obviously it is not nothing. Otherwise it could not be recognized. A vagueness in the beginning of thought testifies to the primacy of the idea of being.

Though pretending to oppose abstractions, the existentialists adopt the conceptualization of being as the norm for determining its meaning. The ultimate for them is meaningless because there is nothing more ultimate in terms of which it can be deduced or described, no genus within which the species are related. Pure analysis must always be a genus-species type of knowledge where, without knowledge of a prior, relating whole, one point of reality becomes meaningful only with respect to the point preceding and not in an ultimate, viewpoint-less fashion.[309] Because they cannot deduce being, they tab it as a meaningless tautology. In search of genus-species relations, the existentialists seek knowledge in terms of clarity and distinction in *ideas*, whereas the full meaning of being is not grasped until man's knowing is completed in judgment.[310] It has recently been evidenced that St. Thomas held to the completion of knowledge of being through the *negative* judgment (*separatio*). Geiger writes: " By this act, as far as it is proper to metaphysics, we not only consider different aspects [of being] but affirm in being the relative independence of certain principles of being."[311] Being is *that which is*, and we are not aware of its *is-ness* until we judge. We know its " that which " by apprehension. Gilson has stated that a genuine philosophy

[308] *How We Think*, New York, 1933, p. 108. That the existentialists have this positive contact with being but refuse to recognize it is suggested by Marcel, G., *Homo Viator*, p. 200.

[309] No matter from what aspect we look at being, we can always say of it that it is. That is why metaphysics is above viewpoints and is a science of the ultimate absolutely.

[310] *de Ver.* 1, 1, *sed. cont.* 3; cf., " Existentialism and the Judgment," by R. Henle, in *Proc. Amer. Cath. Philos. Assoc.*, 1946, pp. 40-53.

[311] *La Participation dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1942, p. 318. The passage from St. Thomas is his long discussion in *In de Trin. Boet.*, 5, 3, c.

" is dominated by that which cannot be conceptualized." [312] If then our knowledge of being, which is not of the genus-species type and is not deduced from previous grounds, requires the act of the mind composing and dividing, it is difficult to see how there can be an intuition of being.

Aquinas held that the naught was the second of man's intellectual experiences after being had been known in the first.[313] The existentialists reverse this procedure, according a primacy to the experience of the naught, so much so that perfection consists not in filling the mind with truth but in keeping it open and vacuous.[314] But if they truly experienced the naught and not merely the vague being of common sense, how could they report on it? Certainly they could not present it in familiar language, the language of being, unless they admit that being is known and understood first, forming the positive reality with nothingness as a negation of it. Knowledge is always of something, and between something and nothing there is no continuity. In holding to the primacy of the naught in knowledge, the existentialists pursue the analytic method to its completion. Scientism has conveniently stopped along the way.

The Thomistic position accords with reality as it is. If knowledge began in nothing it could never get started. If we knew only being, our first idea would never end. The fact that knowledge reflects both beginning and progress shows that the limits must be apprehended after the thing to which the limits apply. The existentialists maintain that nothing is experienced and that it is being which flees us. But obviously it is not a radical flight. If we knew that being were fleeing us, we would already have overtaken it. Lavelle has argued that it is the nothingness not being which escapes us. Unity, for example, is posed at the beginning of counting and it is the multiple, the chaotic, the disordered (hence the relative non-entity) which

[312] " Existence and Philosophy," in *Proc. Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc.*, 1946, p. 7. However, to speak of existence as " something beyond essence and beyond the intelligible " (p. 10) is susceptible of interpretation that there is a Bergsonian irrationale at the basis of reality.

[313] *de Pot.*, 7, 7 ad 15.

[314] Vietta, E., *Theologie ohne Gott*, Zürich, 1946, p. 60.

flees us when we try to count in the direction of the end of the series.[315] In explaining the primacy of being over the naught where knowledge is concerned, Allers has well stated that nothing-ness is experienced as a non-fulfillment,[316] an incompletion. These analyses substantiate Geiger's thesis. The multiple as such is unintelligible, and if existentialism be true, we could never know anything. Anguish, desolation, care—all of these make sense only in terms of a pre-existing possession, the primacy of the positive.

In a more specific sense, existentialism holds that we do not know anything unless we physically are it and are united with the object; knowledge is rendered impossible because there is no subject left to know. Thought, it is said, lies outside of being; experience must be experienced to be known. All we can say of man is that he is *Da*. But in saying that the *Dasein is Da*, the existentialist rules of the game are violated. If existentialism is true, how could we know anything?

Knowledge, obviously, requires two things: the subject must remain itself and know; the object must remain itself and be known. If the subject had to change in order to know the object and to change in order to know the change, an infinite series of subject-less changes is opened, making all knowledge impossible. That is why Plato conceived his theory of reminiscence and why Aristotle posited the agent intellect. If the object must be changed and be changed to make known the change, another infinite series is initiated. If the subject were changed by knowing, it would not *become* the object; if the object were changed, the subject could not become it *as other*. If we know anything, then obviously we remain ourselves while becoming the new. We have our own forms and at the same time the forms of other. If being were changed to be known, it could be annihilated—for how else could being be changed? And hence, in existentialism, neither being nor nothing could be known. An inert universe is a nihilistic one.[317]

[315] *De l'Acte*, Paris, 1937, p. 209.

[316] "On Darkness, Silence, and the Naught," in THE THOMIST, IX (1946), pp. 570 ff.

[317] Marcel, in his analysis of *l'Etre et le Néant*, seems likewise to be in accord

It has been pointed out that the universe of existentialism involves a cosmic dynamism like that of Heraclitus.[318] How in the pure motion can the moments of time be distinguished? [319] That the existentialist universe is pure dynamism can easily be shown. For Kierkegaard, it is impossible to be a Christian; man is always becoming a Christian. For Heidegger, man is caught between being and nothing. Jaspers views existence in terms of struggle. In Sartre, man is constantly fighting to define himself. Sartre is diametrically opposed, he says, to quietism.[320] Such a dynamic version of things is but an aspect of the nihilism where the existentialists end. The universe of Heraclitus was one that had no being, where all is melted into the pure indeterminacy of a continuum. Pure indeterminacy, like prime matter, is *actually* nothing.

Yet in another sense, it can be defended that existentialism offers an inert picture of the cosmos, inert like prime matter itself. This means that there cannot be any motion at all since the agent, alone in his there-ness, could never get started. Man becomes a meaningless tautology, and it takes two terms for motion to occur. If he is, as the existentialists say, an auto-relation [321] then his only possibility is annihilation rather than motion. Another form than his own, far from enriching his being, annihilates it.

Aquinas seems to argue that a completely dynamic universe is likewise inert. In rejecting the principle that there can be no

with Aquinas' view as stated by Geiger. He holds that Sartre actually states but refuses to recognize that being is contacted and that more than mere limit is recognized. Thus Sartre says that the non-being haunts being. It is outside of it, a glove around it, to translate Marcel's language literally. *Homo Viator*, p. 137. The idea of nothingness would thus seem to be secondary and limiting. Marcel thinks that there is a positivity about the concept of abandonment and that the reason for the negative emphasis which this state would seem to have is "notre imperfection rendue manifeste," p. 244. This would imply that the perfective is apprehended first. Without it imperfection would have no sense, just as the concept of limit alone, even as formalistic mathematics of contemporary thought, is nonsense.

[318] Cf., e. g., de Tonquédec, *op. cit.*, pp. 90 ff.

[319] Lefevre, L., *L'Existentialiste est-il un Philosophe?* Paris, 1946, pp. 21-22.

[320] *EH*, pp. 55 ff.

[321] This term is from Alvarez, *op. cit.*, pp. 79 ff.

infinite series of directly subordinated causes, it is familiarly said that all causes would be intermediate. Where all is intermediate all must be process. If M and N were members of the series, subordinated to each other, they would have only intermediates between them and only intermediates joining them to other intermediates and so on. Thus all would be motion, indeterminate. Nothing could be *immediately* as *being is*.

At the same time, everything would be inert. An intermediate cause *A* could never affect its subordinate *B* because it would have to go through simply intermediate steps to do it and thus could never reach *B*. *B* as a result would never move. If everything is intermediate, then there must be a radical between-ness between things, radical such that it could never be bridged.[322]

Aristotle, clarified by Aquinas, deduces both radical dynamism and radical inertia from the pre-Aristotelean hypotheses that there is an infinity of matter, an infinity of parts specifically alike. Of such a complexus Aristotle says: "It will either be at home everywhere—then it will not be moved; or it will be moved everywhere—and then it will not come to rest." [323]

It may seem strange, in spite of loud protests against systems, to find existentialism resembling the universe of modern scientism. According to the doctrine and direction of modern physics, nothing has any reality of its own. Everything is wholly determined by what lies outside of it. The being of physics is thus an impoverished thing. On the side of the subject, a thing cannot remain itself and become something else; on the side of the object, a thing cannot remain itself and "be become." There is thus no possibility of knowledge in scientism. Being is simply inert, and the inert, like the potential, is multiple, chaotic, disordered, and unknowable.

Now the themes of existentialism run in very much the same

[322] *Summa cont. Gentiles*, I, 13.

[323] This English translation from the *Physics* is taken from McKeon, R., *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, New York, pp. 262-263.

monotonous chant. Being cannot remain itself and become other without the annihilation of self. The world, when we try to think of it as other vanishes into pure alteriety (*das schlechthin Andre*).[324] Knowledge involves absolute ek-stasis.[325] *Absolute* ek-statis, *absolute* otherness is a complete denial of the knower and known; it entails their changing rather than persisting through a knowledge act. What is inert is irrelational. In this truth, Aquinas was so tremendously ahead of his time when he rooted individuation in matter, the irrelational—though he recognized that the individual was a *form* individuated. The being of existentialism is inert, and a completely inert universe leads to nihilism.

The affinity for the inert universe of science can be further expressed by noting that the existentialists admit of only material and motor causality. Knowledge can never be enjoyed in such a universe. They wish to get inside of experience to know it—material identity. In the efficient order, they envision knowledge as a construction. The *Dasein* is made intelligible by temporalizing itself. Being becomes an act, a striving, an actualization—in the order of motor causes. Of the same stuff and the same agency is the universe of physics, where the aim is the control of matter. Formal causality is denied. The existentialist and scientistic worlds are thus without form and without finality. With no form, knowledge is impossible. Without finality will cannot be explained. What we know are forms. What we will is not indeterminacy, matter, but determinations.

Though purportedly arguing that the individual cannot know other as other, the existentialists actually compromise their extreme postulates. When Heidegger speaks of other men as "doubles of ourselves,"[326] he actually approaches the Aristotelean view whose realism he so explosively denies. To know other as *of* ourselves implies that we remain what we are. To know other as a *double* implies that we know it as other. Thus there is, at least on one level, not the annihilation of which the existentialists speak but the recognition of a positive thing outside of us who, in our turn, abide through the knowledge.

[324] *WM*, p. 19. [325] *SZ*, p. 320. [326] Cf. *supra*, n. 127.

The subject is thus not inert, and neither is the object. Both remain what they were and enter into the knowledge relation.

Sartre is guilty of the same miscarriage of his principles. In the architectonic of his humanism, he holds that the projects of others can be understood by us because we can remake their own projects in ourselves.[327] But to remake in us what is theirs implies becoming other as other, while remaining ourselves. It contravenes the inert, irrelational type of universe which existentialism describes. Further, if knowledge is a fact, then what is common is apprehended before the particular, what is objective before what is subjective, what is vague before what is distinct. That all men can share in the same project implies that the project transcends them *as individuals* and that what is common or general is reached without recourse to radical induction.

Sartre's theory of the *look* is a verbalism. To know myself as seen and to know other as the seer implies that both subject and object are present in the cognitive act in such a way that other is known as other; the subject, obviously, remains itself while acquiring a new form. There is neither pure otherness where the subject is annihilated, hence not involved in the relation, nor pure sameness where there would be no distinction, no otherness. The knowledge problem cannot be solved by a trick of words but by looking at the facts as they are given. Shame, pride, are social bearings. They imply the permanence of a subject which, while in this identity with itself, can enter into relations with other things.

The existentialist doctrine of will is likewise a play on words. Freedom is a spontaneity, it is said, an autonomy, existing of, by, and for itself. It is not a property of man. It *is* man, random and gratuitous. Freedom is ineffable and indivisible.

An *ad hominem* argument could be drawn here from the appeal, made by the existentialists, for man to invoke his freedom and to realize an experience like theirs. They thus show respect for a common element in all men, and element that

[327] For example, "L'Européen . . . peut refaire en lui le projet du chinois, de l'indien, ou de l'africain." *EH*, pp. 69-70.

cannot be the ineffable and indivisible thing which their extreme principles require. If freedom builds our worlds, why is it that all worlds are alike at least in their larger furnitures, to use Russell's term. Spontaneity cannot originate order, any more than nothingness can suddenly bloom into being. Finally, if will involves preceding knowledge as everyday experience indicates, then to suppose an extraordinary act in the beginning of conscious life when the tables would be turned is a gratuitous assumption. The bridge between the extraordinary and the ordinary must also be extraordinary; a universe results like that of Eddington where everything is a miracle.

But a more direct engagement may be made by reflection on the meaning of the indivisible, unmatchable act which existentialist ascribe to will. If this indivisible of theirs willed anything, even itself, it would be destroyed in the willing because it would be divided. It would not remain itself and will. If it were in immediate touch with nothing, then man could not persist to report on that experience, to submit to its influence, for on existentialist premises there is no continuity between being and nothing but a leap. The will would be alternately as nothing and being, dying and rising from the dead, in a series of annihilations and self-creations. There could be no responsibility, no continuity in existence, no relation to the pristine experience. If awareness of being is being, as the existentialists argue, then this preceding nothingness cannot relate to the awareness. That which is must be explained. That which is not we do not know. Further, we are not responsible for that which is not, only for that which is. Existentialism has thus simply restated the problem of existence without solving it. Why is being not nothing? It is to prejudge the answer to reply that it is nothing. A new meaning has been given to the word "naught." Freedom cannot be inertly indivisible. It takes the form of a *liberum arbitrium*.

Finally, knowledge must precede freedom, at least in a priority of nature if not of time, or it could never catch up with it to report on freedom's prior actions. Existentialism

lays claim to report on experience and the world. That it ventures such a report indicates that it acknowledges the maxim *nil volitum nisi praecognitum*. Its knowledge is there with freedom, analyzing it and, because of the knowledge, surpassing freedom, one may even say dominating it.[328] Man, the reflecting being, can always catch up with himself and start life over again. For man, the master—*causa sui* as Aquinas says because he is free—there is always hope rather than despair.

The decision that the first idea is of ourselves, that there is no form, no final cause for voluntary action, the merger of man and his world with nothingness, are all parts of a single theme, the view of being entirely in terms of finitude.[329] All beings exist only in so far as they bear a likeness to God, participating somehow in His infinite perfection. Because the existentialists never see this spark of infinity in the finite, their minds can never be enkindled with a knowledge of God. Scientism is in the same nihilistic position, and here existentialism can serve as a road-marker that essentialism like its opposite, the forking avenues mentioned in the beginning, really leads beyond the horizons of reality itself.

Because man's first idea is a general, albeit vague, one, that of being, he reaches the level of the truly transcendent, the transcendental. That is to say, he has moved beyond his own

[328] Guthrie's thesis (*op. cit.*, pp. 102-3) is that there is an *a priori* will toward good which starts knowledge. This voluntarism can be rejected simply by showing that the intellect penetrates deeper and more perfectly into reality and cannot therefore have been taken there by the less deep and less perfect action of will. The lower cannot move the higher.

[329] That the existentialists so view man can be seen from the preceding exposition and from the verdict of their critics. Cf., e. g., Delp, A., *Tragische Existenz*, Freiburg im B., 1935, p. 66; Sternberger, A., *Der Verstandene Tod*, Leipzig, 1934, pp. 139 ff.; Stefanini, L., *L'esistenzialismo di M. Heidegger*, Padua, 1944, pp. 55, 60; Hofmann, P., *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.; Jaspers follows Nietzsche in his view of "diesseitigkeit." *N*, pp. 255, 379 ff. That nihilism must be the fruit of such a view can be seen from comparing the above passages with the theses of Truc, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Alvarez, *op. cit.*, p. 284; and de Ruggiero, *op. cit.*, p. 41. The Thomist's decision that existentialism means nihilism will appear from a critical analysis of Löwith, K., *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche*, Berlin, 1941.

subjectivity and has grasped reality in terms of its unlimited, because general, aspects.[330] Philosophy begins, not in dread, negation, limit, but in wonder, the address of man toward the vastness of the unlimited, i. e., the infinite. Man thus reaches the objective order because he touches what is common. When two men have the same idea, there must be an objective standard exterior to both in terms of which the comparison is made; a thing is not changed by being known, for each knower, changing the object, would leave it incapable of being known by the other. The basis of community and objectivity semiotic does not grasp.

If our first idea is a categorical one, limited and even egocentric,[331] then we are consigned to remain in the limits that it sets—remaining an *insistentia*,[332] not an *exsistentia*. What is common then becomes an extrapolation, a simple guess, with no way of including individuals; since the idea of a sum would likewise be irrelational, individual, we could never even know the sum of individuals. What begins with the individual must be radically inductive, and this, it was seen, would make knowledge impossible. We would, it was said, tread the road which science has taken, analyzing matter until it is virtually analyzed away, moving in our search for the individual to smaller and vaguer particles and forces until smallness and vagueness telescope into nothingness. Pure scientific method leads to nihilism because it can never begin with a sureness of foot. It must analyze its own premises and the premises of the premises. Infinite analysis is an infinite series. The existentialists, following Kant, are extremely analytic. More than any of the

[330] That intelligibility follows upon remotion from matter which determines to one, this remotion being the same thing as generality, is shown by the analysis of J. Marcotte, "Materiality and Knowledge," in *The New Scholasticism*, XXI (1947) *praesert.*, pp. 359 ff.

[331] This departure from the subject's knowledge of himself is at least a grave danger in the notion of Balthasar, N., *La Méthode en Métaphysique*, Louvain, 1943. He speaks of "intrinsecisme," a suggestion of Kierkegaardian inwardness, and it is difficult to see how he can escape the fate which befalls the beginning with the limited.

[332] This term is from Alvarez, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

others, Sartre displays the spirit of Cartesian analysis which empties the mind of the world and the world of its being.

In this respect, existentialism has simply pressed forward the method of analysis abroad in modern thought, an analysis that led Russell to a philosophy of pointing,[333] with the object of the finger as the ineffable something which Whitehead and Russell termed an event.[334] But what is pointing? Can we point at the pointing itself? Can we not further analyze tomorrow what today is the object of pointing, showing that this too can be produced and controlled? Knowledge cannot be infinitely inductive if it is knowledge. In that case, it would destroy itself, denying that there is anything to know. Science studies being in terms of what it is not, rather than what it is, its limits, its inertias, its passivities, its controllability in experiment. Radical induction can make no contact with the general, the objective, the common, the public, the infinite.

The existentialists obviously deny form. Like modern science, they deal only in terms of efficient and material causality. Being they insist is inert, i. e., changed only by being annihilated. Now it is by form that a thing resembles the infinite; the perfection of a creature consists in this resemblance.[335] It is only so far as a thing is not limited that it is intelligible.[336] All of man's knowledge is not mediate; in such a series nothing could ever be known. The principle of immediacy is form. It makes a thing what it is. Thus in a universe where matter is

[333] Cf. *The Principles of Mathematics*, New York, 1938, p. 27.

[334] The parallelism between Heidegger and Whitehead is traced out by Barrett, W., *What is Existentialism*, Partisan Review Series, No. 2, New York, 1947, pp. 13 ff. Barrett's thesis could be even more pointedly put by the analysis of the principle of sufficient reason in Heidegger and Whitehead. Barrett's final remarks, redolent of dialectical materialism, are that Heidegger in making man the determinant of time reversed the real order which makes time the determinant of man. Sartre's journal, *Les Temps Modernes*, deals largely with concrete meanings of existentialism. In his articles on materialism and revolution, I (1946), 1-2, he has effectively shown against Marxism that matter can only be controlled by dominating it and revolutions can be implemented only by rejecting determinism and the Hegelian continuum in favor of the free acts of free individuals.

[335] *ST*, I, 6, 4.

[336] Cf. Marcotte, *art. cit.*, *passim.*

wedded to form, there is no need to make reality intelligible as science does. It is intelligible by its nature as informed, needing only to be seen, after the agency of abstraction, to be known. If we had to make intelligible everything that we know we could never know anything. Understanding things in terms of what they are not, we would never know anything at all.

Form enriches the material universe. It is by form that a thing can be itself and extend beyond its own limits, whether it be by transitive action on other things or by being known. That such extensions occur is obvious by the fact that we know, and by the mutual actions of material things, involving both permanence and change, the mediate and the immediate. Man, by knowing, does not impoverish or destroy himself. The world is not known by being annihilated. Otherwise man would not remember that he knew and the universe would not be public for man to know. Thus Aquinas speaks of man's knowledge as being " a remedy " in a finite thing, for its finitude—the remedy of the infinite.[337] Form gives to things their public character, accessible to many individuals because not completely finited to one. Form gives to things a stability that is supra-temporal and supra-spatial, a whisper of the eternal and the infinite.

In their denial of form, existentialists apply, rather than contradict, the Hegelianism to which their doctrine owes its origin as an historical reaction. Hegel denied the difference between real and logical being (the *ens rationis*). It is this distinction which accounts for the objectivity of knowledge. What we do to things, when we know them, is not to wedge a medium between reality and the mind but to employ an *ens rationis* that makes no addition to being, thus preserving its objectivity and independence. Modern logic—existentialist, if the idea of logic has any meaning here, and certainly mathematical logic—is a logic without an *ens rationis*. We neither add nor subtract in being when we know it. Thus to Hei-

[337] *Ibid.*, p. 358; *de Ver.*, II, 2.

degger's question at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*, we do not prejudge the question when we ask what is being. *Is* and *being*, in such a judgment, imply different orders. The first involves the *ens rationis*, the second the *ens reale*. Refusing to bow before the self-evidence of the immediate, existentialists instead declare the nothingness alone is evident. They too, are prejudging the question on their own terms for "is" in their formulation. Since they do not admit an *ens rationis*, it becomes a real being, and in this undifferentiated act of the mind without an *ens rationis*, no duality could ever be detected, and no judicial act or question could occur. Nothing and being are identified because the existentialists fail to see that what is not a real being can nevertheless be not-nothing absolutely but an *ens rationis*. Existentialism has set the stage for its act before its play begins. It is by form that things act, that things are, that they are known. It is by form that unity prevails amid a multiple world which, as pure manifold, would be truly nothing in the actual order. To deny form is to deny being, to deny the principle of contradiction, to deny duality, and to equate what is with what is not. It is to explore being in terms of its limits, what it is not, in terms entirely of its finite character. It is to run the human mind forever in reverse.

The principle of finality comes into the foreground as an answer to the existentialist doctrine of will. Will, even free will, as having a nature can be understood only as a tendency. If a thing did not have definite tendencies, it would tend in all directions simultaneously and nothing could ever happen. It would explode. What tended to nothing would be nothing. The denial of all tendency completely closes man off into his own limitedness, considers only what is finite. This shows again that what is radically finite is nothing. Order, the work of tendency, is but the resemblance to infinity. By tendencies, things stretch beyond themselves, beyond their limits. The natural tendencies of things toward ends which are called the laws of natures are but the effects, St. Thomas says, of the love in the finite for God.[338] *Assimilari Deo* is the aim and purpose

[338] *In de Div. Nom.*, X, 1.

of all finite action. Law is not brute force but a bond (*ligatio*) uniting man to the infinite, and its fullness is love. Man, obeying law, participates in eternal reason.[339] Law is the compensation for the loneliness of man, and if he is not directed by law, he is nothing. Only on recognition that there is in man, and even in nature, both the limited and the unlimited, can a genuine philosophy be constructed. In speaking of man's penchant for the infinite Aquinas writes:

> It was therefore necessary for the perfection of the universe to be consummated that there be some creatures who return to God not only according to a resemblance of nature but also through operation; this could not be except by the act of intellect and will, since God Himself acts in this fashion.[340]

Finality is a pull more than a push; for if all is vacuous outside of us, how is resistance to be explained. A mere push without order and goal would be a random thing. It would be Cartesian teleology all over again, that the explanation of a thing is to be sought entirely within it by breaking it up, thus making finitude sufficient unto itself and failing to account for relatedness. To explain action as a push only takes away nature and substitutes ontologism, even as Descartes was historically culminated by Malebranche. Push is a synonym for *Geworfenheit*, abandonment.

In a word, the nihilism of the existentialist universe is the fruit of seeking the account of creatures entirely in terms of finitude. Only a universe that participates in infinite being can really be. Finite creatures, unless—like God—they are something from within, have form, and display finality, would annihilate themselves by their own limits. It is infinity which is the cause of the universe, infinity which is shared by the beings of the universe, infinity which is the end of action. A radically finite universe could not possibly exist. Sartre holds that the story of life is the story of a check. For Jaspers, what

[339] *ST*, I-II, 91, 2.

[340] *CG*, II, 46. For further enlightening remarks on the question of creaturely similitude to God, cf., Przywara, *op. cit.*, p. 62, also pp. 99 ff.

is ultimate is failure. For Heidegger, man is a prisoner of time, and time is absolutely without that reference to eternity in which tradition says it participates. But a complete check, a radical failure, an absolutely finite duration would be nothing at all. The fact that there is something that is, thoughts that are formed and actions that are posited, is a testimony that man is not absolutely finite and that his world is likewise more than an absolute limit. Guthrie's existential, as opposed to essential, ego is an argument to this fact, though a critic might easily object that existence is here made into a *quid*.[341] D'Arcy, likewise viewing existence as the source of Agape and essence as the *raison d'etre* of Eros, uses the rather suggestive language of man as being "co-efficient" with God.[342] The problem of praemotion is definitely *redivivum* in existentialism.

The Newtonian God did not produce the universe; for it could never be if it were totally finite. The Cartesian God did not make it, for it would then be a random world stemming from blind will without reference to the forms investing things with stability and sense as the reflections of Supreme Intelligence, without reference to the ends ordained by the Creator thinking His Own Essence and projecting into time His Own imitations which bound beyond their limits to return to Him. The Kantian God of will and law is a similar failure to account for the intrinsic likenesses of things to God in their very being. Above all, our universe is nothing at all if it is the universe of modern existentialism and scientism. Existence can only be accounted for by God. If there is no God, it is nothing.

[341] *Op. cit.* Though intending to knit existence and essence closer together than in "algebraic," essentialist metaphysics, Guthrie's analysis would seem in the end to drive a greater wedge between them than there was before. Whether we assign part of our dynamisms to essence and part to existence can only be settled against such hard facts as the unity of being, that existence is a state and not a thing, and the words of Cajetan: *Existentia non existit.*

[342] *The Mind and Heart of Love*, New York, 1947, p. 304. The reader may wonder whether D'Arcy has sufficiently overcome the objections raised against Guthrie that he essentializes existence. The reader may likewise question whether he has satisfactorily dismissed the solutions offered by Rousselot and Gilson to the problem of Eros versus Agape. For a general but perhaps more satisfying treatment of the infinite in our world, cf. Przywara, *op. cit.*, p. 63, p. 104.

Here there is a signal benefit to be derived from existentialism, a kind of *via negativa* which simply sweeps to their logical destiny the forces which Descartes and Kant set in motion. The scientific movement, philosophically embodied in naturalists, logical positivists, and scientists having no other label for their scientism, has not tracked down its analyses. In the strict scientific method, which postulates analysis *ad infinitum*, in its view of being as completely inert to be known by the way in which we can control it experimentally, lurks the same nihilism which the existentialists formally meet by their more stubborn analytic. Scientism would not admit that being is primary and meaningful; it would say, rather, that being is an illusion and that the real world is a patchwork of particles and forces. The pure scientist rejects form and finality. Instead of considering form as the seal of infinity in the finite world, he would reduce it to the limitations of his measure. He would ask it to be controlled, finited. Instead of considering finality, involving an extrinsic something on which a moving object is naturally ranged, he seeks account of his realities entirely within themselves, seeking the inertial structures which things are made of. Whatever dynamism there is has come to be of a statistical kind. The law of entropy, a supreme law in the physicists' world, declares that the universe is tending to a greater and greater thermal disorder through the heat dissipated by every action and which, as heat, is defined as a disordered movement. Absolute disorder, the end of the motion, lies beyond being. It is nothing. Motion in physics, like the Newtonian clock that God threw into space to unwind, involves the direction from act to potency, rather than the reverse, a parallel in the dynamic order to the empirical account of structure.

The positivist, in the spirit of Descartes, seeks to doubt and deny whatever cannot be captured into the clarity and distinctness of pointer-readings, establishing what Russell has called a " hierarchy of dubitables." In this purifying of method, anything short of purging it completely is certainly the failure

of nerve of which Hook speaks. Now when method is purified of everything that is not empirically demonstrable, then it is found that the distinction between thinker and world, even between thinker and thought, is no longer tenable; radically inductive on the side of knowledge itself, we are reduced to repeating the meaningless fact that the thinker is simply *Da*, completely enclosed in his situation, confronted by the absolutely other, the completely ecstatic, the nothingness of things. The existentialist approach which Kant suggests by his stress of analytic is the final nihilism of analysts whose nerve stayed with them to the bitter end. The fact that scientism has not reached this extreme nihilistic impasse reflects its own failure of nerve.

Such a thought may be expressed otherwise by reflecting on the common expression "meaningless question." A question of this kind, say the logical positivists and men like Bridgeman, is one that empirical science cannot formulate at its own level. But the real problem is the definition of a meaningful question which can only be defined according to the canon of meaninglessness. Arbitrary it must remain until it is grounded, but the moment when we pursue the answer on empirical grounds, we are back at the meaning of a question in general and the meaning of the questioner. It is the same problem that beset Heidegger, and the answer to it, from the viewpoint of scientism and existentialism alike, can only be that the questioner is there, a meaningless, vacuous moment in space and time to be known only by Russell's pointing. Nothing could possibly be meaningful in that world. Nothing could possibly be.

Existentialists thus present the soul-shaking depths of a universe where there is no infinite, no God. "We are in hell." [343] They bring out in lurid color the ultimate meaning of considering being, as scientism does, to be radically finite, containing its own laws and available entirely to the measures of scientific method. Existentialism has not yet captured America. Scientism still holds the field. The meaning which

[343] *No Exit and the Flies*, p. 47.

existentialism can bring to American philosophy is the ultimate direction of scientistic principles denying being, its form, finality, and co-efficiency with the infinite, aiming bluntly toward the decision that nothing is and nothing can be known. The price of Cartesianism is atheism, and the hundred-percent tax on it is a nihilistic universe. If anything is, there must be a God.

One may borrow here the formal method of scientism and pose the problem of theodicy for dialectical purposes in obedience to the canon of hypothesis, so widely accepted in contemporary American thought. If there is no God, then nothing is. Only if there is a God can anything be explained, can anything be. The "hypothesis" can be tested in a crucial experiment by opening our eyes. Certainly the philosophers, even in their devotion to science and scientific method, cannot deny the existence of everything. If this is so, then the only way to retain the existence of anything at all is the acceptance that there is a God. What is not love of God is *amor fati*. What is not knowledge of Him is knowledge of nothing. Only in His existence can we save the appearances. Only thus can being be.

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THE BASIS OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

[*Second Installment*]

I. The Suarezian Teaching About Human Freedom

I. the appetitive faculties in general

1. *Appeties in General.* Everything that is has a propensity toward its own good, an appetite called natural which follows every form, even the forms of non-living things.[7] Over and above this, living, knowing substances have an appetitive power peculiar to them, a power through which the soul, by an elicited act proper to that appetite seeks what is good for it in a living way. The reason for this is that appetite always follows form. Therefore, according to the diversity of the ratio of the form there follows a diverse ratio of appetite. Agents which know apprehend what is good and what is evil for them; and that apprehension is a form in them. Necessarily, then, they have a special and peculiar power of seeking that good and avoiding the evil.[8]

Even within the general class of knowing subjects we find differences. Some things endowed with knowledge do not rise above the level of sense knowledge; others are intellectual. Since from diverse kinds of knowledge there flow diverse kinds of appetites we must conclude that the appetites of knowing things differ: some are sensitive, and as such are material and limited to individual material objects; others are rational, rising above the plane of mere sense. They are, in their object and nature, spiritual.[9]

[7] Appetitus naturalis dicitur quaelibet propensio cujusvis rei in suum proprium bonum (*De Anima*, Liber V, cap. 1, n. 1).

[8] Appetitus sequatur formam, ideoque juxta diversum modum, rationemque formae diversa ratio appetitus consequatur (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[9] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

We can consider the object of an appetitive power in a two-fold way: that of which it is "prosecutive" (to which it tends), and that to which it is "aversative" (from which it turns away). The adequate object of appetite in general as it is *prosecutive* is good, or the ratio of good. This does not mean that *bonum in universale* is the object of every appetite; but every appetite does seek good either *in general* or *in particular*. The object of appetite in general as it is *aversative* is evil. This aspect is founded, rooted, in the first; the appetite cannot bear on the evil (as desiring it) under the aspect of evil, as some have said that the intellectual appetite (will) can do; for the appetite is always for the good of the supposit, and for its perfection, which cannot be attained by evil. Hence when an appetite does in fact tend to an evil it always seeks it under some aspect of good, real or apparent, in it.[10] For this reason we cannot desire an impossible thing, apprehended as impossible, except in a conditional way, "if it were possible." It is to be noted that we can never will any good that does not have some reference to ourselves. We will good to God, but He is universal good, the font of all good, in Whom is all good; we will good to creatures because they are in some determined way one with us, or for us.[11]

A capital point in the Suarezian account of the acts of the appetite is the role played by the object. The appetite elicits its own act without any efficiency on the part of the desired object, or on the part of our knowledge of that object. Many have maintained that the object as well as the appetite has efficiency with respect to the act. This for him is false. For it to do so it would be necessary either: 1) that the object produce something in the appetite, given which the appetite could then move to act; or 2) the object *per se* concurs to the

[10] Notandum est . . . non esse sensum conclusionis potentiam appetitivam habere pro objecto bonum sub absoluta ratione boni . . . sensus ergo est omnem potentiam appetitivam habere pro objecto formali rationem boni communis, vel particularis (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 4).

[11] Impossibile est appeti quod non respiciat bonum proprium ipsius appetentis, vel illud includat aliquo modo (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

substance of the act. The first is inadmissible because the object has no efficiency. Only God, as object, can move the appetite efficiently. Moreover, supposing the truth of the position, the object would effectively move the appetite either by efficiently producing a form in it or, though producing nothing, by impelling the powers to second act. The first of these is impossible since the appetite is *of itself* constituted in first act, therefore needs no form. "An appetitive power is of itself constituted in first act . . . the appetite is of itself inclined to good and therefore needs no form through which it is constituted in first act. . . ." [12] The second alternative (that the object impels the power to second act) is impossible for if such objective attraction were efficient the potency would be merely passive; the act then would be from the object and not from the potency.[13]

The second possibility (the object concurs to the substance of the act) is also impossible, since only that efficiency concurs in the act of a power which constitutes it in first act, and the appetitive power is constituted in first act of itself, and not through its object. Neither can it be said that power and object concur as two partial agents, since the appetite alone is sufficient; besides it would lead to an impossibility, namely, that the appetite use knowledge. "If some other cause should concur clearly it would be none other than the previous act of knowledge . . . but the appetite, as it cannot use the object known, neither (can it use) the formal apprehension of it, since

[12] Potentia appetitiva ex se est in actu primo constituta . . . potentia appetitiva de se inclinatur ad bonum, proindeque nulla eget forma per quam in actu primo constituatur (*Ibid.*, cap. 3, n. 3). Suarez here cites St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 27, a. 4, in support of this position. St. Thomas' point in that article is that the intellect is in act because the thing known is in the intellect according to its likeness, through a species; but the will is in act, not through the presence in the will of the thing willed, but from this, that the will has a certain inclination to the thing willed. St. Thomas neither says nor implies that the will needs no form in order to be constituted in act.

[13] Tractatio illa sive impulsio potentiae ab objecto facta non nisi objectum dici aut concipi valeat in quo certe nulla involvitur efficientia, praeterquam quod jam alias potentia haberet se mere passive et ab objecto actum reciperet, quod improbatum est (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

it (the apprehension) exists in another potency." [14] Knowledge is a necessary condition for the act ("apprehension is a required condition of the object.") [15] "The apprehension of the object concurs . . . as an accidental cause." [16] The object, since it does not concur effectively in producing the substance of the act, cannot effectively concur in its specification.[17] The union of appetible and appetite, in fact, differs from that of object known and knower; for in the latter case the union must be in the knowing power, whereas for appetition it is enough that the object be in another power, namely, in the knowing power. Thus, says Suarez, whenever St. Thomas speaks of the will as passive, or of the motion on the will of the end, the term must be understood as a metaphor; when he speaks of the end as a principle of action he is speaking morally and not physically.[18]

2. *The Will in General.* Coming now to that appetite which is the will, its object is the good in general, not any aspect of good in particular. This is clear, since 1) the will is supreme among appetitive powers, hence its object must be supreme, and 2) since the will follows the intellect its act is co-extensive with that of the intellect. But the intellect can know all good; therefore the will can seek all good.[19]

[14] . . . cum appetitus ipse ex se habeat sufficientem inclinationem ad objectum, ex se est sufficiens elicere proprium actum superflue ergo fingitur efficientia in objecto. . . . Cum enim appetitio sit vitalis elici aliter non potest quam a potentia cujus est actus, quod si causa alia concurreret, non alia sane foret quam praevius cognitionis actus . . . appetitus autem sicut non potest uti objecto cognito, ita neque ipsa formali ejus apprehensione, cum in alia potentia existat . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[15] Apprehensio est conditio objecti tantum requisita, et applicans illud potentiae (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[16] Apprehensio itaque objecti tantum concurrit ad amorem, ut causa per accidens physice loquendo (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[17] Objectum autem efficienter non concurrit ad substantiam actus: ergo neque ad specificationem (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[18] Averroes vero agit de motione metaphysica, de qua etiam interpretandus erit D. Thomas ubicumque de eo tractat, quando autem finem vocat principium actionis intelligit moraliter, non physice: similiter appetitus potentia passiva dicitur, metaphorice, sicut motio finis metaphorica est. (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[19] *Ibid.*, cap. 7, n. 2.

The acts of the will include all eleven acts of the lower appetitive faculties (love, joy, desire, flight, delight, sorrow, hope, despair, fear, and anger), but in a higher, a spiritual way. Such acts are divided into those concerned with the end of man, and those concerned with the means to it. With respect to the end as such we can have desire (intention) and delight (fruition.) With regard to a means as means two acts are possible: election and use. By the former we separate and prefer one of the means offered by reason as capable of leading to the end desired; by *use* that means is placed in the order of execution.[20]

Acts of the will are elicited or imperated according as they proceed from the will itself or from some other faculty moved by the will, for the will can move all the powers which can help attain the end, since the will regards the end.[21] With regard to the acts of the intellect there is some difficulty, for while intellect is moved by the will, it also moves the will (since appetition follows knowledge). St. Thomas answers that the intellect moves the will after the manner of a final cause but the will moves the intellect efficiently. If the intellect at times, through imperation, effectively moves the will this is not due to the intellect as such, but to a previous act of the will; the efficiency is altogether from the previous election on the part of the appetite. Of the acts of the two powers that of intellect is first. To its first act it is moved not by the will but either by a natural inclination or by the extrinsic proposal of some object.[22] We often experience, Suarez adds, certain acts in our intellect which proceed from the will in no way but come from

[20] At circa medium ut medium duo versantur proprie actus voluntatis: nimirum electio et usus. . . . Primum est acceptare aliquod illorum (mediorum) . . . facta autem electione necessarium est ut id medium executioni mandetur cui deservit usus (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[21] *Ibid.*, n. 5.

[22] Absolute loquendo intellectus tantum potest movere finaliter voluntatem, voluntas vero intellectum effective. Ex quo colliges inter actus harum potentiarum praeire primo oportere actum intellectus. Quoad primum actum non movetur a voluntate sed vel ab inclinatione naturali, vel ab extrinseca aliqua propositione objecti (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

God, angels or devils; both intellect and lower faculties then can act without the will.[23] The motion by which the will moves the other faculties is merely a moral motion, an efficiency which is accidental in the eyes of the philosopher, though it is *per se* to the moralist.[24] As between intellect and will the former is the more noble power, since 1) its object is more simple and more abstract (the quiddity of things, abstacting from their existence, whereas the will bears only on things having order to existence), 2) it flows more immediately from the essence of the soul, 3) it is from the intellect that man's dignity is especially derived, and 4) it is the rule of all voluntary operations.[25]

II. The Existence of Human Freedom

1. *Significance of Freedom.* But we are more concerned with the precise nature of human freedom. Freedom can be understood in a three-fold way: 1) as freedom from the servitude of sin and punishment; 2) as freedom from coaction only. This is two-fold: a) freedom from that coaction which brings absolute necessity of a motion which is against the internal appetite of the thing moved; and b) freedom from that coaction which brings necessity improperly so called, such necessity as arises from fear which induces us to avoid some undesirable thing; and 3) freedom from necessity. Suarez noted that freedom from coaction is not identical with freedom from necessity. Love of God in heaven is free of coaction, yet necessary; the act of a created will can be truly voluntary and therefore free of coaction, yet necessary because impelled by an extrinsic efficient cause.[26]

[23] Saepe experimur actus quosdam apud intellectum nostrum qui a voluntate neutiquam praecedunt. . . . Motio ergo voluntatis non est adeo necessaria in his potentiis ad agendum ut sine illa operari omnino nequeunt; saepe enim aliae potentiae in actionibus suis motionem intellectus praecurrunt (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[24] (illa motione voluntatis a qua dicuntur effective moveri potentiae reliquae) . . . est nimirum sola moralis motio, quae in philosophia naturali efficientia est accidentaria, in morali vero censetur per se (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[25] *Ibid.*, cap. 9, nn. 2 ss.

[26] Dilectio enim Dei in patria a coactione libera est, non tamen a necessitate

2. *The Fact of Human Freedom.* Can the notion of freedom be verified of man's will? It can, and that in the third and most perfect sense of freedom from necessity, necessity such as is found in irrational things. Man's freedom is so evident that Suarez pauses only once to prove it. He shows it: 1) from the common agreement of men and especially of philosophers, pagans as well as Christian; 2) from common experience. We know that we have in ourselves the power to do something or not to do it; that we think things over in order to decide on one or the other course of action; and 3) from the fact that we are intellectual. This argument is simple enough. A universal and indifferent appetite follows knowledge which is universal and (in its own way) indifferent. But intellectual knowledge, such as men have, is universal and perfect in such a way that the intellectual being knows what constitutes its final goal, and what constitutes a mere means to that goal, a means not really necessary to it. The appetite therefore which follows such knowledge (the appetite called the will) has this same indifference or power so that it does not desire everything, nor does it desire every means necessarily, but rather it freely desires those things which the intellect shows it are not necessary. Thus free selection follows on reason's weighing of the goodness of various things. The major premise is proved by pointing out that vital appetition always follows knowledge. Hence the more perfect the knowledge the more perfect the appetition.[27]

The argument is confirmed by a consideration of man's participation of God's attributes. God is free with regard to things not necessary to Him. Since man participates God's

(*Ibid.*, n. 4. aliquando vero actus voluntarius potest esse necessarius tantum ab extrinseco efficiente); (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 1, nn. 4, 7).

[27] Appetitus vitalis sequitur cognitionem et ideo perfectiorem cognitionem comitatur perfectior appetitus; ergo et cognitionem universalem et suo modo indifferentem sequitur etiam appetitus universalis et indifferens; cognitio autem intellectualis ita est universalis et perfecta ut propriam rationem finis et mediorum percipiat . . . ergo appetitus qui hanc cognitionem sequitur habet hanc indifferentiam seu perfectam potestatem in appetendo ut non omne bonum aut omne medium necessario appetat (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 2, nn. 12-17; cfr. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-225; 339-351).

intellectual nature it follows that man also participates, in his operations, God's freedom.[28]

III. The Free Faculty in Man

1. *The Nature of the Free Faculty.* Suarez now determines more precisely what this freedom of will is and what are its conditions. We have seen that liberty from mere coaction is not human liberty, for the former implies that the act is free of extrinsic compulsion, not that it is free in the sense that the agent has determined himself to do this. Clearly, then, human liberty implies freedom from necessity arising from natural determination to one thing, such as animals have. But what is this freedom?

There are four possibilities. The name might indicate: 1) an act; 2) a habit; 3) a potency as modified by a habit; or 4) a potency as unmodified. It cannot be an *act* since man remains free even when he is not operating. Neither is it a *habit.* Any habit is either acquired or natural. Now there are no innate or natural habits in a man's will, hence that possibility is ruled out. If freedom were an acquired habit it would have to be preceded by similar acts (i. e., free acts) which would generate it and hence freedom would exist prior to the existence of the habit which, on the supposition, is freedom. But nothing can be prior to its own being.

Nor can freedom be the will as modified by a habit for no habit gives a faculty power to act. Presupposing that power, it gives facility in its use. Any natural act which is placed by the will as modified by a habit can be placed by the will without the habit. The only possibility is that freedom is a faculty, absolutely taken.[29]

Just which faculty is the subject of freedom is a much discussed question. Suarez' answer is clear: the will is the *liberum arbitrium.*[30] His argument is this: freedom must be

[28] *Ibid.*, n. 17.

[29] *Ibid.*, sect. 5; Pesch, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

[30] Quia hic modus operandi soli voluntati convenit, ideo illa est formaliter libera

in a spiritual faculty but it cannot be formally in the intellect and therefore it is in the will alone, formally. That it is not in the intellect is clear from this, that the intellect is not indifferent. As to specification this is clear, for the intellect is naturally determined to assent to the true, to dissent from the false. In probable matters the intellect does seem to have some freedom, but this is only because the object is not sufficiently applied for reason's natural impulse to bear on it. Again the object of the intellect is truth, and since truth consists in the indivisible there cannot be, in one object, truth and falsehood. Hence the intellect, unlike the will, is naturally determined to one thing as to the species of its act.

Neither is the intellect free as to exercise, since only the act of a faculty which is intrinsically voluntary can be free in this way. This is clear since the determination of a power to an act can only be either voluntary (i. e., from the elicited inclination of the one operating) or natural. But a power free as to exercise cannot be determined only by nature, but must be determined voluntarily. This can be either: 1) extrinsically (by a voluntary act elicited by another power), and the power so determined is not free since it is moved and determined by another faculty; or 2) intrinsically, i. e., by the power itself, which can only be an appetite. Since the intellect is not an appetite it is not free as to exercise. To dispute whether it is the root of freedom or simply a necessary condition of freedom is simply to dispute in words for Suarez. He says it is both. In-

et liberum arbitrium (*Prolegomenon* I, cap. 3, n. 7; cfr. particularly *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 5 and 6, in which Suarez clearly denies to the intellect any determining judgment in a free act. He rejects a preceding definite practical judgment on the ground that "si illud judicium rationis est ita praerequisitum ad operandum ut in suo genere sit causa necessaria ad actum liberum voluntatis ergo voluntas . . . non est potentia libera"—*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, sect. 6, n. 2). Suarez also rejects the doctrine that the act of intellect and will can mutually cause each other: "Dicunt . . . illos duos actus esse sibi invicem causas in diversis generibus causarum, quia et voluntas determinat intellectum, ut ita practice judicet, et intellectus determinat voluntatem, ut velit rem talem. . . . Voluntas enim determinat intellectum efficienter, intellectus autem voluntatem finaliter. Sed haec doctrina mihi non probatur . . . et praeterea ostendo esse impossibilem (*Ibid.*, n. 5; Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223; 351-355).

tellectual knowledge is certainly a necessary condition for the formally free power which is the will.[31] To maintain that it is also free is to open the way to such inconvenient conclusions as this, that sin would really be two sins: one of judging evil that is to be done, another in electing the evil.

The first characteristic of a formally free power is that it be active.[32] Scripture,[33] The Council of Trent,[34] and St. Thomas[35] are among the authorities cited for this. Suarez argues from reason, that a free faculty is that which has in its own power to change or not to change; for in that power is dominion over the act. But this power is not in a passive faculty as such. Therefore it is in active faculty. The minor premise is clear from this that, whether a passive power receives an effect or not depends, not on the power of the patient, but on the power of the agent; for granted the action the passion necessarily follows. If the will received its act from an extrinsic agent, then, it would be necessitated and not free. The very notion of freedom supposes determination from within; only an active faculty can so determine itself.

The second characteristic of a free faculty is that it be indifferent. For the formal liberty of any faculty there is required indifference through a certain dominative eminence of the active power (precisely as active) both as to various actions and as to exercising or not exercising those acts. Here we are speaking of created liberty which regards principally internal acts of the will. God's freedom falls only on external acts and effects since in His internal acts (acts *ad intra*) " no effect

[31] Neque oportet disputare (utrum) . . . rationem dicendam esse radicem libertatis, (vel) solum conditionem necessariam . . . nam hi auctores videntur de modo loquendi magis quam de re contendere. Nam cum cognitio solum est necessaria conditio . . . ideo modum cognitionis solum appellare volunt conditionem necessariam ad modum volitionis. . . . Optime tamen dici potest radicem libertatis esse rationis . . . usum (*Disp. Meta., loc.cit.*, sect. 5, n. 21).

[32] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 1-6.

[33] Suarez cites *Ecclesiasticus* xv: " Ad quod volueris porrige manum tuam " and " Quae enim odit, ne feceris."

[34] Suarez cites Trent, sess. VI, cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797) and cap. 6 (Denz., n. 798).

[35] *Summa Theol.*, I. Q. 82, a. 4; I-II, Q. 9, aa. 1, 3; *Q. D. de Verit.*, Q. 22, a. 9.

or reception or addition can be free." [36] That liberty is indifference is a dogma of faith accepted by all Catholics. "It is certainly of faith therefore that there is in us liberty of indifference or dominion." "It is a dogma of faith that liberty consists not only in the faculty of operating voluntarily and freely, but moreover that there is in us that condition of liberty which includes the power of acting and not acting, indifference in operating." [37] Again Suarez says that the Council of Trent enunciates the doctrine that liberty is indifferent. "It (the Council) declares that the use of this (liberty) consists (*positum esse*) in the aforesaid indifference." [38]

Supposing that liberty is indifference, of what is it indifference and with respect to what? Here we must distinguish. Liberty can be understood, as Scotus says, in order to: 1) diverse acts immanent in the free faculty (i. e., indifference of the faculty with respect to acts); 2) different objects (i. e., indifference of the acts with respect to objects); or 3) to diverse effects extrinsic to the agent. The third is consequential and posterior to any liberty, so interest centers in the first two. Human liberty is primarily in the faculty with respect to acts. Divine freedom is the indifference of most pure act with respect to created objects; and in this is the distinction between the two. To have this indifference immediately in the act with respect to objects is proper to God; creatures have liberty as a faculty which can act or not act. To argue then in this way: "God is

[36] Secundo dicimus . . . ad formalem libertatem alicujus facultatis requiri indifferentiam per eminentiam quamdam potentiae activae ut activa est, tum ad varias actiones, tum ad exercendas vel non exercendas illas . . . in Deo ad intra nulla effectio, vel receptio seu additio libera esse potest (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 7).

[37] In hoc solum (asserimus esse certum de fide) dari indifferentiam in actibus humanis et liberis quod in nobis nostrisque actibus inveniri potest haec perfectio . . . quae in hoc dominio et indifferentia consistit. . . . Est igitur certum dogma fidei (ut existimamus) libertatem hanc non consistere tantum in facultate operandi voluntarie . . . sed praeterea dari in nobis . . . eam libertatis conditionem quae potestatem agendi et non agendi includit quae . . . dici solet dominium in actionem propriam seu indifferentia in operando (*Opusculum Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1, n. 2).

[38] Sufficit nobis definitio Concilii Tridentini (sess. 6) ubi non solum definit esse in nobis liberum arbitrium sed etiam illud ejusque usum in praedicta indifferentia positum esse declarat (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

determined and yet free; therefore men can be determined to act and yet free " is to overlook the perfection of God's liberty which no creature can attain. God's determination is an act of His own freedom, it comes from His own intrinsic liberty and not from something other than Himself. Therefore it is not at all in conflict with liberty, as determination in us would be.[39]

Admitting the distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification (" The first of which consists in the power of having or not having the act, the latter (consists) in the power of having this or that act ") Suarez shows that indifference is necessary for each. For freedom of exercise an active power is needed (otherwise the power will always lack action). If the power lacks act from some impotency there is necessity and not freedom in that lack, since impotency equals impossibility. Hence for the lack of power to be free there must be in the very faculty a power of action such that by its own power it cannot act by reason of its dominion.[40]

If freedom of specification is with respect to many acts it is necessary that there be in the faculty a power effective of all these acts. If it lacks that power it is not free since it is not active. Thus for both kinds of freedom indifference is necessary, an indifference which has a certain dominative eminence so that it chooses between the possibilities.[41]

In the third place it is required for the proximate and

[39] Si vero est sensus non esse necessariam potentiae indifferentiam in ordine ad actus sed in ordine ad objecta sufficere, est quidem hoc verum in Deo, non vero in nobis; Deus enim ex se est indifferens ad volenda objecta extra se, non per modum potentiae ad actus sed per modum simplicissimi actus . . . quod in Deo mirabile est et proprium ejus. . . . Creatura vero non potest attingere perfectionem illam. . . . Neque ad rem spectat quod voluntas Dei fuerit ab aeterno determinata; . . . illa determinatio non pugnat cum indifferentia quia est ab intrinseca libertate (*Ibid.*, cap. 2, n. 14; cfr. also *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19).

[40] Nisi supponatur vis agendi in tali facultate semper carebit actione . . . si potentia careat actione ex aliqua impotentia agendi tunc non est libertas in carentia actionis sed necessitas quia impotentia aequivalet impossibilitati: ergo (libertas) supponit . . . potentiam . . . ex eminentia virtutis (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 8).

[41] Si talis indifferentia (quoad specificationem) sit respectu plurium actuum, necesse est ut sit in tali facultate sit vis effectrix omnium illorum actuum: nam si tali virtute careat ad aliquem illorum . . . respectu illius non erit libera, cum . . . non sit activa (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

absolute freedom of the will that the power of the faculty in its order of proximate cause have complete active and dominative power over those acts with respect to which it is said to be simply and proximately free. If the faculty does not have in itself this complete power it cannot will or not will; therefore it lacks dominion and hence freedom. Suarez claims the support of St. Thomas for this position quoting his words that "free will consists in this that it does not exceed the powers of the potency."[42] Even if one supposes that the will is not the sole proximate principle of the act but requires the object too (which, according to Suarez, is more probably incorrect) the will still has complete active power; for on the supposition the will has only inchoative liberty prior to the presentation of the subject; given the presentation it is completely free. For supernatural acts the will clearly needs some complement. The point is, granted the complement, it is free.[43]

Suarez' fourth condition is that while liberty in first act can be both remote and proximate it requires, in both cases, the *indifference of an active power.* Remote freedom is that of an operative faculty regarded in itself alone, a faculty which does not have the other things required for act. Proximate freedom in first act is that of a faculty expedited and endowed with all that is needed to act, for, simply speaking, one is able to act (*potens*) in first act who is so disposed that he can place the act without any immutation at all, in himself, in the object, or in anything else.

[42] *Q. D. de Verit.*, Q. 24, a. 4. St. Thomas in this place points out that the liberum arbitrium is a faculty. He does so by showing that the judgment involved does not require that peculiar principles be added to the faculty since the judgment is a natural one, hence does not exceed the power of human reason. His point is that the act of this faculty is a perfectly normal one; he does not say or imply that the liberum arbitrium is of itself a complete principle of its own operation.

[43] Dico, tertio, ad libertatem proximam et absolutam arbitrii requiri ut virtus facultatis, in suo ordine causae proximae habeat completam vim activam et dominativam illorum actuum . . . alias non habebit dominium . . . neque proximam et absolutam libertatem. . . . Quomodocumque ergo voluntas supponatur habere integram vim agendi actum sive per se sola, sive per aliquid jam illi additum, vel sufficienter conjunctum esse poterit plene et sufficienter libera (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 10-12).

That liberty in the first state (i. e., remote) requires indifference is clear; a man who is sleeping (or one who is not actually thinking) is still free, for his will can still act without necessity. Should he lose the faculty or its property he can no longer be called free.

That proximate liberty in first act also requires indifference (and this is, for Suarez, the cardinal truth in reconciling freedom and divine motion), is proved from a three-fold consideration. 1) The power in question is, on the supposition, free. Therefore it must have active indifference in operating, since that is the very definition of freedom. 2) Otherwise, the power which is remotely free would never be proximately free to act and not act; which is against the very nature of a free power and makes the actual use of liberty impossible. 3) Formal liberty includes a two-fold power with respect to one and the same object, namely, the power of willing and the power of not willing. If the faculty as proximately disposed to act is not indifferent to both parts of its power it must be proximately and simply potent as to one part, and remotely potent but proximately impotent as to the other part. In acting, then, the will would not be master of both powers but would have one part of its powers only and therefore would not be free.[44]

So much for the notion of and conditions requisite to a free power. Suarez is now in a position to determine the very definition of such a power.[45] It is one " which, given everything

[44] Dico, quarto, libertatem in actu primo esse remotam et proximam et utramque requirere indifferentiam potentiae activae. . . . Quod quidem in statu remoto per se notum est. . . . Altera pars est difficilior; est tamen verissima . . . et fortasse est cardo totius concordiae gratiae cum libero arbitrio. . . . Primo ergo probatur quia illa etiam est potestas vere libera: ergo in illo etiam statu retinere debet indifferentiam activam . . . quia haec est de intrinseca ratione libertatis . . . secundo quia alias nunquam potentia libera in actu primo remoto esset proxime libera ad agendum vel non agendum quod est . . . contra usum libertatis. Tertio probatur quia libertas formalis . . . duplicem potestatem inadaequatam . . . includit circa idem objectum; potestas volendi . . . (et) non volendi. Si ergo voluntas jam expedita . . . ad operandum non est indifferens ad utramque . . . ad unam manebit proxime et simpliciter potens, ad alteram vero non nisi remote ac subinde proxime impotens (*Ibid.*, nn. 13-15).

[45] Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 3 for the discussion of this definition; also Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 365-371.

necessary to the act, can act and not act " (quae positis omnibus requisitis ad actum, potest agere et non agere).

This description is nothing new, Suarez maintains; it simply gathers in one formula the elements of freedom described by authorities who preceded him.[46] St. Thomas's description for instance, " *liberum arbitrium* is the faculty of will and reason," with St. Thomas's own modification " by which man is master of his acts," [47] is equivalently expressed in " the faculty of will and reason for both acting and not acting," for the very mastery or dominion mentioned by St. Thomas is precisely the power of doing or not doing. The final element of Suarez' definition " granted everything necessary to the act " is added to indicate in which faculty freedom resides, for while many faculties can act or not act (as intellect can believe or not believe in credible matters, assent or dissent in probable matters) the will alone continues to have this power even when everything necessary to its act is present. It alone can do or not do by its internal force. Thus the will alone is a free faculty.[48]

Now the definition just given is to be understood in the composed sense, and not in the divided sense, that is, granted the prerequisites the will can still both act and not act. The divided sense is this, that given the prerequisites the will can use its freedom not to act, only if one of the requisites to act is taken away. If this divided sense is maintained the will is no more free than any natural agent. The sun, for example, while acting can still not act on condition that a requisite for its operation be removed; and again the blessed in heaven who love God necessarily by reason of the object (God Himself) can

[46] *Ibid.*, nn. 4-5.

[47] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, 1, a. 1.

[48] Intellectus autem non habent hanc facultatem (agendi et non agendi, ut credendi et non credendi, vel etiam dissentiendi et assentiendi) ita indifferentem ut sese possit determinare ad actum vel suspendere illum aut ad oppositum se determinare. . . . Et tunc intellectus nunquam positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere. . . . Voluntas autem sicut potest agere ex interna facultate . . . sine motione alterius potentiae ita ex eadem interna facultate potest non agere (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 3, nn. 6-7).

stop loving Him if something necessary to the act be taken away. Formal freedom, then, demands that the free power have the power to cease acting of itself and by its own dominion, and not merely because requisite external conditions no longer obtain. Things which stop acting for that reason are not said to have a power to non-act; rather they are said not to have the power to act.[49]

The divided sense destroys freedom, for if the will's power to non-act were not intrinsic, then, supposing the necessary conditions, the act would flow necessarily, not freely; for if in the presence of the prerequisites there is no power not to act, the power to act is necessary. Again if the will in the presence of everything necessary to its act can not-act only in the divided sense (i. e., if a requisite be subtracted), then the will has never the proximate power to act and not act, but only to act. Thus there would be no true use of liberty; there would be only exercise of that one member of the disjunction to which the will is proximately disposed. Moral imputability and responsibility for our acts thus becomes impossible.[50]

What has been said of the prerequisites to act in general is also true of that prerequisite which is God's concursus. Granted God's influxus man can still act and not act in the composed sense, a proposition which must be defended for the reasons indicated above. If the will could not-act only on the supposition that concursus were removed the will would not have

[49] Dicimus descriptionem illam in sensu composito esse intelligendam . . . quia positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum posse non agere in sensu diviso, i. e. retinere potentiam ad agendum ablata aliqua conditione ex praerequisitis non est proprium potentiae liberae, sed cuilibet naturaliter agenti convenit . . . ita operari . . . ut solum possit facultas ab operatione cessare in sensu diviso . . . non est posse cessare ex interna potestate et domino actionis . . . quia tunc non cessatur ex potestate non agendi, sed potius ex impotentia agendi (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-10).

[50] Si ergo voluntas positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest non agere tantum in sensu diviso, tunc non est potentia proxima ad non agendum, sed tantum potentia remota. . . . Quando non habet omnia praerequisita ad agendum non est potentia proxima ad agendum; nunquam ergo est potentia proxima ad agendum et non agendum, sed ad alterum tantum . . . ergo . . . nunquam exercet potestatem liberam sed solum eam partem exercet ad quam proxime est praeparata (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

a proximately free power; for the condition of its not acting would not be under its control. Hence free use would be impossible. The hand while writing can not-write, supposing that the will ceases to move the executive faculties, but no one maintains that the hand is therefore free. To reply that the will is a peculiar kind of agent in that even under God's motion it retains its power to not-act solves nothing. If that is understood in the composed sense, then the Suarezian position is admitted. If it is understood in the divided sense (and it can be meant in only one or the other sense), then the will, like any other faculty, does not (supposing the removal of a prerequisite to act) have intrinsic power to not-act, but rather *necessarily does not act.* To safeguard the reality of freedom we must accept his formula in the composed sense Suarez assures us.[51]

To safeguard the same human liberty he also denies any previous concursus on God's part. Concurrent motion suffices in his view. God wills to concur with men who cooperate with Him he argues; but whether, in fact, this man does cooperate is left in man's own power. God's volition falls on the (human) act, not absolutely, but as the act is co-produced by the human and divine wills; His volition is quasi-conditional if this man wills to co-operate. God's will in such a matter of itself alone effects nothing. From all eternity the divine will is, as it were, prepared, and has its power applied to co-acting with the created will.[52]

[51] Omnia quae generaliter diximus de praerequisitis ad agendum aeque procedunt de omnibus praerequisitis sive ex parte Dei sive ex parte aliarum rerum vel causarum. . . . Si (divina motione) posita non manet in voluntate potestas ad non agendum nisi in sensu diviso . . . ergo in voluntate sic mota non manet libertas non agendi et consequenter nec ipsum operari liberum est (*Ibid.*, nn. 12-15).

[52] Negamus priorem partem de concursu praevio; sufficit enim simultaneus. . . . Concedimus enim aliquam voluntatem Dei esse praeviam ad volitionem hominis . . . non oportet ut sit voluntas absoluta quod talis actus fiat et in rerum natura ponatur . . . sed sufficit voluntas concurrendi cum arbitrio hominis . . . si ipse cooperari velit quod semper relinquitur in manu et potestate ejus . . . per illam volitionem (Deus) non vult actum voluntatis humanae simpliciter et absolute, sed ut coefficiendum ab eadem voluntate humana et quasi sub conditione . . . et ideo talis voluntas Dei nihil operatur per se sola (*Ibid.*, n. 16).

2. The Relation of Freedom to Partial Goods. To understand more fully the Suarezian notion of the nature of the free faculty we must now take up another question, whether this indifferent power can by God's motion be necessitated to act with respect to an object which is indifferent, that is known not to be the perfect good.[53] As to specification there is no difficulty since God can necessitate it in this way by denying concurrence to every species but this one. The problem arises, Suarez thinks, with reference to exercise of act, and his answer to it is that God can necessitate the will even in this way.[54] The argument from authority includes: a) a very lengthy list of theologians said by Suarez to favor this position, among them St. Thomas;[55] b) the mode of argumentation used by the Fathers against the heretics; and c) such pronouncements as those contained in the Council of Trent, which latter imply not that such necessitating motion is never given, but that when freedom is used, such motion cannot precede that use.[56]

His proof from reason is easily grasped. Since God can do all things He can change the will when and as He chooses (provided no contradiction is implied), preserving its liberty or not, as He decides. There is repugnance in neither, though it seems more difficult to Suarez to move the will by preserving its liberty, than to move it by necessitating it. It is clear that when God does so necessitate the act it is not free because liberty in operation is not only the being of the act or its intrinsic mode, but is its denomination from the power of acting and not-acting precisely as that power is expedited to both parts. Since that power is not used in the act in question, denomination from it must be lacking. To deny that God can

[53] *Ibid.*, capp. 4, 5; cfr. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 ss.

[54] Dico ergo Deum posse ita movere voluntatem (quoad exercitium) stante integro judicio rationis de objecto ex se indifferente, seu non necessario, ut motu non libero sed simpliciter necessario in illud feratur (*Ibid.*, cap. 4, n. 9; cfr. Joannes a Sancto Thoma, *Philosophia Naturalis*, IVa Pars, Quaestio XII, art. 2). Suarez adds, however (*Opus. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 7), that God does not orinarily do this.

[55] *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 22, a. 8.

[56] Suarez appeals to Sess. 6, c. 5 (Denz. n. 797) and can. 4 (Denz. n. 814).

necessitate the will with respect to such an object is, Suarez adds, to derogate from God's omnipotence.[57]

Those who deny this position and simultaneously assert that God can efficaciously or physically predetermine the will are illogical. The predetermination they affirm would be the necessitation they deny. The fact that the object of the act in question is indifferent does not guarantee actual liberty for the will itself can be necessitated *ab extrinseco*. The argument that an indifferent object makes a free act overlooks these elements: 1) judgment is the root of liberty, not its form; 2) the intellectual judgment is natural, not free; 3) the object of the judgment, though not necessitating the will, cannot be the form from which the volitional act is denominated free since formal liberty is a property not of the object, but an intrinsic property inhering in the will of the one operating.[58] What the proponents of this theory forget Suarez thinks, is that necessity arising from an extrinsic principle is quite as absolute as that from an intrinsic principle. Liberty requires freedom from both.

Those who deny that God can necessitate the will with regard to indifferent goods and who yet affirm that He does predetermine it with regard to those same things argue that the will bears only on known goods, therefore it cannot be necessitated to what is known not to be necessary. Suarez uses

[57] Posse Deum, quia omnipotens est mutare voluntatem hominis quando voluerit, et ubi voluerit . . . non solum potest mutare voluntatem servando ejus libertatem sed etiam necessitando illam. . . . Imo difficilius videtur voluntatem mutare efficaciter salva ejus libertate, quam eam necessitando . . . tunc autem operatio erit necessaria et non libera quoad exercitium quia libertas . . . est denominata a potestate agendi et non agendi ergo tunc actus carebit tali denominatione et consequenter erit necessarius (*Prol. Primum*, cap 4, n. 13).

[58] . . . illud ipsum praedeterminare illo modo est necessitare . . . cum objectum sic judicatum non necessitet voluntatem potest aliunde voluntas superari et extrinseca necessitas illi imponi. . . . Illud judicium est origo libertatis . . . non ergo est ipsa formalis libertas. In illo judicio . . . actus non est formaliter liber, sed naturalis prout antecedit voluntatem; ergo non potest esse forma denominans liberum actum. . . . Formalis libertas non est proprietas abjecti, sed intrinseca proprietas hominis operantis voluntati inhaerens . . . argumentum (Thomistarum) enim probat actum a voluntate elicitum cum indifferentia judicii non esse necessarium ab intrinseco, ac subinde fore liberum nisi ab extrinseco necessitas inferatur voluntati; hanc vero inferri non posse illo argumento non probatur (*Ibid.*, nn. 14-16).

their own argument against them. The will bears solely on known goods, he answers; therefore it cannot be predetermined unless the good (object) be judged as something to be loved. So long, then, as the judgment is indifferent, i. e., proposes the object as apt to be either chosen or rejected, the will cannot be predetermined to one part. It is impossible, then, for the will to tend to the good by reason of this supposed predetermination; since, in fact, predetermination is true necessity, the argument, if valid against necessitation, is valid against predetermination.[59]

How can God necessitate the will with regard to an indifferent object? [60] Suarez indicates two ways: 1) by a mutation in the will antecedent to and really distinct from the act of the will, by which mutation the will is so impelled that it necessarily elicits its act; or 2) God immediately by Himself makes the will act necessarily, not by some prior reality distinct from the human act, but by an action imbibed into that human act. God's action is an aid or simultaneous concursus which cooperates with the human will.[61]

The first of these is for Suarez the same thing as the premotion spoken of by some of his adversaries. It is a quality in the order of first act given to produce the act efficiently together with the will, yet it is inseparable from second act and might be permanent or transient. The non-repugnance of this notion is evident from this that a finite power (such as the will) can be overcome by an infinite power (such as God).[62]

[59] Voluntas non fertur nisi in bonum cognitum; ergo non potest praedeterminari nisi bonum illud judicatum sit ut determinate amandum; ergo quamdiu judicium est indifferens ex parte objecti . . . non potest voluntas ad unam partem praedeterminari; ergo erit impossibile mediante illo judicio voluntatem intendere in illud bonum ex praedeterminatione (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

[60] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

[61] Unus (modus necessitandi voluntatem) est per antecedentem mutationem factam in voluntate, distinctam realiter ab ipso actu . . . alter est si Deus per seipsum immediate faciat voluntatem necessario velle . . . per actionem ipsam imbibitam in ipso velle quae ut est a Deo, habet rationem auxilii seu concursus simultanei cooperantis. . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[62] *Ibid.*, nn. 2-9.

The second mode is deducible from St. Thomas' teaching [63] and also from reason, that is, what God can do through second causes, He also can do alone. But we have seen that God can necessitate the will by a created quality, therefore He can do it without that quality. Necessitation of the will comes through an absolute and efficacious divine will which excludes every contingent condition on the part of man and is antecedent to human consent. It is of such decrees as these that theologians understood such Scriptural texts as: "No one can resist Thy will." [64]

God's effective decrees, then, are two-fold. 1) the *intention* which of itself effects nothing in creatures, but is an internal predefinition by God; 2) *execution* through which God efficaciously and immediately causes what He wills. This second necessitates our will and efficiently produces in it some reality distinct from act and distinct also from ordinary concursus, since it necessitates the will by effectively restraining its natural power of resisting God's help. This reality changes the connatural mode of its (the will's) operating. Its possibility arises from the subordination of the created will to the divine, a subordination having its fundament in the active power of the divine will.[65]

Since we are now at the very heart of the controversy (the relations of necessity and freedom) Suarez pauses to clarify

[63] *Q. D. de Verit., loc. cit.*

[64] Quidquid Deus operatur per causas secundas potest se solo operari . . . sed dictum est posse Deum necessitare voluntatem media qualitate creata: ergo etiam sine illa. . . . Est . . . certum sc. necessarium esse ut Deus, efficaci et absoluta voluntate excludente omnem conditionem contingentem ex parte voluntatis humanae et antecedentem ad consensum hominis velit facere ut homo . . . consentiat (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 5, nn. 9-11).

[65] . . . distinguere soleo in divina voluntate duplex decretum efficax: unum per modum intentionis tantum . . . nihil per seipsum et immediate ad extra operans . . . aliud per modum usus seu executionis quia per illud efficaciter Deus ad extra operatur quod vult (*Ibid.*, n. 13) . . . quando Deus efficaci et absoluta voluntate . . . vult hominis voluntatem velle objectum alias indifferenter propositum . . . minime possit voluntas per innatam libertatem illi (concursui) resistere (n. 20). Actus voluntatis nunquam est necessarius quoad exercitium nisi quia voluntas privatur potentia proxima suspendeni influxum suum vel . . . impeditur omnino ne illa uti valeat (n. 22).

the terms and precise things controverted.[66] In this matter certain propositions are universally admitted. They are: (1) a certain suppositional necessity of producing some effect, and impotency to produce, at the same time, some other effect, are reconcilable with the freedom both of the power and of its act. Some other necessity, even though suppositional, can be repugnant to liberty or to its use. The first part is clear. Divine foreknowledge and predestination imply a free effect so preknown that it is impossible for the effect not to take place; yet the act does not therefore cease to be free. There are other such suppositions which leave the act free. Supposing an end already intended there necessarily follows the election of the unique and necessary means to the end; yet there is liberty in that election provided the original intention was free.

The second part of this proposition is likewise clear from examples. The love whereby the blessed love God is necessary yet it supposes the sight of God; and the acts produced in us by exciting grace (*actus gratiae excitantis*) are necessary in us, though only on the supposition of divine motion.[67]

All likewise admit (2) that the distinction of two-fold necessity, in the composed and divided senses, explained in the legitimate way, is very good and necessary.[68] (3) There is no repugnance in one faculty's being, at one time, potential to two acts; wood, for example, is, at one time, capable of being both hot and cold; the intellect, at one time, has the active power of assenting and dissenting. The same is true of the will.[69] (4) When a faculty which is capable of contrary effects or acts receives one of them it does not lose its power for the other, though it cannot exercise that power while yet retaining the act being exercised. The will, then, while acting, has the

[66] Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 6.

[67] . . . beatificus amor in patria eam habet necessitatem quae libertatem excludit et tamen illa necessitas non est sine aliqua suppositione saltem visionis Dei . . . actus gratiae excitantis sunt ita necessarii in nobis ut non sint liberi, et tamen non fiunt necessarii nisi ex aliqua suppositione divinae motionis (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

[68] *Ibid.*, n. 4.

[69] *Ibid.*, n. 5.

natural power to suspend the act or to place a contrary act, though it cannot use this power while persevering in the act in question. It is said to suspend the act, or to do the contrary, in the divided sense, and no one disputes this explanation of the famous distinction.[70] (5) Necessity is two-fold, that is, preceding (which makes the thing to be) and subsequent (which the thing operating makes). The first is, as St. Anselm teaches, opposed to freedom, the second is not. We can apply this distinction to the composed sense, and have it:

composed < from a previous supposition
from a subsequent supposition

According to Suarez, the first of these induces necessity absolutely speaking, but a consequent supposition does not. St. Thomas' dictum that necessity of consequent is opposed to liberty, but that necessity of consequence is not opposed to it, is to be distinguished in the same way, for some necessity of consequence does destroy liberty, as in this reasoning: "Man sees God, therefore man loves Him." Hence the Thomistic dictum should be:



[70] *Ibid.*, n. 6.

[71] Unam (necessitatem) vocat (S. Anselmus) praecedentem quae facit rem esse; alterum subsequentem quam facit ipsamet operans et priorem dicit repugnare libertati, non tamen posteriorem. . . . Similique modo distingui potest duplex sensus compositus. . . . Itemque dicendum est de alia duplici necessitate consequentis et consequentiae quae sumitur ex divo Thoma . . . nam prior necessitas dicitur contraria libertati quia est absoluta necessitas rei, posterior vero dicitur non tollere libertatem. . . . Secundum autem membrum solum negative et permissive seu indefinite accipiendum est. . . Aliqua enim necessitas consequentiae repugnat libertati, qualis est haec: Homo videt Deum; ergo amat illum. . . . Et ideo membrum illud distinguendum est. . . . Nam si consequentia est necessaria ex

These points, then, are admitted by all, Suarez states. As to the application of the distinctions agreed on, there is no unanimity. Some hold that no supposition inducing necessity in the composed sense excludes active freedom except that by which the will is intrinsically determined to one thing and to exercise of the act. Any other necessity is compatible with freedom. Thus in heaven the will is necessitated by the medium of the Beatific Vision; but on this earth man can be necessitated only when the mode of cognition naturally determines intrinsically, i. e., the judgment presents the object not as indifferent but necessary. For the freedom of an act the power of not eliciting it in the divided sense is sufficient, according to this theory.[72]

The Suarezian position is: 1) that a supposition inducing necessity in the composed sense is not opposed to liberty provided it be such that it itself is placed through the use of liberty; 2) any supposition is opposed to freedom which altogether precedes the use of freedom, and, in the composed sense, induces necessity of the will's operating so that the simultaneous composition in the will of this supposition and of lack of act, is impossible.

The first proposition is quite generally agreed upon. The will in the very instant in which it is freely operating cannot at the same instant lack the operation. Its necessity is the necessity common to all things that they be while they are. The same is true of God's concomitant concursus. Supposing it, it is impossible that the will be not acting, but this composed necessity does not militate against freedom for the very supposition of such concursus involves a human, voluntary act.[73]

suppositione antecedente, repugnat libertati; si. . . ex suppositione consequente, non . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[72] *Ibid.*, nn. 8-9.

[73] Suppositionem inducentem necessitatem in sensu composito si talis sit ut per usum libertatis fiat vel illum usum liberum involvat seu comitantem habeat, inducere tantum necessitatem consequentiae . . . et non pugnare cum libertate; si vero . . . omnino antevertat usum libertatis et necessitatem operandi in voluntatem inducat . . . et in sensu composito . . . talem suppositionem inducere necessitatem simpliciter et contrariam libertati . . . Voluntas in eo instante in quo libere

The second and controverted proposition is, Suarez thinks, the common opinion of all theologians who accept the definition of freedom already given.[74] Under the preceding supposition the will can only act or not act, it cannot do both. The position that an antecedent supposition necessitates if it comes from a created agent but not if it comes from God is called unacceptable.[75] For in the first place, it cannot be reconciled with the definition of freedom, since freedom demands that both act and not-act be compatible with the pre-requisites to act. In the second place it is unreasonable, for even God cannot move the will by a previous motion which necessitates in the composed sense and at the same time preserve the will's freedom; St. Thomas' authority cannot be alleged for this position, Suarez argues; but rather the Angelic Doctor holds with St. Anselm and Suarez himself. He says, for instance, that the principle: "It is necessary that everything that is, while it is, be," is founded on the principle: "It is impossible for one thing simultaneously to be and not to be." "And," he adds, "this is not absolute but suppositional." Later he says: "That which is not absolutely necessary becomes necessary from the supposition of that thing." [76] It is clear that for St. Thomas the true composed sense (excluding absolute necessity) should be founded on the supposition of that very thing to which necessity is attributed. Thus he agrees with St. Anselm that all necessity which is not from the supposition of the thing, but of

operatur . . . jam non potest in eodem instanti carere actu sed habet necessitatem, de qua dixit Aristoteles res, quando est, necesse est esse (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[74] Cfr. *Ibid.*, nn. 11-25 for Suarez' treatment of the opinion of Theologians on this point.

[75] Quoties suppositio omnino praecedit et inter praerequisita ad agendum ponitur et talis est ut illo stante . . . tantum non agere compositive . . . illam suppositionem impedire usum libertatis (*Ibid.*, n. 11). (In doctrina) necessitatem provenientem ex antecedenti influxu voluntatis divinae non impedire libertatem . . . sed causare illam . . . neque expositio verborum Anselmi nec doctrina ipsa probari potest. . . . Ratione item id convinci potest, qua simul improbatur illa doctrina, etc. (*Ibid.*, nn. 15-16).

[76] Et haec est necessitas non absoluta sed ex suppositione (*I Periher.*, lect. 15, sect. 1). illud quod non est absolute necessarium fieri necessarium ex suppositione ejusdem (*Ibid.*, sect. 2).

some prior thing, is absolute and antecedent necessity, necessity simply speaking. Even more clearly in the *Physics*,[77] he writes: "That necessity which depends on prior causes is absolute," and "However, that which has necessity from something after it in being is necessary conditionally or by supposition." Some distinguish St. Thomas and say that which depends on prior causes, the first cause excepted, is absolutely necessary. This is unreasonable, Suarez repeats, it is also against St. Thomas' own words, "necessity from an exterior principle . . . if it is the efficient or moving cause brings about necessity of coaction," [78] and under this he includes that which comes from God.[79]

Reason itself indicates that when a supposition is antecedent to the act and the effect is connected necessarily with that supposition the necessity is not rooted in the principle: "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at one and the same time," since what is supposed is not the same thing as that which follows from the supposition. But necessity which is not rooted in this principle is necessity simply so called, necessity of consequent. Therefore a supposition which precedes actual liberty makes a free effect impossible. Given the supposition the will can do only one thing that, namely, which flows necessarily *quoad exercitium* from the supposition. Hence it is not proximately disposed to act and not-act, as the use of liberty requires that it be.[80]

God's preknowledge and predestination of things for Suarez

[77] Necessitas illa quae pendet ex causis prioribus, est absoluta. Quod autem habet necessitatem ab eo quod est posterius in esse est necessarium ex conditione vel suppositione (*II Physic.*, lect. 15).

[78] Quamdam necessitatem ex aliquo exteriori quod si sit causa efficiens vel movens facit necessitatem coationis (*Summa Theol.*, III, Q. 46, a. 1).

[79] Intelligit sub illa violenta necessitate proveniente ex aliquo exteriori princcipio includi etiam illam quae a Deo provenire potest (*Prol Primum*, cap. 6, n. 24).

[80] Quando suppositio est antecedens in sensu dicto . . . si effectus est necessario connexus cum tali suppositione, talis necessitas non est fundata in illo principio . . . posita hujusmodi suppositione voluntas . . . tantum potest unum agere, illud, scilicet, quod ex tali suppositione sequitur cum necessitate quoad exercitium: ergo non agit ut potens agere et non agere (*Ibid.*, nn. 26-27).

is not a precedent but a consequent supposition; foreknowledge is not a cause of reason that a thing is future, but *an intuition* of a future thing; and *predestination* supposes divine knowledge of the future free use of the created will with divine concursus, (if the other prerequisites to act are fittingly prepared for that will.) God, in predefining, always observes this respect. Hence the predefinition too is a consequent supposition.[81] Lastly Suarez maintains that those passages in St. Thomas cited by Thomists as opposing Suarez' notion actually favor it. Thus in the *Summa Theologica* (I. q. 14, a. 13, ad 2^{um}), what he actually teaches is that future free things are necessary by the necessity common to all things that they be, while they are; and this is consequent necessity. In the same article (ad 3^{um}), St. Thomas says that God's knowledge is extrinsic to the thing known, imprints nothing intrinsic to it, and so leaves it contingent. Everywhere in his works the Angelic Doctor teaches that, because God is the first root of all free effects, the efficacy of His will does not induce necessity in created free causes.[82] As to God's motion, in the *Summa* (I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3^{um}), St. Thomas is speaking of God's moving created wills by concomitant concursus, and not by a previous motion.[83] Again in the *Summa* (I-II, q. 112, a. 3), he proves only that God at times efficaciously intends an effect, depending on man's free cooperation, and that He has a way of moving man's will so that He obtains human consent freely but infallibly. He does not say how this is done; but Suarez explains that it is through

[81] Scientia Dei involvit rem esse futuram, et ita . . . non est suppositio antecedens . . . praescientia haec futurorum, ut scientia visionis est, non est causa vel ratio quod res sit futura, sed pura intuitio rei futurae. . . . Voluntas divina . . . praedestinans seu praedefiniens quatenus est de actibus liberis . . . supponit aliquam praescientiam, saltem conditionatam ipsius liberi usus voluntatis futuri cum solo concursu concomitante si caeterae . . . voluntati praeparantur ex hac parte (praedefinitio) est suppositio consequens, et non antecedens (*Ibid.*, n. 28).

[82] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 3^{um}; q. 22, a. 8; q. 23, a. 6; *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 6, a. 12, ad 7^{um}. Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 6, n. 30.

[83] Respondemus D. Thomam loqui de Deo movente per concursum concomitantem (*Ibid.*, n. 31). Thomists hardly agree.

a supposition which induces consequent, not antecedent necessity; that is, through the mediation of God's foreknowledge.[84]

3. *The Relation of Human to Divine Freedom.*[85] Suarez now considers the relation of human freedom to divine freedom. We can state the question simply: Can man act freely if God does not? Now that question has many senses, so to avoid ambiguity Suarez distinguishes them. The first sense is, whether, if there is no freedom in the first cause, there can be freedom in second causes. The answer is negative. Created perfection supposes divine perfections since they are participations of the divine.[86] The second sense of our question is: if, through an impossible supposition, God acted by natural necessity but creatures had a free faculty, would God, because of His natural mode of acting, impede the creature's *use* of liberty so that it would not have a free act, despite its free potency? Some Thomists seem to think not, insisting that given a free faculty and an indifferent object the act will always be free. Suarez disagrees saying that God can efficiently produce in such a faculty a necessary act with reference to such an object, as we have seen. On the supposition, then, that God is acting by necessity of nature none of our acts would be free, for God's motion being always infinite (for every agent acting as a nature acts with all its powers; only a free power can temper and moderate its own act) would always overcome man's finite faculty.[87]

The third sense of the question is: if God acted necessarily

[84] Solum probat Deum interdum efficaciter intendere effectum pendentem ex libera cooperatione hominis . . . quomodo autem id faciat Deus, D. Thomas ibi non exponit (*Ibid.*) St. Thomas, however, in the place cited, appeals to God's indefectible power, not to His knowledge; and the movement of the human will through God's power includes a precedent supposition.

[85] Cfr. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 3.

[86] *Ibid.*, nn. 5-6.

[87] Fieri autem potest ut agens alioqui ex se indifferens, ita feratur vel determinetur ad agendum ab alio superiori agente ut . . . non habeat potestatem non agendi, . . . potest privari usu libertatis. . . . Deus potest per infinitam suam potentiam ita movere voluntatem ut necessitatem illi inferat . . . sed si Deus ageret ex necessitate naturae . . . ageret quanta efficacia posset; ergo semper ageret necessitatem illi inferendo (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-12).

but nevertheless moved the will only as He now does by concursus, would He then take away our freedom of action? The Suarezian answer is negative. Liberty requires not that every cause of the free act be able to act and not-act, but only that the proximate cause be such [88] In the hypothesis, the proximate cause would be such, for God's concursus does not now necessitate, so neither would it necessitate if the mode of its bestowal were necessary and not free. The different mode would make no real distinction because then (as now) the concursus would be given dependently on the human will. It could not be placed in reality without the will, without its cooperation; hence it would not be absolutely necessary. It is a general rule that even though some cause concurs by natural necessity to a given effect (e. g., habits so concur), that necessity does not destroy the contingency of the act so long as the cause with respect to which the act is denominated free acts with indifference.[89]

Here Suarez raises the difficulty that, even granted that God's motion is freely given and not necessarily, it must necessitate the will.[90] He states the difficulty in the following ways: " 1) The second cause can do nothing unless moved by the first cause. But, when the second cause is moved by God it necessarily moves itself." " 2) A free cause is that which can act and not-act, given everything necessary for it to act. But one of the things necessary to its act is God's motion given which it cannot act and not-act." Therefore under that motion it acts necessarily.[91]

His opponents, Suarez points out, will avoid the difficulty by distinguishing the minor of the first syllogism: " When the second cause is moved by God it necessarily moves itself: by

[88] *Ibid.*, nn. 15-16.

[89] (Data illa hypothesi motio) Dei solum enim esset necessaria, quantum esset ex parte Dei; quia, tamen, simul penderet a voluntate creata nec posset in re poni sine illa, ideo non esset absolute necessaria (*Ibid.*, n. 19). Huic colligitur generalis regula . . . nihil obstare libertati . . . quod aliqua causa naturali necessitate ad illum concurrat dummodo aliqua cum indifferentia efficiat, respectu cujus effectus denominetur liber (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

[90] *Ibid.*, sect. 4.

[91] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

necessity in the composed sense, yes; in the divided sense, no. But necessity in the composed sense does not militate against freedom. Therefore. . . ." To the second syllogism, they answer: " A free cause is that which can act and not-act given everything necessary for its act must be distinguished in this wise: it can still act and not-act given everything necessary on the part of intellect and will, yes; but it cannot still act and not-act given God's motion.[92] For they say indifference of the faculty is not required for freedom, but indifference of the object is sufficient. Suarez repeats that this position fails to distinguish between radical and formal liberty. To have his definition of freedom apply to a free act as well as to the free faculty, the prerequisites must include God's motion, and not merely the requisites on the part of intellect and will. In answering the first objection the use of the distinction of the composed and divided sense is termed unjustified. God can necessitate the will by His motion. Now the act will not be necessary in the divided sense (for apart from that motion the will can not act), but in the composed sense. Yet this necessity in the composed sense even destroys the free use for we are supposing that God necessitates the human will by all His strength.[93]

In the answer to the second syllogism, the limitation of things necessary to the act is termed arbitrary and unproven. One could as easily say, Suarez argues, that given a celestial or dia-

[92] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

[93] Tota haec doctrina . . . non distinguit satis inter radicem libertatis et formalem libertatem (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Nec recte limitare descriptionem facultatis liberae . . . ad requisita ex parte judicii et ipsius voluntatis et existente . . . facultate de se libera potest in ipso usu non esse libera. Unde . . . haeretici . . . aiunt nos non libere operari eo quod ab ipso Deo necessitatem patimur. In quo quidem errant . . . non errant tamen in illatione . . . quod si Deus infert extrinsecam necessitatem actui non est de facto liber (*Ibid.*, n. 5). Distinctio illa sensus compositi et divisi . . . ita generaliter sumpta satis esse non potest. . . . Deus aliqua motione potest inferre necessitatem voluntati et tunc actus non esset necessarius in sensu diviso . . . esset necessarius in sensu composito quia posita illa motione non potest non exerceri; et tamen illa necessitas in sensu composito tolleret usum libertatis quia supponimus Deum tunc necessitare voluntatem quantum potest (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

bolical influence our will could not not-operate and yet be free since the judgment remains free, as does the faculty in itself. Indifference of the potency is, in fact, just as necessary to a free act as is indifference of the object. To argue that God is free, yet determined to one thing, is not to the point. That determination is not natural, or God would not be free. Divine determination is from liberty, an eternal self-determination. The consequent necessity is a necessity not of nature but of immutability, which does not take away the freedom which a free thing has of itself. In God's will there is no efficiency of the act, no composition of potency and act, the indifference which is His liberty is not liberty with indifference of a power with respect to acts.[94]

To give the real answer to the difficulties raised above Suarez says we must remember the definition of freedom. It contains two elements: 1) it is an active faculty which, of itself, has power both to act and to suspend action; 2) that faculty while acting is, proximately, so disposed that given everything needed for its act it can act and not-act. The second element, which touches what is necessary to the use of freedom, must be distinguished. A thing can be necessary to the placing of an act:

antecedently: prerequisite to act; in the order of first act.
concomitantly: intrinsically included in the second act, and not distinct from it.

In his definition the phrase: "given everything necessary" refers only to things which are antecedently necessary.[95] The

[94] Pari ratione posset quis dicere posita quadam influentia coeli, vel adhibita speciali daemonis motione non posse voluntatem nostram non operari sequendo illam et nihilominus tunc libere operaturam (*Ibid.*, n. 6). Exemplum de voluntate divina . . . non est ad rem. . . . Voluntas enim divina . . . vere tamen est indifferens de se ad volendum creata objecta . . . et licet ab aeterno se determinaverit . . . tamen illamet determinatio . . . est ex libertate; ejusque necessitas non est naturae sed immutabilitatis quae non tollit . . . indifferentiam. . . . In voluntate Dei . . . illa indifferentia est . . . in puro actu respectu objectorum et ideo in hoc non est comparanda indifferentia liberatis creatae cum divina (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[95] Cfr. *Ibid.*, nn. 8-10. Dupliciter posse dici aliquid requiri ad actum: uno modo

fact that indifference still remains, given these, is clear. If it did not remain the non-position of the act would not be from internal ability to not-act but (because of the deficiency of the requisites) inability to act. On the other hand the term "everything required" as used in the definition cannot include those things which are concomitantly necessary for they are included in the very act as essential elements. Certainly the action itself is required as that by which the faculty is formally determined, and by which it is constituted as acting; therefore the act can hardly be included among these things given which the faculty remains indifferent to acting and not-acting. Neither therefore can the essential elements of the act (those things concomitantly required for the action) be among those things in the presence of which the will retains its indifference.[96]

To the first syllogism, then: "Second causes can do nothing unless moved by first cause. But when the will is moved by God it moves itself necessarily." Suarez answers that God's motion is two-fold: a) that which precedes actual concursus; and b) concursus itself. The former (which is certain in theology, but hardly known in philosophy), a motion which is in the order of first act with respect to operation, but is after the manner of second act with respect to the faculty itself, leaves the power free to place or not to place the act. If it did not do so it would, of course, determine the faculty and so take away freedom. Thus Trent defines (with respect to supernatural acts) that given this previous motion the will can still not consent. "If anyone shall say that the free will of man,

tanquam praerequisitum ad actionem alio modo tanquam intrinsece vel essentialiter inclusum in ipsa actione . . . prius dici solet praerequisitum antecedenter; . . . posterius . . . requisitum concomitanter. "Positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere" . . . intelligendum est de praerequisitis antecedenter . . . non de aliis (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[96] Quod ad usum liberum sit necessarium . . . dictam indifferentiam (patet) . . . quia alias cessatio . . . ab opere non esset ex intrinseca vi . . . sed ex defectu . . . non est posse non agere, sed est potius impotentia agendi (*Ibid.*, n. 11). Definitio intelligenda non sit de requisitis concomitanter . . . est autem actio requisita ut id quo formaliter determinatur potentia et constituitur actu agens et ideo non potest includi in his conditionibus cum quibus potentia debetesse indifferens (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

moved and aroused by God . . . cannot dissent if it will, or as a lifeless thing does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema." [97] Man can dissent, not because God is deficient in power, but because He moves us wisely, providentially. When He wishes to, He efficiently causes the will infallibly to consent, though it can not-consent. Absolutely speaking it is not repugnant that, granted this motion, the will does not move.[98]

The second motion, actual concursus (better known in the natural order than the first motion, since it is, physically, more intrinsically necessary to the created action) is that through which the act of the second cause essentially depends on the first cause. Granted it, the will cannot not-move. Freedom does not thereby suffer, however, since concursus is not a prerequisite to act, but an essential element included in the act.[99]

To the second syllogism Suarez answers with the same distinction: " A free cause is one which can act and not-act, given everything necessary to its act. But among the necessary things is God's motion, given which it can no longer act and not-act, but must act." God's concursus is not among the antecedent requisites of which the definition of liberty speaks. Under concursus the will cannot not-move, for it is already supposed as constituted in act by its own determination.[100]

4. *The Relation of the Free Faculty to Intellect.*[101] There remains to consider the very important point of the relations

[97] Trent, Sess. 6, can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

[98] Duplicem intelligi posse motionem Dei respectu voluntatis nostrae. Una est antecedens actualem concursum . . . alia consistens in . . . concursu. Prior parum nota est in metaphysica. . . . Tamen in Theologia est certa . . . respectu alterius actus propter quem datur illa motio comparatur per modum principii . . . illa data adhuc potest voluntas non operari. . . . Neque hoc est contra efficaciam divinae motionis . . . tum quia id non provenit ex impotentia sed ex sapientia, providentia . . . tum etiam quia quando ipse vult etiam facit efficaciter ut voluntas infallibiliter consentiat. . . . Per se et absolute non repugnat, stante hac motione, non moveri voluntatem (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, nn. 13-14).

[99] Posterior motio est magis nota lumine naturali quia physice est magis necessaria ad actionem creaturae (*Ibid.*, n. 13; cfr. also n. 15).

[100] *Ibid.*, n. 16.

[101] *Disp. Meta., loc cit.*, sects. 6-7.

between intellect and will. We have seen that freedom is formally in the will alone. How, then, is the free will determined by the intellectual judgment? Some answer that there must precede in reason a definite practical judgment, an *imperium*. Until reason judges determinately, the will cannot elect; otherwise it would tend to an unknown object which is impossible.[102]

Suarez replies that if this were the case, if judgment were a necessary cause of free acts, the will would not be free. The judgment is either necessary or free. If it is necessary there is no actual freedom in the intellect nor in the voluntary act which follows; if the judgment is free it is so either elicitively or imperatively (by imperation of the will.) It cannot be elicitively free since the intellect is not a formally free power. Neither can it be free imperatively for then either we have an infinite regress of will moving intellect and intellect moving will, which is impossible; or else the will is not determined in every act by the intellect, and this denies the original proposition. He concludes that the will is not determined in all its free acts by an intellectual judgment, and that no subsequent judgment determines the will to any act except in virtue of a previous free volition.[103]

The position that will determines intellect efficiently and that intellect determines the will finally, is quite unacceptable to Suarez. It is: a) unfounded and unnecessary; b) hardly understandable; c) impossible. In proof of the charge of its impossibility he reasons that in every vital act the sufficient application of the object antecedes the act, for it is impossible that this application come from the act to which it is ordered. But rational judgment is required for volitional acts because that judgment is the application of the object. Therefore the judgment cannot proceed efficiently from the act because that judgment precedes the act of will.

[102] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 1.

[103] Si . . . illo judicio posito voluntas non potest non consentire illi ergo voluntas . . . non est potentia libera (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Voluntatem non determinari in omnibus suis actibus liberis a judicio intellectus . . . (et) nunquam sic determinari nisi in virtute alicujus prioris volitionis liberae (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

The major premise is shown by induction: among all natural agents it is impossible that an agent which requires a patient in order to act does not suppose absolutely the application of the patient to such an act, for the agent is impotent except as to applied matter. The minor premise is proved by this that nothing is willed which is not already known. If one answers that judgment is required for volition not merely as an application of the object but as an efficient principle with the will, Suarez says that his case is stronger. The judgment cannot then be from the volitional act as from its efficient principle, since judgment is the efficient co-principle of the volitional act.[104] The Suarezian position is shown *a priori*: "The intellectual judgment moves the will only through the medium of the proposed object. But the object proposed does not always induce necessity in the will, nor determine the will to one thing. Therefore, such determination from the judgment is neither necessary nor possible." The major premise is clear from this consideration that the intellect cannot be an efficient principle: a) this would destroy freedom in the will; b) it would be contrary to the intellect's mode of acting; c) only the will can move the other powers as to exercise. Even the *imperium* of reason of itself moves only objectively. If it seems at times to move efficiently this is in virtue of a previous act of the will, as when the will intends a certain end, or elects this means, the intellect judges that it is to be done. The will is determined, however, by its own act, not by the *imperium* as such.

The minor is admitted by all, for it is the same thing to say that the will is not necessitated by something other than itself as to say it is not determined to one by that other. But it is certain the will is not necessitated by all objects; neither, therefore, is it determined by all. Only in heaven is there determination to one object as to exercise; that determination is from the infinite goodness of God clearly seen.[105]

[104] In omni actu vitali sufficiens applicatio objecti necessarii ad actum simpliciter . . . antecedit talem actum . . . sed judicium rationis requiritur ad actum voluntatis ut applicans objectum; ergo impossible est ut judicium rations . . . effective proveniat ab eodem actu (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[105] Judicium intellectus non movet voluntatem nisi medio objecto quod proponit;

Suarez presumes as the root misconception of those who oppose him the position that the judgment must determine the will to one thing. To say the intellect must first judge what is to be elected is ambiguous. If the meaning is that intellect must first judge what goodness, what utility, this means or this election has, the statement is true. If it means that it must first judge " this is to be elected " it is false, for that would be repugnant to the will's liberty. It is enough that the object be judged eligible, i. e., that it is sufficiently good, that it can be loved.[106] We cannot say that God before He freely loves some creature judges: " This creature must be loved, or chosen." That would imply that something other than God is necessary to Him. What God does judge antecedently is that this thing is convenient and eligible. The same thing is to be understood of the created will. Once the intellect has judged a particular means to be eligible, even though it judges at the same time that another means is also useful, the will can choose one and it is not necessary for the intellect to judge beforehand that that one must be chosen, or that it is better than the one not chosen.[107] When the intellect sees that certain means are equally apt the will chooses one of them, precisely because it is free. This is true of God; it is true also of men. In Suarezian doctrine, such an election comes only from free voluntary determination. When the means are judged as unequal, the will, more probably is not necessarily determined to the better means by reason of the judgment. God could have made better things than He did make, but He chose not to. If the will is, in virtue of a previous intention, determined to choosing the more useful

sed objectum propositum non semper infert necessitatem voluntati aut determinat illam ad unum. . . . Nam perinde est dicere voluntatem non necessitari ab alio quod non determinari ad unum ab illo (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-9).

[106] " Necessarium esse ut intellectus prius judicat quid eligendum sit " ambigua esse: . . . si vero est sensus prius esse judicandum absolute . . . hoc esse eligendum falsa est propositio. . . . Sufficit ergo illud judicium quo medium hoc judicatur utile et . . . aptum ut eligi possit (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[107] Ergo si judicet intellectus hoc medium esse utile vel eligibile, etiamsi simul judicet aliud esse utile potest voluntas unum eligere, neque est necesse ut intellectus prius de altero determinate judicet esse eligendum, imo neque esse eligibilius alio (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

means (because that is necessary to attaining the end) that determination is from the will's intention, not from the rational judgment.[108]

If it is true that the will can choose something contrary to the judgment of reason, how, Suarez asks, can one admit the common teaching of philosophers and theologians that there cannot be a defect in the will unless it exist first in the judgment?[109] Scotus answered that there can be a moral defect with no defect preexisting in the reason. Others answer that whoever does evil always has a practical judgment which is conformed to some predisposition, a judgment that " this is to be done " supposing the disposition. Suarez rejects this on the ground that the intellect, prior to election, need have no such judgment. The judgment " this must be done " has place only when there is a *necessary* connection between the object and some preceding affection.[110]

To arrive at the real answer Suarez employs the distinctions between antecedent and subsequent judgment (or disposition, or intellectual defect) and that between absolute (physical) and moral necessity.

To do evil it is not absolutely necessary, according to Suarez, that an error of judgment precede. This follows from the principle that no judgment is, of itself, sufficient to determine the will. Morally speaking, however, the will never is ensnared unless a defect in judgment precede, at least the defect which is inconsideration. It is not even morally necessary, however, that the judgment be formally comparative; e. g., " this is to be preferred to that," or that it be formally of an object as something which must be done. It is enough that it judge that this object is, here and now, convenient.[111]

[108] Posse esse judicia de mediis aequalibus: et tune voluntas nec . . . necessario est suspensa, sed haec est ejus libertas ut unum possit eligere, et aliud omittere . . . quando objecta vel media judicantur inaequalia censeo probabilius . . . non determinari voluntatem necessario ad id quod est melius, ex vi judicii (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[109] *Ibid.*, sect. 7, n. 1.

[110] Nunquam satis probatur esse necessarium hoc judicium ita absolutum . . . non esse necessarium judicium de objecto amando sed de amabili (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[111] Non existimo absolute necessarium ad operandum malum per voluntatem ut

It is probable, he thinks, that from the free consent of the will about things to be done there follows, of necessity, in the intellect the practical judgment by which it is judged absolutely " This is to be done " in the sense that this judgment signifies: a) the necessary following of one thing from another; and b) a man's absolute resolution about the operation to be placed or the object already willed. If this is so, then, sinners are always in error, but by a consequent error. The necessity for such a judgment is evident, for as soon as man consents to something he must notify himself of that consent and, in some cases, approve it. This consequent judgment takes the form of *imperium* when the object chosen requires the use of the executive faculties.[112]

5. *The Necessary Acts of the Human Will.*[113] So much for the relation of intellect and will. We must now consider this difficulty: how can the will be called free, since it is not free in its principal acts? Here two questions are involved: 1) can the will elicit some acts freely, and others necessarily? 2) if it can, which acts are exercised freely, which necessarily? [114]

In answer to the first question Suarez admits that the will can love some things freely others necessarily. The divine will loves God necessarily, other things freely. Proportionately the same is true of the created will. One act cannot, under one aspect and at one time, be both free and necessary; but it is not repugnant that one potency be the principle of different acts, some of which proceed necessarily and some freely, supposing that those acts are concerned with different objects or through different media. Substituting the term " natural " for " necessary " we can say that certain operations are natural to the will, i. e., they are from an inclination of the will as it is a

praecedat defectus erroris in judicio . . . (quia) nullum judicium intellectus per se sufficit ad determinandam voluntatem (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Moraliter loquendo, nunquam voluntatem labi quin praecedat in intellectu aliquis defectus (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[112] Probabile esse ex consensu libero voluntatis . . . sequi in intellectu judicium illud practicum . . . quo simpliciter judicatur hoc esse agendum (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[113] *Ibid.*, sect. 8.

[114] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

nature determined to one thing, for the will truly is a nature. Even such operation, however, is preceded by knowledge.[115]

To the question, which voluntary operations are necessary, the usual answer is that man is free as to election of means, but not as to the intention of the end. This answer, in Suarez' view, needs both modification and explanation. The end can be proximate (my private good loved for its own sake, e. g., health) or ultimate (either some determined thing or beatitude taken in general.)[116] Considering the will operating according to its own nature, and especially in this life, it has no act which is simply necessary as to exercise. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and of Thomists generally, according to Suarez; but he adds that St. Thomas arrived at the truth by false reasoning.[117]

The position that the first act following the use of reason is necessary as to exercise is quite mistaken. The will can never be necessitated as to exercise unless the object, for its part, sufficiently concurs to that necessitation and subjects the will to itself. The object proposed through the first cognitional act, however, is often a particular thing which cannot concur to the necessitating of the will.[118] Neither is this act necessary as to specification, for it need not be about a universal good. The fact is, this act in question can be evil. That the cognitional act, in this instance, is necessary proves nothing with regard to the will. The will is never necessitated unless the object, and even the act, are proposed as altogether necessary (something which cannot happen in this life).[119]

[115] *Ibid.*, nn. 2-6.

[116] Voluntatem solum esse liberam in electione mediorum non vero in amore vel intentione finis (*Ibid.*, n. 7). Sed haec sententia moderatione indiget et declaratione . . . supponatur distinctio duplicis finis scilicet proximi . . . et ultimi (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[117] In hoc sensu dicimus primo, voluntatem nullum habere actum simpliciter necessarium quoad exercitium sive circa finem sive circa media (*Ibid.*, n. 9). Suarez here cites *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2.

[118] Falsum esse quod Cajetanus ait, nempe primum actum voluntatis in homine jam utente ratione esse necessarium quoad exercitium (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[119] Addo illum primum actum . . . non esse necessarium . . . quoad specificationem . . . hic primus actus in humana voluntate potest esse et bonus et malus moraliter (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

To an end proposed to a man as something universally good, the will is necessitated as to specification. No man can hate such a thing, although he can refuse to do anything about it. With regard to particular ends the will is free even as to specification, for in such good defects, or inconvenience, or difficulty, can be found.[120] St. Thomas's statement [121] that such things as being, knowledge, etc., are willed naturally does not mean for Suarez that they are willed with necessity of specification; rather it refers to the mode of operating naturally (that is, to be moved by a certain propensity of nature with which natural propensity liberty is compatible), and not to necessity of operating. Nevertheless (Suarez adds), with respect to these goods some necessity of specification can be admitted.[122]

Freedom is most properly exercised in electing means, since in that act the faculty is more fully moving itself than in intending an end. Still, there is freedom in intending the end, even though the intention proceeds from a natural inclination. The very intention of ultimate happiness as here and now exercised is a virtual election by which that act is elected as a means to beginning or to attaining happiness. Hence it participates freedom.[123]

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(To be continued)

[120] Circa finem sub universalis boni ratione propositum voluntas feratur necessario quoad specificationem (*Ibid.*, n. 15).

[121] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

[122] D. Thomam ibi non loqui de necessitate ulla etiam quoad specificationem, sed de modo operandi naturaliter (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, n. 18).

[123] Liberatem voluntatis evidentius et perfectius exerceri in electione mediorum . . . ad intentionem finis fertur voluntas et sola aliqua inclinatione naturali, quamvis libere feratur (*Ibid.*, nn. 19-20).

BOOK REVIEWS

The Apocalypse of Saint John. By R. J. Loenertz, O.P. (Translated by Hilary Carpenter, O.P.) New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948. Pp. 156, with index. $2.50.

The Apocalypse or Revelation of Saint John is a long letter, written to seven Christian communities or churches of the Roman province of Asia, in which the author sets down what he has seen, heard, and understood in the course of his prophetic ecstasies during his exile on the island of Patmos in the Egean Sea. The book, "The Apocalypse of Saint John," attempts to analyse this letter and the result is uniformly good. The book is made up of three parts, an introduction, a translation of the Greek text of the letter, and a commentary. The introduction is brief and is concerned with the scheme or plan of the literary structure of the letter. Père Loenertz has made use of the French translation by Bossuet but the English translation of the work reproduces the Douai version with certain modifications. These modifications, as noted by the Translator, are four in number: (1) the numbering of chapters and verses are relegated to the margin, (2) divisions in the text have been introduced to serve as a basis for the commentary, (3) certain words are enclosed in brackets because they do not pertain to the original text, (4) occasionally, in view of some particular need, in a note, an alternative translation is given which is more in conformity with the critical Greek text. The commentary, however, follows the Greek text, and is brief but lucid. It is meant to appeal to the ordinary reader as well as the expert and is based on the classical commentary of the late Père Allo, O.P. Without introducing the wealth of detail which increases the bulk of the more technical works of this kind, he has produced a valuable introduction to a little known but very important book of the New Testament, the Apocalypse or Revelation of Saint John. The work of Père Loenertz comes to English readers through a clear and pleasing translation made by the English Dominican Provincial.

Of all the books of the New Testament, the Apocalypse, perhaps, is the least read; not, however, because it is the least interesting for it is not. Indeed there are some passages familiar to everybody, familiar even to those who have never heard of the Apocalypse. For instance, the scene of Apocalypse 6: 1-8, describing the four horsemen, is one of the most popular in the book. And the reason is because that vision is readily grasped by the imagination and even easily transferred to canvas. It has in fact, inspired many illustrious artists and among them, Dürer. And there are a few other sections which are among the most widely known parts of the Bible. But the book, as a whole, is neglected because of its extreme difficulty. In

many of the visions we cannot visualize all the details that John describes; they are intellectually but not pictorially comprehensible. Many details appear fantastic and even grotesque, and it would seem that the ecstatic experience of the Seer enjoyed the same liberty which the human imagination possesses in dreams. As soon as people begin to read the book as a whole, they are perplexed by obscurities which confront them in almost every verse. They may get as far as the end of the third chapter without much travail but as soon as they attempt to penetrate further, the symbols of the visions sometimes become so strange as to seem meaningless. And this failure to penetrate the visions of the Apocalypse is not entirely due to some ineptitude on the part of readers in modern times. Even in the early days of the Church the book was considered obscure. Although few of the Fathers have written formal commentaries on the Apocalypse, they quote it frequently and from the references and commentaries which have come down to us, they all agree, it appears, that the book is filled with mystery; indeed, it itself is the sealed book of chapter five. For instance St. Jerome (Ep. 53) says: "How many there are who imagine they are educated; yet the book they hold is sealed! For they cannot open it unless He unlocks it 'who has the key of David; He who opens and no man shuts, who shuts and no man opens.'" And again, "John's Apocalypse contains as many mysteries as words . . . in every single word lie many meanings!"

The difficulties, therefore, which surround the interpretation of the Apocalypse are admittedly very great. But what is the source of the obscurity? Some of the difficulties are, no doubt, the legacy of time. Others are due to the prophetical contents of the book and to the symbolical character of its style. But Saint Augustine points to a great source of obscurity when he says (De Civitate Dei, XX): "In the book called the Apocalypse many things are said in an obscure manner in order to exercise the reader's mind. And there are few passages so plain as to assist us in the interpretation of the others; and this is especially due to this that he repeats the same thing in various ways so as to lead us to think that he is speaking of different things, when indeed he is trying to tell us the same thing in different ways."

How then are we to penetrate the mystery of the book? For Père Loenertz the key to the Apocalypse is to be found in the mystical number seven. And he is of the opinion that he discovered a septenary, in the section on the fall of Babylon, which other commentators had overlooked so that the whole Apocalypse is a septenary of septenaries. He sent the result of his study to Père Allo and received the reply (p. vi) ". . . you press much further than I the use of the septenaries. It is a system that must certainly be taken into serious consideration." Père Allo does state, however, in his introduction to the Apocalypse (ch. viii) that, from the time of the Venerable Bede, the greater number among the commentators

on the Apocalypse recognize that John has arranged the scenes of his book in a sevenfold structure. For these commentators the action is depicted in seven acts and each act is subdivided into seven scenes but all do not agree in marking off the limits of each act or scene nor do all explicitly number the subdivisions. But some do. For instance the Westminster edition of the Apocalypse, published in 1931, divides the text into seven septenaries and each septenary is subdivided into seven numbered sections and, of course, this includes the septenary on the destruction of Babylon.

Does this help to solve the mystery of the Apocalypse? It certainly enables an unprejudiced critic to determine that one mind conceived and carried out the plan of the Apocalypse. According to many independent critics the book now bears the stamp of a single author, but according to these critics, there are many indications in the book that this unity has been imposed by some editor on a number of documents which were originally separate, and which were composed at different times and under different circumstances. Of course, here and there, the Epistle exhibits certain disparate phenomena which an honest critic would expect to find in an Oriental record depicting Eschatological visions. But the manner in which the septenaries are interconnected so that the last episode of one septenary often forms a skilful transition to the next is beyond the power of any editor to impose, no matter how well versed or trained he may be in the art of editing. Thus the fact that the Apocalypse is a septenary of septenaries proves that there is but one author who produced a unified book and that it is not a compilation of two or more apocalyptic documents by two or more authors or editors (p. xv).

But does a recognition of the septenaries enable a reader to penetrate the meaning of the book? It certainly helps a reader to understand that John is not writing a continuous exposition of the Church's future history in chronological order; he is setting before us various phases of that history through different symbolical visions and one vision may be a recapitulation and completion of a previous vision, as for instance, the vials complete what has already been revealed by the trumpets (p. 106), or in the words of Saint Augustine, cited above, " he repeats the same thing in various ways so as to lead us to think that he is speaking of different things, when indeed he is trying to tell us the same thing in different ways." Thus through the recognition of the septenaries the reader can view the book as a whole.

The main source of the difficulties or obscurities, however, in this letter of Saint John, is not in recognizing the septenaries but in penetrating the meaning of the visions contained in the septenaries. True it is that many commentators or readers do not take the sevenfold division sufficiently into account but the plan itself of seven subdivided by seven is so clear that he who runs may read it. But the symbols are not so easily deciphered

and there are a great many symbols. There are numerical symbols, many more than the mystical number seven. There are symbols of seals, of trumpets, of signs and of vials, of horsemen, of witnesses, of women clothed with the sun, of a beast of the earth and a beast of the sea, of angels and plagues and a scarlet beast, of an earthly city called Babylon, and of a heavenly city named Jerusalem. Around these symbols the prophet of Patmos weaves the action of his prophetic drama. Will a recognition that the prophecy is framed in a septenary of septenaries enable us to penetrate the meaning of these symbols? This, indeed, would be too much to expect. For instance, the vision of the horsemen of chapter six seems simple enough to grasp and yet commentators, who agree on the literary structure of the Apocalypse, differ in their interpretation of the rider on the white horse and therefore in the meaning of the vision. So too is it with many other symbols in this letter of John. And Père Loerentz (p. vi) states that in following Père Allo he sometimes differs from him and in rare cases contradicts him, and yet both agree, at least in principle, on the septenaries of the Apocalypse. So, while recognizing that the Apocalypse is a septenary of septenaries will tell us much in regard to the book, we see it will not tell us everything. We have to fall back on something else.

Père Loenertz has done a good work in insisting on the importance of the septenaries. His exposition is based on the sevenfold division of the book and is after the manner of an analytical commentary, succinct yet lucid, and sufficiently elaborated to enable a reader to grasp the general import of the revelation of St. John which is the revelation of Christ. It is worthy of mention that he points out the fact that the mystical number seven is woven into the text by uniting on one page in a group of seven certain things scattered through the book and which might otherwise escape the reader's attention: the seven apocalyptic beatitudes (p. 39), the seven interventions of the twenty-four elders (p. 58), the glorious return of Christ in a cloud seven times (p. 102), the seven appearances of Jesus in person (p. 128), the expression " behold, I come," seven times (p. 146). There are some points in the commentary with which one might disagree and all difficulties are not solved nor, perhaps, can they be in the present state of our knowledge. Yet, it is a worthwhile addition to the literature on a book that is veiled in mystery, but a very important book to the Church since it is a prophecy of her tribulation and triumph, the Apocalypse or Revelation of St. John.

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Metafisica dell' essere parziale. By Carmelo Ottaviano. Padua: Cedam, 1947. (2nd. ed. revised and enlarged) Pp. 667, with index.

The author is known by several works, historical and others; he has edited some treatises by Campanella, written on medieval philosophy, and publishes a philosophical review. The first edition of the present volume appeared in 1942: it is not without amazement that one realizes that a republication has been necessary and possible in the Italy of to-day.

I regret that it will prove hardly feasible to do full justice to this work. If it is always difficult to render account of a lengthy work in philosophy on the few pages of a book review, this task is even more difficult here, partly because of the method of presentation adopted by the author, partly because of the novelty of some of his ideas which cannot be appreciated correctly unless exposed in greater detail and critically examined. The author feels that he has restricted digressions on the history of philosophy to the indispensable minimum; but even so, these digressions are of considerable length. They are indeed as important in the progress of the author's exposition as they are interesting. But they are so much interwoven with the systematic discussion of the main problems and the particular points the author wants to make that it becomes impossible to disengage the systematic from the historical. It is therefore inevitable that this review must content itself with pointing out the intentions and the fundamental views of the author.

With respect to Dr. Ottaviano's intentions, these are not less than the presentation of a new all-comprising philosophy which, without ignoring, least of all despising, the work of predecessors, would open the way towards the " fourth age " in philosophy. This age will be equally aware of the demands evolving from scientific and social progress, of the eternally immutable truths contained in Revelation insofar as the supernatural is concerned, and of the work by the great thinkers of the past. This new philosophy is consciously and thoroughly a Christian, a Catholic philosophy. If it is to be related somehow with the great trends of Christian philosophy, it is more in line with the thought of Augustine-Anselm than with that of Thomas and the medieval Aristotelians; but not as if Dr. Ottaviano were not an admirer of St. Thomas or disregards the achievements of other medieval philosophers. The Augustinian-Anselmian heritage becomes visible in a basic attitude strongly reminiscent of what some have called the " Christian rationalism " of St. Anselm. Perhaps, our author does not go as far as his great predecessor who wanted to prove by *rationes necessariae* some of the fundamental tenets of the Faith, *quasi nihil sciatur de Christo,* as he says in his *Cur Deus homo.* Dr. Ottaviano recognizes that speculation would be lost in the tangle of multiform problems and approaches did it not find a sure guide in revealed truth. But he apparently thinks that the

mysteries, at least some of them, can be demonstrated, not in the *quomodo sint*, but in the *an sint*, by speculative reason, which however needs for surety the confirmation by Revelation.

The three preceding ages of human thought are those of Greek Antiquity, of the Christian Middle Ages, and of the modern time, from the Italian Renaissance to our own days. The author envisions the notion of the eternity of matter as the fundamental tenet of Greek philosophy; in virtue of this notion, Greek speculation could conceive of God only as a demiurge or a physical mover of the material universe. This mode of approaching the problems of reality and life ends in a deep pessimism as soon as matter appears as the principle of death, imperfection, finiteness, of the tragic aspect of existence. Medieval thought conceived of God, aided therein by faith, as Creator and as the metaphysical principle of being, the *summum bonum* and the true end of human existence. This view was, says the author, essentially anthropocentric and hence implied the notions of God's transcendence on one hand, as origin and goal, and transcendence of the material world on the other, as an obstacle to be overcome and a principle to be transformed. These views, however, brought forth the great difficulty of the gnoseological problem: how was man to attain knowledge of transcendent entities? The basic immanentism of the philosophies which followed is the inevitable consequence; therewith man again became the "measure of all things." Subjectivism and relativism in all their various shades emerged necessarily, once Descartes had made inner evidence the only criterion of reliable truth.

One cannot go back to the Middle-Ages; the world has advanced since then and the philosophy it needs is not that of past centuries. Ottaviano points out, in a concluding chapter, that the modern age has progressed beyond the Middle-Ages mainly in virtue of three great conquests: the juridical equality of all human individuals, the achievement of scientific domination over the physical world, the freedom of philosophical, generally speaking scientific, conscience. Thus, our times differ so profoundly from those of medieval centuries that to solve the problems of to-day within the framework of any of the past philosophies is a hopeless enterprise.

A new philosophy arises when a new standpoint is discovered from which to re-evaluate and re-examine the age old problems. The importance of Descartes or of Kant is this, that they have—as did any other of the truly great thinkers—placed themselves on a new standpoint, that they believed themselves to have discovered a new principle in the light of which the obscurities of past systems seemed to disappear and the whole of human speculation, the practical needs of man's life and destiny, the meaning of all that is presented appeared as a consistent, intelligible context. The author of the present work has such a new vision; he too believes that he has discovered a new principle, a new interpretation of being.

By means of this basic principle he undertakes to erect a system which comprises all parts of philosophy. His work is divided into seven sections labelled " inquiries ": methodological, logical, gnoseological, metaphysical, physical, religious, moral. Since I cannot venture to analyse and criticize his ideas, a brief report on the fundamentals and some few indications of the way he uses his basic intuition in the various " inquiries " must suffice. It has to be admitted that he manages to present a consistent system and to find a place for each one of the great problems of philosophy. If his basic thesis is granted, one will, of course, still object against one or the other of the author's views, but one cannot deny the coherence and systematizing power of his work.

One of the main criticisms he raises against the philosophy of Aristotle aims at the notions of potency and act. Ottaviano considers the former as utterly impossible because he cannot concede that there be anything in between being and non-being. Hence, it becomes one of his foremost tasks to render account of change and becoming. Now, becoming has been considered always as an increase in " beingness "; the act is more than the potency; perfection, achieved by actualization, better than the state of imperfection. Being, insofar as it is actual, is considered as " given." To this thesis Ottaviano opposes a wholly different one; he rejects the Greek position, viewing being as given or matter as eternal, as well as the modern conception of being " making itself " or as " autocreative." His thesis reads: " Being is, but nullifies itself, and this self-nullification of being is the essence of becoming." Being was bound to vanish into nothingness, if not preserved in being by God, Who is beyond all becoming and Creator. The " melancholy and tragedy " of existence has its roots in this basic self-nullification of being. This notion implies that other of a " quantity of being "; being, either of the universe or of single individual beings, is not a constant magnitude. Hence, there are not two individuals, however much they appear to be the same, which possess the same quantity of being. The differences in this quantity of being appear as such of quality.

The author is not at all blind to the fact that with this notion of quantity is introduced the other of continuous gradation of beingness. " Matter," he declares in the preface, " is nothing but being on the lowest degree and therefore fundamentally spirit, although it possesses totally different properties or qualities arising from the diversities of gradation."

It is highly interesting to see how this metaphysical proposition determines the author's views on logic. This is one of the points where the inner consistency of Ottaviano's reasonings becomes most apparent (the other is his philosophy of religion and his speculations on the relations of philosophy and theology.) The inquiry on logic starts with a critical study of the views of Aristotle and of Kant to show that by assuming analytic and synthetic judgments one gets involved in insoluble problems. There

are however, analytic judgments implying a necessary connection between diverse terms, such that from a given concept and its definition, or nature, or essence, arises a different concept with necessity because the first concept can be thought in coherence with itself only in regard to the other. The two notions of diversity and necessity underlying such judgments find their expression in the name devised by the author, who calls such judgments "syneteric" (from *syn* and *heteros*.) These judgments are defined as those in which an identical something, to be itself, is linked necessarily with something diverse. Thus, the passage of heat into a metallic body (remaining self-identically the same heat) is possible if and only if there follows the effect of distension of the heated body. Cause is possible only insofar as it implies, to be itself, the effect as different from itself, the cause. Such syneteric judgments have been used extensively without the various authors being aware of the peculiarities of their reasonings. Thus, the five ways of Aquinas rest all on such syneteric judgments insofar as they imply a connection between diverse elements. The discovery of the syneteric judgments also furnishes a solution for the problem of the nature of mathematical reasoning; the latter's judgments are neither synthetic, as Kant claimed, nor analytic, as many moderns pretend, but syneteric; they are analytic in one sense, but nonetheless lead a step forward and thus allow the mind to attain new insights. In these judgments we become aware of necessary relations of two different intuitions. Having thus achieved a new approach to the problems of logic, the author proceeds to a new theory of reasoning on which however nothing can be said here. Of a greater importance is the use he makes of his idea in the chapter, "A new theory of principles." The notion of individual is, so he states, the result of a syneteric judgment, because the existence of one individual necessarily presupposes the existence of other individuals without which the individual would be incomprehensible and even self-contradictory. If, indeed, one defines the individual as *divisum ab aliis*, the *alii* are presupposed. In the words of the author: the other individual is a condition of the essence and the definition of the individual and a concomitant cause of its being. Since an individual demands, to be itself, the existence of other individuals, the general conception of reality is an "organic" one.

The basic logic principles, too, are revealed as of syneteric nature: the principle of identity, that of non-contradition, of the excluded third. The passage from logical to metaphysical argumentation is indicated in the summary of the logical principles: those of homology or formal being comprise that of the excluded third or of the "primogenity of being"; "there is no middle way between being and non-being or Being is the absolute *prius*." Hence the rejection, mentioned above, of the notion of potency. Likewise, under the heading of principles referring to being as one we find that of "metaphysical organicity. A is a, if there exist b, c. d. . . ."

Each individual points at and is related to, even dependent on, other individuals; they together constitute a system or an organism, and their relations then appear as an hierarchical order.

Dr. Ottaviano sides with realism, immediate realism that is, because the " splitting " into an intentional and objective being and therewith the subjectivistic turn and the emergence of a " screen " between subject and object must be avoided. Knowledge must be considered as a true attaining of the object and not as a " modification " of the subject. The author proceeds by way of a penetrating analysis and criticism of the idealistic tenets, including those of Kant; he holds that neither Descartes' nor Kant's conception suffice to prove the existence of reality. One has to conclude that it is the real object which is itself present to the subject; this is achieved by the object conferring on the subject some additional being: the quantity of being increases.

The metaphysical inquiry states the problem of becoming as it appeared first with Parmenides, and considers the various solutions in Aristotle and others up to Hegel. It is here that the notion of " quantity of being " is systematically introduced, as the only possible conception of becoming not guilty of the nonsensical assumption that there be a third between being and non-being. Becoming is interpreted as a " progressive annulment of being, as a subtraction of a definite quantity of being." The sum total of being in the universe is not constant, but decreases steadily. There are four modes by which the quantity of being may change: creation, increase, and annihilation. Because of every individual having its own, unique quantity of being, there is no such thing as an universal nature common to all individuals of one species; genus and species are but " approximations." So are, incidentally, the laws of physics. The absolute non-identity of individuals renders it impossible that anyone of these behave in exactly the same manner; there must be insensible differences even in the velocity with which one and another body fall. (The author refers here, of course, to modern " statistical " physics; one might question whether he is therein justified.) Not only has every individual its own quantity of being, different from that of another, but this quantity changes by addition and subtraction. (It then becomes difficult to see, how the uniqueness of individual quantity can be maintained; it seems that if there is one individual possessing the quantity of being a at one time and of $a + c$ at another, that then it had to pass through a stage $a + b$, b being smaller than c; the only way out would be, it seems, that one conceives of " unities of being," in analogy of the quanta in physics, a conception, however, presenting difficulties not easily overcome.)

I cannot report, however briefly, on the author's ideas concerning mathematics and physics the criticism of which sciences leads him to new theories of time and space.

The next section deals with theology, from the philosophical angle of course, and in the taking account of revealed truth. The author is convinced that the falsity of other religions (pagan, Moslem, Protestant, pantheistic, etc.) can be demonstrated by reasoning. He discusses the five ways of Aquinas, the conclusive value of which he recognizes, not however without some alterations. Particularly, he insists that these proofs can be reduced to four; two are fundamental, namely the proof from part to whole and that from becoming to that which is beyond all becoming; two subordinated to the second: the caused presupposes the uncaused, the possible the necessary. Dr. Ottaviano asserts that these proofs and what others there may be, answer only the question *an sit*, but leave the mystery of *quid* or *quomodo sit* as dark as ever; for, although we may arrive at certain " attributes " of Divine nature, these are only by way of analogy. This " religious inquiry " contains a long chapter on the " tragedy " of reality; the sense of futility, emptiness, of a life devoid of meaning can be overcome only if one realizes that " the supernatural is, so to speak, the *milieu* (*ambiente*) in which nature becomes perfectly itself, thoroughly nature." Now, for the supernatural raising the natural to the plenitude of the latter's being, two conditions must be fulfilled: the finite creature must not reject the additional being which comes to complete it by closing itself in its isolation; and this concerns the aspect of ethics; and, secondly, it is indispensable that the supernatural descend to the level of the natural; and this is the question of Grace on one hand and of the mystery of Incarnation on the other.

It would lengthen this already long report unduly, were I to comment on the last parts of this work, dealing with problems of ethics and the metaphysics underlying the science of morals.

As it may have become clear, there is much in Dr. Ottaviano's work which appeals to the philosophical reader; at least, it is highly provocative. It gives testimony of a sincere and inquisitive mind, one deeply concerned about man and the " human situation " and equally anxious to ensure to faith in the supernatural the place it has to occupy. On the other hand, there are many points which arouse doubts and questions. It would be of no little interest were one to try to locate, as it were, this work within the framework of philosophical speculation as it evolved in the Western world since Plato. I have remarked before that Dr. Ottaviano is more a disciple of St. Augustine and St. Anselm, and hence somehow of Plato and Plotinus, than of Aristotle and St. Thomas. But it would seem that one can discern other influences too. One of them might be that of Hegel. Although the author is extremely critical of Hagelianism in its original and its derived form (e. g., as in Gentile or Croce), he nevertheless seems to have fallen somehow under the spell of the great idealistic systematizer. The notion of the " syneteric judgments " may be envisioned as an attempt to do justice

to certain tenets fundamental in Hegelianism and, at the same time, to eliminate the self-contradictoriness of these theses.

Yet, even though there are many reasons for not agreeing with the author on many points, even for disapproving his basic notion of a changeable "quantity of being," it must be admitted that in studying his work the reader makes the acquaintance of an original and powerful mind, with ideas well worth attention and consideration.

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The Shaping of the American Tradition. By LOUIS M. HACKER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. 1271. $6.50.

Earlier in the present century, before the devastation of two wars had demonstrated the flimsiness of the widely-expressed hopes for international amity, the United States had begun to examine the contributions its citizens had made in various *genres*. Where was the great American novel? the typically American drama? the peculiarly American poetry? the specifically American philosophy? Each of these questions offered fascinating prospects for investigation, yet each presented a stubbornly insoluble question early in the investigating process. Could one speak of a typically American production in any line, in the absence of any well-defined American tradition?

It had for so long been generally held that the United States was too new a country to have solidly established patterns of thought and action, that to contend for the existence of an American tradition would have been simply to invite ridicule. Since that period, however, there have been a widespread re-examination of the position of this country, a critical appraisal of its history, a series of attempts to organize its regional and cultural aspects into understandable fields for study, and a quickening of interest in the fundamentals of what we are pleased to call the American way of life. Out of such attitudes, on the basis of preliminary studies made by other scholars, Professor Louis M. Hacker has written, compiled, and edited—all three activities were involved in his task—a volume titled *The Shaping of the American Tradition.* It is not his contention that this tradition, if it really exists, is now complete, but rather that it is in the process of becoming an integral part of American life.

Inasmuch as this is his thesis, it seems proper to ask what we should expect to find in such a volume. This is unquestionably the day of the anthology, and the convention has grown up that the anthologist's tastes may not be questioned. His productions are to be judged on the merits

and the arrangement of the contents; one may deplore the inclusion of this work, lament the exclusion of that, but one must always qualify such expressions with the observation that the work under consideration is, after all, the anthologist's. The weaknesses of such an attitude in a reviewer are self-evident, but the convention has been so long accepted that it is a relief to observe that Professor Hacker is not just an anthologist, but a text writer as well. He has courageously exposed himself to criticism by organizing his selections to illustrate his text, and it is therefore quite in order to examine the thesis upon which the text is based.

Among the constitutive elements of the American tradition, then, one would expect to find an emphasis upon freedom, upon the written guarantees of freedom, upon individual enterprise and its concomitant assurance of rewards to the specially fortunate, upon external activity rather than upon introspection, and upon democracy as that term is used here. If all of these concepts were examined and elaborated in the *Shaping of the American Tradition*, there would certainly be no cause for complaint on the score of inclusion or exclusion. This is not to say, however, that neglect to consider any one, or several, of these concepts would damage the book irretrievably. The concepts are basic to American life, but it would indeed be difficult to contend that they are the only ones which are so. Here there is room for legitimate difference of opinion, and certainly Professor Hacker would not agree upon the inclusion of all of these concepts, nor upon an arrangement of them which separates the notion of freedom from that of democracy.

In beginning his task, Professor Hacker was embarking upon a course not radically different from that which has preoccupied so many American writers recently. Re-examinations, re-appraisals of figures like Henry James, Henry Adams, Emily Dickinson, indicate that serious efforts are being made to determine what is the specifically American feature of their productions. To put it another way, as Hacker would perhaps do, attempts are being made to discover the extent to which these articles conform or contribute to the American tradition. Since this tradition has been so amorphous, so tantalizingly elusive of definition, Hacker's first task is to set some standards for himself, and then to observe the extent to which they are applicable.

The dangers inherent in such a procedure are, of course, very great. A writer who places his conclusions first, and then proceeds to justify them may well experience violent reactions from those who read his work. Hacker, however, is saved from a pretense at omniscience by the fact that his conclusions, stated at the beginning of his work, are the result of a considerable amount of experience derived in teaching a course in Contemporary Civilization at Columbia College. Tried and tested on successive groups of students, these ideas have proven their value and may therefore

tional history had formed in the minds of the colonists an ineradicable distrust of merely verbal assurances, and an implicit and complete faith in the binding power of the written word.

After the colonial governments experienced the failure of the British government to abide by the terms of such written guarantees, and had made such failure one of the chief grievances in the Declaration of Independence, they continued to insist upon the importance of these inscribed assurances in the new state which they were founding. The Declaration itself, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, all attest this. Later ages of American history repeat the lesson over and over again. To anyone who has studied the connection between British colonial beginnings and American history proper, the conclusion is inescapable: this has always been a nation which has placed extreme reliance upon the written word.

To take up this text, then, and find in it the Articles, but not the Declaration nor the Constitution, is to experience a distinct shock, and to initiate some further examination of inclusions and exclusions. Deficiencies of an amazing type begin to appear. In the era of John Marshall, for example, there is not a single one of that famous jurist's decisions given. Yet surely he contributed forcefully to the formation of the American juridical pattern, and is not this part of our tradition? If Hamilton's views on the bank are to be included, why not Marshall's on the sanctity of contracts?

Admittedly this is not a constitutional history of the United States, nor should it be condemned for failing to be what it does not want or pretend to be. It is, nevertheless, a book which essays the ambitious task of presenting a history of the shaping of our tradition, and ignores in that shaping the part played by the Constitution. If the constitution of any state is its fundamental organic law, how can consideration of the organism or its activities ignore the nature of its vital principle? If this procedure is possible, then words are meaningless, and to call a constitution fundamental or organic is simply to pay it a pretty, meretricious compliment.

Exclusion of John Marshall might be objected to on other grounds; his style, for example, is not only beautiful in itself, but was long influential in American courts. Even if he were rightly excluded, however, what of other jurists? In this volume, as its excellent index so revealingly notes, there are three judicial opinions given. Two of these are majority opinions, one in *Munn vs. Illinois*, one in *In re Debs*. The dissenting opinion of Holmes in *Lockner vs. New York* ends the list of judicial decisions, and there is no attempt to mention the formative opinions of such able men as Story, Taney, Field, White, Hughes on the supreme bench, or Kent, Shaw, Hand, or others in the lower courts. The only feature of this sad lack of discussion of the courts which can be commended is the inclusion of

Holmes. Probably no justice since Marshall has been so influential in our system; probably no justice has used his influence so irresponsibly and with such evil results. But the influence is always present in our system, and it is an influence of which Mr. Hacker seems blandly unaware.

The second, and ultimately more serious, defect in the volume is its conformity to the American scholarly tradition of objectivity. This tradition, which becomes on occasion a peculiarly pernicious means of avoiding issues, insists that one merely present facts, and allow the reader to draw his own conclusions. To the extent that he ignores this tradition, in presenting his reasoned conclusions and the means by which he arrived at them, to the extent that he admits selectivity and subjectivity in the choice of his materials, Mr. Hacker is successful in evading this American snare for scholars, and is again to be commended. To the degree, however, that he fails to criticize or to measure the results of the phenomena he notes as exercising a formative effect upon our tradition, he is to be censured, at least mildly. The mildness of the censure must be based partially upon the difficulty encountered by any American scholar who attempts to evaluate his country's position in time of stress. It must also be based partially upon Hacker's avowed intention merely to present materials, for, though such an attitude is to be deplored, it must be respected as having formed the volume presented to the reader.

Censure is therefore to be applied because this is the volume which had the opportunity, from the instant its title was conceived, of pointing out the amorphous, the nebulous, the inchoate character of the American tradition. This is the volume which could have pointed out what influences must shape our tradition, must really infuse it with life, must integrate its scattered, often mutually rebellious elements, must make it the tradition which Mr. Hacker now thinks he sees, but which is really not there. The prime weakness of this book is that it is actually admiring a potentiality, instead of pointing out the means by which it may be actualized. It is idle to pretend that we have an American tradition; traditions, yes, and traditions which could chisel and carve away all the superfluous materials from the figure which Mr. Hacker displays to us. For displaying that figure, he has our gratitude; for informing it with life we must look to our appreciation of an ideal of which far too many of us are completely ignorant and unappreciative.

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La Synthèse Thomiste. By Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1947. Pp. 739.

This book is the synthesis of a synthesis.

What stamped the genius of Aquinas more than any other intellectual seal was his power to pierce to the very ultimates in the soil of experience, finding there roots that could account for the whole of reality from the trunk to the tiniest of twigs. It is no over-statement to say that a thinker, philosopher and theologian alike, is not a Thomistic realist until he begins to cultivate a similar piercing, simplifying, and synthetic spirit. To be a Thomist means, in some measure or other, to be another Thomas.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange is eminently qualified to write a *summa* of St. Thomas' own thought. He is entitled to first rank among living theologians by his success as a teacher and writer, his simplicity of style, his frank facing of contemporary issues in the spirit of his master, and his fidelity to Thomas because he can rediscover him through his own thought. Even his opponents in the Thomistic school, for example Marin-Sola and Charlier, would have to acknowledge his excellence in general, with respect to the great challenge of making Thomism available to the twentieth century. If this book is opened in the spirit of *docilitas* which the author's past expressions would encourage, such a spirit is richly rewarded by the vast sweep of scholarship, explanation, proof, and sublimity which the long tract includes.

The major portion of the work is taken from the article on Thomism which the author contributed to the *Dictionnaire de Thèologie catholique.* This material is supplemented by a largely philosophical epilogue on the realistic and contemporary character of St. Thomas' thought. There are several pages of bibliography, according to the various divisions of the work. Unfortunately there is no index either of topics or of names. Considering the reference character which this work may well boast for itself, the lack of indexing is especially notable. To some extent, the loss is compensated by the copious subdivisions of the work, all of which are listed in the table of contents. If this book is translated into English, and it is hoped that this work can be quickly undertaken for both the classroom and more general purposes which the book can serve in this country, perhaps this highly desirable indexing of the work will be done.

After a discussion of the work of St. Thomas and a cursory evaluation of his classic commentators, Father Garrigou-Lagrange naturally begins his more formal discussion of theology by a concise statement of the metaphysics which is its handmaid. This chapter is important not only for its contents but for its emphasis on philosophy as the *ancilla theologiae* at a time when it is perhaps over-stressed as the *rectrix scientiarum.* In actual practice, the better it performs the latter office the better it will

measure up to the former. It is well known that courses in philosophy and religion are so separated that the ancillary function of the one is sometimes forgotten and the other remains unintegrated with the rational disciplines. In the order in which man lives, a fully real and rich integration can come only through theology. It is one of the merits of the present book, assuming a purely philosophical foundation, to take a student through all the high points of Thomistic theology.

After the opening metaphysical section, there follow the treatments of God as one and as triune; on the angels and man; on the Incarnation; on the sacraments; on moral theology and spirituality; and finally on the realistic basis of the Thomistic synthesis. An appendix is added on the so-called new theology, dealing chiefly with such thinkers as Bouillard, Fessard, Teilhard de Chardin, and to a certain extent Blondel (who has been previously treated in the work.) These authors Father Garrigou-Lagrange accuses of undermining the realistic foundations of theology, compromising it through the attempt to reach a *modus vivendi* with contemporary thought and life. It is known, for example, that Fessard would "baptize" Hegel in the way in which it is often said that Aquinas "baptized" Aristotle. There is no mention in the book of the efforts of men like Pryzwara and Haecker in Germany and Troisfontaines in France to relate the Kierkegaardian theme to traditional theology.

As a compendium, largely explanatory in character, this book includes no notable controversial material that has not been previously put into the forums of theological discussion. It would seem to be more or less a summary of the great number of books—nineteen are listed opposite the title page—which the author has previously published. This fact alone makes the present volume distinctly worthwhile for reading and for reference. That the author has not delved deeply, in the past, into the area of moral theology explains perhaps why the treatment of this subject here does not measure up to the completeness and clarity evidenced in the sections on dogma. A fuller version of the *prima secundae* and its sequel would require companion volumes like, for example, the recent commentary of Ramirez.

The difficulty with the moral section of the present work is not, of course, one of misrepresentation but one of not developing the subject in a manner commensurate with that of the foregoing sections on dogma. Such a difficulty, however, is to be minimized by comparison with the high standards set and almost constantly maintained by the book as a whole. Considering the synthetic, clear, and consecutive character of the work which ranges for its subject-matter through the whole of St. Thomas, this treatise may well become rated as the best statement of Aquinas' thought in the present century. In includes a vast amount of positive theology and defends Thomism against the Scotists and Suarezians, clearly exposing the

views of the adversaries despite space limitations. This book differs greatly from Gilson's recently revised *Le Thomisme* by its theological rather than philosophical dimensions. The two authors neatly complement each other.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange is at his Thomistic best in the problems of sufficient and efficacious grace which divide Thomism from Molinism. To judge by recent literature, this controversy seems now fortunately on the wane. But the death of the battle in the Scholastic field may only mean that it is living elsewhere, with both of the traditional opponents now lined up together against the effects of Newtonian and Renaissance Deism that are the logical fruits likewise of Molina's principles. When Nietzsche concludes that God is dead or the existentialists that man is abandoned, they simply express the denial of God's universal causality which was Molina's unfortunate achievement in Scholasticism at a time when Deism was being born in more secular circumstances. Deny God's causality in the faintest action of the smallest atom, and it may be consistently denied in the swing of the largest star. Without God's efficacious premotion, man is abandoned, and only with it can there be preserved that freedom which the Molinists laudably aim to defend.

In his just verdict against contemporary theologians like Fessard and de Chardin, Father Garrigou-Lagrange points up the danger of attempting to convert the modern mind by learning its language only to end the adventure by being converted instead to contemporary philosophy, abandoning St. Thomas. Truly this is a peril, but it is one that must be faced realistically, faced as Aquinas faced the suspected Aristotle. It may be wondered whether the danger may not be more in the method of study rather than in the purpose of the scholarship. Just as the positive must be known before the non-being or the negative, so a measure of truth must be known in order to understand and evaluate error.

But there is the danger of simply studying St. Thomas without recourse to the reading of his modern adversaries who clarify him by contrast and thus make his principles more meaningful and alive. Converts make good apologists in many cases, and the gifted among them often write books on their spiritual odysseys. They have to struggle toward the truth rather than receive it ready-made. Confronted by problems and objections, the genius of Aquinas matured through its searchings for the answers to disputed questions. In his own example lies a good lesson for becoming Thomistic.

The point of it all is that adversaries should not be studied in old age after a youth concentrated only on St. Thomas. The two should be studied side by side before habits become case-hardened to an intolerance of opposition or at least to a total apathy to all views other than our own. The errors of adversaries mean nothing unless a standard of truth is known to evaluate them. But Thomism also means nothing or correspondingly little until we see the problems that it answers, see them as our answers

to our own problems as if discovering the truth for the first time not from Aquinas' authority but from our own reasoning. This opinion does not imply that Thomism is one among many other philosophies, each being equal to the other. An appreciable probing of its principles is required before it comes into its role as a yardstick for dealing with thought that, as far as it is alien to Thomism, is also contrary to experience. But there is a danger of waiting too long before entering into other philosophies which contain a great deal that can actualize the potentialities of the Thomistic synthesis and make it more conscious of itself. The wider the base of the pyramid, the stronger the pinnacle will stand.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange devotes a chapter of his work to show the assimilating power of the Thomistic synthesis. In its vast folds there may be included all the truth in such opposing doctrines as mechanism and monadology, while avoiding all of their errors. It is related to truths in other philosophies not as particular to particular but as universal to particular. Meyerson echoed Tertullian's phrase when he said that reason is naturally catholic. Reason is also naturally synthetic. Yet tragically enough, the most universal method of thought, practically since the time of Aquinas himself, has been an analytic one. The only notable exception on the modern scene is in dialectical materialism, and here the employment of synthesis is a rather arbitrary and postulational epilogue to analysis.

Such a thought engraves again the reflection that Thomism and realism can neither be analytic nor synthetic. These are methods applied after the philosophical edifice has come to rest on a previous foundation, that of being itself, and after being is seen to demand their introduction. Aquinas is comprehensive only because he is depth-sounding and intensive. He is synthetic only because he discovers the basis of the hierarchy which permits and even requires synthetic treatment. The principle of contradiction is neither analytic nor synthetic in content since being is not a genus. Being is what it is. Things are what they are. The ultimate realism and synthesis of St. Thomas consists in his recognition of that simple fact which volumes have since been written to deny. Against the background of experience, the full probing of this principle of identity or, in its negative form, the principle of non-contradiction, gave to Aristotle and Aquinas the insights into potency and act, the twin realisms that organize the Thomistic universe, making it a synthesis not of monism or of logical relations but a synthesis of hierarchy.

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Essays in Science and Philosophy, By Albert North Whitehead. New York: Philosophical Library, 1947. Pp. 348, with index. $4.75.

A new book by Professor Whitehead is always approached with a certain interested curiosity and anticipation. The individual chapters in *Essays in Science and Philosophy*, however, are not new. All have appeared in print at various times since 1912. The jacket tells us that these essays represent a cross-section from the career of the late distinguished philosopher. Mr. Whitehead's selection of material for the book indicates very well that his great contribution has been in the field of science and mathematics. He tells us that in 1924 at the age of sixty-three he joined the faculty of Harvard University in the department of philosophy. His philosophic writings were begun in London at the latter end of World War I. Thus it is not surprising to find that he devotes half again as much text to science and mathematics as to each of the other topics which are entitled: "Personal," "Philosophy," and "Education." The fact that three of the essays in science—"Axioms of Geometry," "Mathematics," and "Non-Euclidean Geometry"—first appeared in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* is an indication of the author's excellent reputation in the field of mathematics. The essay on non-Euclidean geometry is especially interesting to the ordinary reader because of its historical approach to the subject.

It would be eminently unfair to attempt a critical analysis of Mr. Whitehead's philosophy on the basis of this series of essays. His claim to fame as a philosopher rests on his *Process and Reality*, published in 1929. In the present series, the most representative are the essays on "Immortality" and "Uniformity and Contingency." The latter, by the way, is not listed in the table of contents.

The reader's interest is immediately aroused when he notes the title, "Immortality." More specifically he is told that the immortality of *human beings* is the subject of discussion. Most of us would expect the word, as applied to man, to involve a personal, individual immortality in a life after death. Such a use of the word is meaningless in this philosophy. First of all, any immortality possessed by man is not essentially different from that of any other being in the universe. Men and matter are the same. This immortality consists in the "Evaluation" of the whole World of Action or Activity. Immortality means that the World of Activity, which is passing, is transformed in God's nature. "This nature (of God) conceived as the unification derived from the World of Values is founded in ideals of perfection, moral and aesthetic. It receives into its unity the scattered effectiveness of realized activities transformed by the supremacy of its own ideals." (p. 94)

In terms of the doctrine as expressed in *Process and Reality*, any entity

achieves its immortality in its character of "subject superject" when it is ready to be an object of prehensive unification in a higher entity. No entity ever *is*, it is always becoming. It passes without any state of being, into the next higher step in the process of unification. This is called the process of concretion. Eventually, immortality is attained by transformation (union) in the Consequent Nature of God. The whole process of the universe of things is merely a constant becoming: each entity positively unites in itself other lower entities. The process of prehensive unification is guided, after a fashion, by God, the Principle of Concretion, until all entities are united in his Consequent Nature. This is their immortality—each entity is immortal insofar as it is an element in the constitution of a higher entity.

Such immortality is by no means personal in the Scholastic sense of that word. Rather, it is a pantheistic continuation of the being in God. As Mr. Whitehead says, things simply *are not alone*. They are always in process, a process which involves the unification of personality in a coordination of the becoming of all Active Entities in God. This pantheistic type of immortality leaves the reader definitely unsatisfied. If that is all human immortality invokes, why should it be discussed?

The author's ideas on Education are far more interesting. Although his practical suggestions for education are by no means justified by his principles, they are, nonetheless, practical and valuable. He holds that it is the business of the study of any subject "to transmute thought into an instinct which does not smother thought but directs it, to generate the feeling for the important sort of scientific ideas and for the important ways of scientific analysis, to implant the habit of seeking for causes and of classifying by similarities." (p. 193) We might criticize this statement of aims on the basis of an overemphasis upon science or because of its failure to emphasize a relation of study to life, but we might more properly indicate here one of the great weaknesses in the system of philosophy which underlies this notion of education. As was pointed out above, there is a weakness, and even error, in the principles of this system. In the above quotation we rejoice to see that the student should form the habit of seeking causes. Yet, in his essay on the value of induction, "Uniformity and Contingency," Mr. Whitehead first notes that the validity of the doctrine of causality is most fundamental. He quotes from Hume: "But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist." (p. 140) Induction, we know, is valid provided our notion of causality is valid. Mr. Whitehead poses the problem of the validity of the one (and, therefore, of the other) but he does not give us

any answer. Nevertheless, education is supposed to implant in the student the habit of seeking causes. In practice such a habit is excellent but one should have a valid foundation in philosophical principles for developing such a habit.

The author sees, as we all see, that in education there is a problem. In liberal education there is a special problem. Concentration in subject matter is necessary, yet there are so many fields of investigation which ought to be considered. Mr. Whitehead evidently approves of the classics as an element of liberal education but finds them inadequate, when taken alone, as a center or core of such education. We all know that it is rapidly becoming impossible to study the Greek and Latin originals. The accuracy and disciplined power of definitely controlled thought which could come from such study cannot now be obtained in classical education. How then obtain such discipline? Mr. Whitehead very wisely suggests that mathematics be given a greater part in liberal education. Certainly accuracy and discipline are attained in mathematical investigation. Would he then agree to the study of the classics in the vernacular for their cultural content which now enriches our literature and life?

The series of essays has some value. Those about the author's personal life are charming, with the charm to be found in the life of a cultured gentleman of the old school. The greatest weakness in this series, as well as in the whole system of philosophy of Mr. Whitehead, lies in the almost incomprehensible terminology. He coins new words and uses old words in an entirely new meaning. We know the difficulty in writing philosophy in English. The accepted English words are often deceptive as well as inadequate. At one time it was suggested that Mr. Whitehead's language might be the foundation of a new English medium for the transmission of sound philosophical knowledge. It now seems quite evident that there is not sufficient solidity and uniformity in his use of words to warrant its adoption for such a task. In addition to that, his influence in contemporary philosophy is not powerful enough to guide the majority of present day philosophers. It would be a great service to readers and much fairer to his own ideas if Mr. Whitehead had accomodated his writing to the older usage of words and submitted himself to a consistent use of new terms throughout his philosophy.

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Nervous Disorders and Character. By JOHN G. MCKENZIE. New York: Harper, 1947. Pp. 126, with index. $1.50.

Medicine For Moderns. By F. G. SLAUGHTER. New York: Julian Messner, 1947. Pp. 254, with index. $3.50.

These are lectures delivered at Manchester College, Oxford. The subtitle states them to be: "A Study in Pastoral Psychology and Psychotherapy." The author teaches Social Science and Psychology at Paton College, Nottingham. The four lectures are concerned with: Character Structure and Personality Disorders; Psychology, Psychotherapy and Pastoral Psychology; Mental Mechanics; The Nature, Origin, and Resolution of Conflicts. Books on pastoral psychology are not numerous and every new one arouses expectations. The present volume is written from the viewpoint of a Protestant minister who is well conversant with the problems of daily life and various mental disorders. There is, perhaps, as is the case with most works of this kind, too much emphasis on the abnormal aspects. What is really needed is a psychology of moral and religious life within the boundaries of normalcy. Again, the author's views are somewhat too much indebted to psychoanalysis, although he definitely prefers Jung to Freud.

Dr. McKenzie's position, however, is in many respects perfectly sound. It is commendable that he does not side with those who believe that "frustration" explains all neurotic troubles. Rather, says the author, it is the incapacity to deal with erotic deprivation which causes the disturbance. He distinguishes the fields of pastoral and of medical psychology; they overlap, yet neither comprises the whole of the other. The former, especially, has the prerogative to convey a definite philosophy of life, a problem the medical psychologist can approach, if at all, only with diffidence and caution. One will agree with the author that in many cases there is a greater need of such a philosophy than of a thorough sweeping of the unconscious. The digging out of so-called unconscious factors is not all that has to be done; the main thing is that a man assume a rational attitude in regard to himself and his world.

There are many clever and even wise words in this little book. It deserves attention. It is objective and based on large experience and wide reading. The author has friendly words to say on the confessional and the Catholic notion of morality and religious life. He wonders, however, that contrary to the salutary effect Catholics experience through confession "many members of the Catholic persuasion of the Anglican Church go regularly to confession . . . but some of the worst sufferers from morbid guilt . . . were practicing members of Anglo-Catholicism." Is this so amazing after all? Several reasons might be given as, the sacramental character of confession; and, on the psychological level, the somewhat different attitude in

regard to the sinner. It was Kierkegaard, a Protestant, who said that it is part of the Church's wisdom that she never forgets one thing: that all men remain ever naughty boys playing in the streets.

While one point and another will of necessity be envisaged differently by a Catholic, on the whole the treatment accorded the subject in this little work is well worth reading and study.

The value of a book popularizing some science is always a matter of debate. Such books are needed, but they are also difficult to write; some of them, when written, prove to be dangerous or, at least, misleading. Not everything in science lends itself to a popular presentation. Not every topic can be discussed in total avoidance of technical language. It is particularly in the field of medicine that such books may become harmful. Yet, there is an interest in things medical; there is a need to inform the public and to make the average person realize what medicine may or may not do for him.

In recent times there has been much talk concerning psychosomatic medicine. It is hailed as a new discovery which, in fact, it is not. It may be justifiable that the author of the present work refers almost exclusively to recent American studies; yet a good deal of what he presents as novelties has been known for more than a quarter century. The great discovery is one which might have been made at an even earlier time, if the medical world has not separated itself altogether from philosophy. There the physician might have found the doctrine of the basic unity of the human person and his attention might have been directed towards the mutual dependency of somatic and mental factors. It is on this group of problems that the author reports. He does so ably, insofar as the mere mode of presentation is considered: his text is readable; his explanations intelligible. Nonetheless, this is a bad book. Not only is this so because of the author's preference for strictly Freudian interpretations, which sometimes are utterly fantastic, some times highly hypothetical, often far from convincing; but there are further many statements which appear as factually erroneous. Particularly in the field of psychiatry, in his remarks, for example, on schizophrenia, the author presents as assured knowledge ideas that, to say the least, are very controversial. While it is recognized that other procedures than those of "orthodox" psychoanalysis are recommended, the basic views are strongly influenced by a rather materialistic outlook. On the whole, the work cannot be recommended.

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Ethics. By Radoslav A. Tsanoff. New York: Harper, 1947. Pp. 399, with index. $3.50.

This work of Professor Tsanoff is proposed as a textbook for American Colleges. If the publishers are to be believed, it marks a new high in the field and is certain to be widely adopted. From the viewpoint of the perennial philosophy it has many appealing features. Though not Scholastic, it is Aristotelian in orientation. The arrangement of matter is good. After an introduction which considers the nature and range of morality and the problem of value, there follow four parts in which first comes a treatment of the main types of ethical theory, then a consideration of the problem of personal morality, next a section on social ethics, and finally a fifth part which takes up the questions of moral freedom, progress and civilization as well as the relations of ethics and religion.

The introduction reveals the Aristotelian direction of the author. "When Aristotle set out to achieve a science of the good on functional lines, defined virtue as a habit of the will, studied man's nature and behaviour in relation to those of the animals and plants, and the various situations of our life when directed and when not directed by reason, he set an example in ethical procedure which has not been sufficiently followed, but to which many contemporary moralists incline in their method and outlook" (p. 20). In this part, too, the author's tentative proposal of a hierarchy of goods follows the same tenor of thought.

The study of the main types of ethical theory which follows seems to this reviewer the best part of the book. Ethical formalism and its great exponent Immanuel Kant, Hedonism and Evolutionary Ethics come in for strong, withal balanced criticism. Tsanoff himself demands "rational intelligence, decisive in human conduct and values" (p. 96) and gives admirable example of its functioning in his judicious and rigorous rejection of the above named errors. He concludes by a choice of goods arranged and subordinated in terms of man's end—self-realization or fulfillment of personality.

Problems of personal morality are the concern of the next part. A dangerous flaw in Professor Tsanoff's thinking reveals itself here. Ethics is a practical science but it has its roots deep in speculative philosophy with its summit on the First Cause, God. Because of a faulty metaphysical foundation Professor Tsanoff is betrayed into a statement such as this: "there is no single principle supreme and encompassing all moral value" (p. 132). Of a part with this fault and flowing from it is a totally mistaken notion of Christian morality. For instance, there is the mistake of holding that "the repression of all appetites found a religious utterance in Christian asceticism" (p. 137). Their sublimation for a higher good, yes; their total repression, no. Nor is it true that "whether temperance tends to emphasize moderation or abstinence depends upon the partial or

utter depreciation of the passions generally, and especially of the sensual appetites" (p. 138). Professor Tsanoff can be assured of this: in Christian ethics the temperance which asks abstinence is on a much surer and much more positive base than "utter depreciation of the passions generally." Yet in this section there is emphasized a profound insight, dear to Saint Augustine and often cited by St. Thomas: "*Bona spiritualia possunt simul a pluribus possideri, non autem bona corporalia*" (*S. T.* III, q. 23, ad 3.) Because of the above mentioned flaw Professor Tsanoff is vague on the highest spiritual good and the means to attain that good. In the year of our Lord 1948 one cannot be just an Aristotelian.

The following division treats of social ethics and says much that is worthwhile on marriage and family life, character training, culture in work and play, vocation, economic and social life. Tsanoff is to be commended for insisting, that divorce is a moral problem (p. 193); but in holding "divorce may sometimes be justified" (p. 210), he must define just what he means in such a case. Does he mean the dissolution of a valid marriage with the ability of one or both of the partners to contract another marriage? Nor has he distinguished enough. As a consequent his dichotomy between those who hold an unbending opposition to the dissolution of marriage and those who demand frankly that dissolution be made easier with the removal of the least vestige of social stigma does not correspond to fact. Tsanoff also would have moral training as part of education. He is opposed to "released time" for religious instruction in our public schools. For him the fact that "multitudes of young people are growing up without any religion or morals" is a serious problem "which only the public school can meet, for it alone reaches all classes of boys and girls" (p. 216). It seems he does not know how Catholic thinkers and leaders faced that problem in our country over a century ago, and took practical steps to combat it by the school system they inaugurated. On the strength of its principles and their practical application that solution merits at least the appraisal of the ethical thinker. Too, Tsanoff looks to human piety as the main ingredient in the solution of modern economic problems (p. 291). Could divine pity be any help? Not in the strict Aristotelian scheme of things. The god of Aristotle remains remote from this passing and pitiful show.

A consideration of the ultimate problems of moral philosophy closes the work. Human freedom and moral progress Professor Tsanoff holds and hopes for in the recognition and achievement of the hierarchy of values after Aristotle. Significantly, as he points out: "the solid rationalistic tradition in the history of thought has been in the main optimistic in spirit, or at any rate resistant to basic negation. But irrationalism involves a collapse of spiritual morale" (p. 350). Yes, to call philosophy and theology, as he does on the next page, "monumental edifices of man's self-outreaching zeal, sublime but pathetic," is an all too sweeping indictment, akin to a

basic negation. In this part, too, there are a pair of contradictories one of which is open to question. Tsanoff would have an integral and adequate ethics which is a mean between a distortion of moral conduct to make it fit into the conceptual mold of the factual sciences and the earlier dogmatic-theological view of morality as somehow exalted above the daily actual lives of men and women. The exclusion of theological influence on ethical science is justified if the above is the earlier view. But is it? In conclusion the author offers as moral grounds for belief in God the arguments of the necessity of sanctions and the desire of happiness. The metaphysical arguments for the existence of God he would seem to waive on the strength of Kant's criticism of them p. 368).

It is good to find a textbook on ethics that goes counter to the relativism and what might be called the "zoocentric" character of much modern ethical inquiry. Here zoocentric is understood as confining man's activity and perfection mainly to the properly animal level. The direction Professor Tsanoff takes its anthropocentric in the sense that the perfection of man is in terms chiefly of the functioning of higher faculties, intellect and will. But is that enough? Must not ethics be theocentric in a strict and metaphysical sense?

The dangerous flaw in Professor Tsanoff's thinking, mentioned before, shows up in the lack of that last orientation. So strict an Aristotelian is he that the criticism leveled at Aristotle in this regard strikes him too. For ethics to be theocentric there must be a personal relationship between God and man. Such could really never be the case for Aristotle because of his erroneous idea that God's knowledge of anything other than himself would argue imperfection in the divine nature. With no knowledge of creation, not even creation from eternity, it is understandable how he inclined to that position. Yet one of the greatest Aristotelians could not accept such a conclusion. "*Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se sint ei ignota; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia*" (*In Meta.* 12, II). With that premise there is a strong bond between natural theology and ethics sadly lacking in Aristotle. In the last analysis a high-minded humanism is the best the Stagyrite can offer to man. What it amounts to is the religion of a pagan philosopher which cannot but appear to us cold and distant. Professor Tsanoff does not get much further.

Then, too, on Professor Tsanoff's testimony: "the good life is conceived as obedience to God's will. This is of the utmost importance to the moral factor in religion. Men's view of the good and the godly life change when their ideas of God and God's will are altered" (p. 362). Much of the criticism of the book under review is due to the fact it reflects an unawareness of how great the alteration has been. The work is an impressive example in action of the impossibility of an adequate ethics autonomous and independent of Christian revelation.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Man and the State: Modern Political Ideas. Edited by WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. New York: Rinehart, 1947. Pp. 797, with index and bibliographical note. $6.50.

Man and the political unit in which he lives have from the remotest ages engaged the attention of political theorists, and the present age has remained true to this tradition at least. There could probably be no more all-inclusive title than the one chosen by Professor Ebenstein for this ably edited volume, although it is necessary to add the subtitle for delineation of the period covered by the excerpts included in the book. It should certainly be noted, in these days of many anthologies, that the integrating force of the editor's thesis lifts this work out of the anthology class, and transforms it into a valuable tool for the student or the researcher in politics.

By limiting himself to modern political ideas, the editor has eliminated from inclusion in this collection any ideas which appeared earlier than the last four centuries. While the usefulness of the volume for earlier periods is completely nullified by this procedure, its value for the later period is considerably increased because of the larger number of selections which may be given. Since many of these selections are from the works of practicing politicians, or from the scarce political writings of persons usually not associated with politics at all, *Man and the State* offers much more than similar volumes can contrive to do.

Within its chapters appear such diverse thinkers as John Locke and Harold Laski, expressing varied opinions on the right to rebel; Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jacques Maritain, writing on the subject of freedom; Thomas Carlyle and Adolf Hitler, on the necessity of leadership. Similarly stimulating and entertaining contrasts are to be noted throughout the eighteen chapters of the volume, which is divided into four roughly equal sections, each considering some large subdivision of the book's general theme. The final division, for example, contains writings on the subject of the supranational community, and the chapters are evidently arranged to show that the transition from nationalism to world order is desirable, if not inevitable.

Each series of selections has been chosen, according to the editor's preface, on the basis of readability and freshness of expression; each is preceded by one of the outstanding features of the book, a chapter by the editor which sets each selection in its historical perspective, and does so in a delightful fashion. These introductory chapters, abstracted from the remainder of the book, would constitute an excellent review of recent

political thought, presented in well-chosen, highly skillful terms, and with a minimum of apparent subjectivity.

It is precisely here, however, that the one objection to this book must be expressed. The truism that prefaces must be read if books are to be understood is particularly applicable here, and a reading of the preface discloses Mr. Ebenstein's intention of presenting selections chosen on the basis of "great issues." How these great issues are determined we are never told, and the whole volume is therefore arranged according to a predetermined plan of which the reader must necessarily remain ignorant. The procedure may be valid or invalid, but only the editor can determine the extent to which either judgment would be true.

Since this is the manner in which he has chosen to proceed—and of course one cannot quarrel with the procedure as such—Ebenstein's objectivity is only apparent, and the discussions in the chapters introducing each section are objective only in what they present, since exclusion of other materials must have followed some subjective decision. Furthermore, these chapters are victims of the usual delusions of the determinedly objective writer: in their effort to preserve objectivity, they carefully refrain from noting differences in values. An example of the absurdities into which this attitude may lead one is given in the choice of a title for Part II: Antidemocratic Thought. Since Ebenstein had insisted earlier that democracy is not only institutions, it is men (an obscure and muddled concept in itself), he need not have accepted this label of antidemocracy from other writers; only his ill-considered wish to preserve objectivity, or his failure to realize the extent to which old liberal traditions still bind him could involve him in such contradictions.

Used properly, as a means of determining quickly what important theorists or practitioners of politics have had to say about man and the state, or as a means of reviewing rapidly the history of recent political thought, this is an invaluable addition to tools available in political philosophy. Accepted as an authoritative reference and guide, its seeming merits may involve the reader in many difficulties and inconsistencies. To the credit of the editor it should be noted that the latter course was not in his mind as a motive for his labor. The labor and its presentation deserve the heartiest praise.

Papal Legate at the Council of Trent: Cardinal Seripando. By the Rt. Rev. Hubert Jedin. (Trans. by F. G. Eckhoff). St. Louis: Herder, 1947. Pp. 720, with index. $7.50.

When this work, the fruit of some ten years of work on the part of the archivist of the archdiocese of Breslau, appeared in 1937 in German under the title *Girolamo Seripando, Sein Leben und Denken* . . . , its scholarly

tone and extensive documentation, particularly from unpublished manuscript sources, met with warm approval. The appendices and, to a large extent, the documentation have disappeared in translation, but the ponderous air of German scholarship remains in spite of the change of title. Hence its appeal is chiefly to historians of the Counter-Reform, and possibly to Augustinians of whom Seripando was General from 1539 to 1551.

The general reader, however, will close the book with mixed feelings of admiration, irritation, bewilderment and discouragement, and a firmer conviction that the Church cannot but be divine when for the guidance of her Councils and the formulation of her doctrines she has to turn to such as Seripando. Admiration for the skill and objectivity with which Seripando's deficiencies and shortcomings are presented alongside his talents and virtues to give a balanced picture is qualified by a certain looseness in the manner of presentation. One gets the impression of a sheaf of notes hastily shuffled together. Probably because Msgr. Jedin's knowledge of this period of history is so extensive and his acquaintance with his characters so perfect, he is inclined to omit the explanatory data which will put order and coherence into the vast crowd of personalities and events among which Seripando moved. Passing allusions to things like the scandal in Venice, the "catastrophe," the Vatican librarian, the "affair with Staupitz" are significant to close students of the period, but leave the ordinary reader baffled. The author also has an irritating, and somewhat pompous, trick of announcing that he is going to determine the place occupied by Seripando, or identify his influence, or define his position, yet the complacent declaration a few paragraphs later that he has done so comes as a surprise; what has intervened is a few vague generalities, true of most of the men of the period, or worse, a frank statement that documentary evidence is too meager to warrant a definitive statement.

The attempt to correlate—one would not dare say, identify—Seripando and Thomism is particularly deplorable and betrays a very imperfect idea of the latter. Seripando's acquaintance with the doctrine of St. Thomas, and even his personal regard for Cardinal Cajetan, do not make him a Thomist; anymore than his acquaintance with the ideas of Martin Luther, or his relations with him, make a Lutheran of him. As a matter of fact, while some theologians at Trent suspected Seripando of Lutheranism, few accuse him of Thomism. His leaning toward Neo-Platonism and his open avowal of voluntarism place him at the opposite pole from Thomists.

Scion of a good Neapolitan family of career bureaucrats, and therefore by birth and breeding a diplomat and a politician, Seripando entered a congregation of the Augustinians, the comparative fewness of whose members promised preferment sooner; becoming a protégé of the General of the Order almost immediately and ordained without any theological training after a course of reading the classics privately, he was attached to the Curia of his Order. His reputation for eloquence was based on his skill

in exemplifying Christian doctrine by pagan antiquity; his sources and spiritual guides were Cicero, Plutarch and the Neo-Platonists. His reputation for learning rested chiefly on a knowledge of St. Augustine and St. Paul, admittedly peculiar and at times suspect, acquired long after he left the *Studium* of his Order at Bologna. He began the study of philosophy after his ordination; the highest academic honor, the title of master, was conferred by order of the General seven years later, in 1519. Yet it is only around 1538, according to Msgr. Jedin, that he began to study the problems posed by the heretics on original sin, faith and justification. Ecclesiastical studies must have fallen to discouraging levels when a man with a background so defective was outstanding for eloquence and learning.

And yet, warm-hearted, generous to his enemies and rebellious subjects, loyal to his friends, kind to all, Seripando was certainly, if not perhaps a great man, a good man, and how his Order and the Church at large profited from this goodness is the burden of this book.

Aux Sources de la Pensée de Marx: Hegel, Feuerbach. By Franz Grégoire. Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1947. Pp. 204, with index.

Hegel and Feuerbach are the intellectual parents of Karl Marx. From Hegel, as it is well known, Marx took his dialectical method. On Feuerbach he drew for his materialism. As Hegel had idealized matter, Feuerbach materialized the ideal, bringing Hegel's system earthily to the earth, where instead of interring it Marx pumped into its dead body the dead blood of his economics and sociology. As such an artefact, Communism has descended to our own day—a crass philosophy of matter that could not live without the dialectical spirit promulgating it. Without the synthesis achieved by spirit, transcending time to discuss the origins and the destiny of society, supporting the machine of dialectics and materialism—for art is only possible with reference to nature,—Communism could not even be conceived. What is only economic cannot dominate its economics, either conceptually or in action.

Hegel and Feuerbach, who contributed to Communism its ambivalent forces that can only be held together by the pressure of iron curtains, form the subject-matter of this highly interesting study by Professor Grégoire. He excuses himself from the study of the British economic and French sociological doctrines, that go to make up Marxism, on the ground that the two German figures form the philosophical backdrop of Marx. To a certain extent, and wholly in appearances, this is true. But the doctrines of men like Adam Smith and Saint-Simon, as in the case of modern science when it passes for an ultimate, are of genuine philosophical stock and could have been included for the more general reason that economics and philosophy are synonymous in Marxism. Hegel and Feuerbach have

been repudiated by the typical Latin and Anglo-Saxon mind. If Communism wins further theorists in these cultures, it is likely that economic and sociological dogmas will prompt their views.

But this book is not to be disparaged for its exclusions in the face of the riches which it has actually assembled. Hegel, denying that being is simple and too often the victim of his own dialectical virtuosity when attempting to unravel the complexity, is always a problem to explain with both brevity and fidelity. Whoever may be so baffled over this, perhaps the most typical and synthetic of modern philosophers, is likely to look long and in many languages before finding a clearer presentation of Hegel's thought. After a short introduction to Communist philosophy, Professor Grégoire launches into the considerable effort of exposing Hegel's triadic dialectic. As any philosopher should proceed, he studs his exposition with rich examples that both explain Hegel and challenge the Thomist to bring the riches of his own thought to bear upon not only Hegel's problems but Hegel's solutions. That Hegel caught glimpses of great truths, much more so than any original development since the middle ages, is hardly a matter for question. For instance, he envisioned the world as moving toward the Absolute and not centered on a meaningless treadmill. How does his dialectical method square with the established realisms of potency and act? These are not equal to each other since the equality of action and reaction, notwithstanding what the physicist says, would form a static universe. Novelty results from the clash of active and passive potencies. In a deep sense, there must be more act than potency in the world to account for motion and yet, because there is novelty, the potential must somehow win out. Hegel's principles may well evoke Thomists to develop more of the potentialities in their doctrine of nature and its finality.

Grégoire also has chapters on the pantheism of Hegel, his axiology, and his philosophy of history. There follows a short chapter on Hegel and Marx.

Feuerbach's philosophy is almost forgotten in the twentieth century. Grégoire recalls it in the second part of his work, a statement of Feuerbach's philosophy of religion and his influence on Marx. If the second part of this book is not as interesting as the first, the fault is not in Grégoire but in Feuerbach who was a much grosser thinker than Hegel, his master.

The work ends with two appendices, one a recasting of the famous dialectical argument on the master and slave, the other containing extracts from the works of Feuerbach. There is a copious index and a handily subdivided table of contents.

One question will remain perhaps in the reader's mind after seeing Hegel and Feuerbach side by side. The former held that there was an end to dialectical development, the resorption of all into the Absolute. The latter viewed the process as essentially infinite. How could Marx justify his

choice of Hegel's answer, holding as he did that the tensions of society would end in the utopia of Communism? If the process ends it is not dialectical; if it does not, it is not material. It is this *finis operis* which is one of the most baffling puzzles in understanding Communism. Yet this tenuous and enigmatic leap of the imperfect to the perfect is the central principle of Communism. It is what makes it Communistic.

Il Devenire in Aristotele. By Carlo Giacon. Padua: Cedam, 1947. Pp. 202, with index.

The problem of motion may not be the principal axis in modern philosophy, but there is no doubt that post-Renaissance thought, either in fact or by flagrant omission, has always involved the issues that confronted Aristotle, the cosmologist. Thus Descartes and Leibniz, in the company of modern scientism, never got down to motion; Hegel and Marx never got beyond it; the existentialists never get up to it. Kant could only reduce it to the static character of categories, substituting for the scholastic tradition of nature as mobile the Newtonian regard of matter as mass. For all these reasons then, a basic statement of Aristotle's views on motion is a welcome addition to the realistic philosophical literature of our day. Such a statement is the aim of this book.

By steering completely clear of some of the larger controversies which the texts of Aristotle present, the author has managed to organize his subject-matter in a simple and straightforward manner, showing the historical setting that provoked the Aristotelian principles of potency and act into their classic expression and then building on this clarifying foundation the whole edifice of Aristotle's cosmology on the intrinsic character of motion. Time and quantity, the measures of motion, are not considered. But such an omission is no serious set-back to the modern Aristotelian reader's enthusiasm. Time and quantity, though victims of the natural inadequacies of empirical science, are constantly mentioned in the contemporary approach to reality. It is the intrinsic character of motion that the modern period has forgotten, or badly misunderstood.

Such a book as this is a genuine contribution. It should be a potential stimulus to Italian thought, suffused with the idealism of men like Croce and Gentile and by Fascist propaganda on motion and its kindred topics like work and war. But the book should also have value elsewhere. The manuals of cosmology in both English and other languages give the impression, too often, that it is cosmological to begin with quantity, the continuum. Such an approach is one of the reasons for the scholastic failure to make an accepted stand against the claims of modern physics. In such a cosmology, motion cannot be treated at all. One may well move from motion to quantity, its measure. But one cannot move from quantity to

motion. Aristotelian cosmology moves up the hierarchy of abstraction, not down it.

The author points out in a clear and convincing language the necessity of a substrate in motion, the reality of matter and form, the facts of finality in nature. He gives an excellent defense of the maxim, *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur*, propped up by an incisive analysis of the principle against the infinite regression. The exposition ends with a treatment of Aristotle's doctrine on the Prime Mover and the second, eternal movers.

An interesting feature of this book that would recommend it as a convenient reference manual is the subdivisions of the chapters which identify all of the larger topics in Aristotle's cosmology on motion as such. Those who have read the *Physics* of Aristotle know that it is a difficult book and that St. Thomas' commentary is necessary as a companion volume to clarify Aristotle. The *Physics*, at least at first sight, seems to move abruptly from one topic to another and to involve questions like the arguments against Heraclitus and the Eleatics which are not properly cosmological but dialectical and pre-scientific. In fact, Jaeger has even argued that the *Physics* was not written continuously but at various stages in Aristotle's life.

There is one aspect of Aristotle which is perhaps not duly emphasized in this book. Would the doctrines of potency and act suffice to define motion of themselves? Aristotle apparently did not think so. He held that motion must be known by induction, a fitting rebuttal to those who claim to follow Aristotle but do not accord inductive primacy to motion. In fact, when St. Thomas formulated his first argument for God's existence, he called it the *manifestior via*, conceding to motion a primacy in discovery.

This book is the fifth volume in a series generally entitled "Problems of Today" and edited by Ottaviano and Flores d'Arcais. Coming from Italy which has supplied so much to Thomism in the past, including of course St. Thomas himself, this book can well be a sign of the continued vitality of wholesome thought in that country where material conditions of the post-war world make it difficult to fulfill the maxim: *primum vivere, deinde philosophari.*

Philosophy: Its Significance in Contemporary Civilization. By Hirsch Lazaar Silverman. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1946. Pp. 36. $2.00.

The somewhat crowded format of this little essay allows Prof. Silverman to say much more than appears at first glance. The table of contents lists such interesting topics as the need, purposes, basic tasks, attitudes, types, psychological character, constituents, definitions and a subjectivistic interpretation of philosophy. Philosophy is then considered in relation to democracy, systematic thought, science, creative spirit, the good life, and human nature. The essay ends with philosophy in contemporary civiliza-

tion and some fundamental conclusions. Yet when one puts the book down and attempts to complete the sentence: " the significance of philosophy is . . . ," one experiences a sense of puzzlement and frustration. It is as if one were following the laying of a lovely mosaic, reveling in the beauty of each exquisite bit, but when stepping back with anticipation to view the completed picture, found no picture there.

Prof. Silverman uses many traditional expressions in exposing his ideas, but the meaning he attaches to them varies from page to page. After a not too flattering portrait of a philosopher as a different, anti-social being, with more than normally intense inhibitions, incapable of practical affairs, and the assertion that philosophy's greatest gift is skepticism with which to meet every dogmatic assertion, he demands that philosophy be " useful and of value," and that philosophers help mankind pass from verbal dialectics to a profound understanding of our communized production and distribution methods in technology and industry, and bring to light our true objectives in life, conceived not in terms of abstractions but in terms of the functions, the needs, the possibilities of life itself. Perhaps a philosopher could swallow that, but to a layman it looks like a contradiction to expect from philosophers the practical answers it was agreed they were incapable of by nature. Prof. Silverman also uses the term *abstraction* loosely, to the extent at times of using it as a term of opprobrium, yet he confesses he is an idealist. Another example of the topsy-turvy world in which he dwells is his assumption that abstractions and universals are the cause and principles of multiplicity and division, and consequent confusion, while the material and the concrete is the principle of unity, order, simplicity. " A changing civilization necessitates a simplification of worldly concepts, a reduction to concrete terms." Mindful of his observation, that " philosophers should display constantly the attitude of enquirers rather than of expositors of absolute knowledge; . . . the most confident affirmations must not be expressed in a tone that shows that they are regarded as final," we should take him at his word, and leave him to further reflection, for the philosophy that he gives us here is neither " useful " or " of value " when viewed against the assured richness and completeness of the Thomistic synthesis.

Why I Am For The Church. By Charles P. Taft. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947. Pp. 102. $2.25.

The clarion tones of this apology for the Church by the distinguished layman who is the President of the Federal Council of Churches in America have the sound of brass and cymbals. Mr. Charles Taft bewails, in a series of papers, the confusion of the world today, and offers " the church " as a solution, but only leaves us worse confounded than before. It is incredible that anyone, presumably trained as a lawyer in the niceties of

logic, could present so slovenly a case based on private prejudices, unwarranted assumptions and amoebic definitions.

One looks in vain for a definite statement as to which, if any, of the 258 denominations is " the church " of Mr. Taft. However, " the church " that he is " for "—a barbarous expression—will have these marks. In place of apostolicity, it must put God into politics, a thing, says he, the primitive churches failed to do. Instead of sanctity, it must stand for the dignity of the human personality, an idea which he believes first appeared among the nonconformists in England. It is catholic only in the sense that the better people, the nicest people in any community are members, in whom one can have confidence. And finally, it must fight " secularism, nationalism and the abuses of industrialism," and also Marxism and Hitler. Mr. Taft is " for " a church which does these things.

He urges his readers again and again to adopt and develop a philosophy of history, and yet his own naiveté, or ignorance—the line between them is sometimes difficult to draw—is astonishing. A warden of an Episcopalian church, his most lavish praise is spent on the discordant elements and the discontents, the Methodist and Baptist revival. As he points with pride to his Irish ancestry with one hand, he exalts Oliver Cromwell with the other as a model of respect for human rights and the dignity of the individual, the patron saint of toleration and compromise, the father of democracy, worthy to stand beside Abraham Lincoln. Aside from the fact that no one seems to have had an idea between the time of St. Augustine and Oliver Cromwell, Hegel is credited with first conceiving the idea of progress and perfection in human affairs. Even a glance at Somervell's Toynbee might change some of his conclusions if he is a fair-minded man since most of his premises are historically indefensible. For it is precisely history that enables Catholics to be uncompromising and absolutist—a heritage from the founder of *the* one true Church, Jesus Christ.

One soon suspects that Jesus Christ, who incidentally " distilled his philosophy from the Old Testament," would be uncomfortable in Mr. Taft's church; for, however amorphous it might appear, it still excludes stubborn Romanists and all who refuse to accept the political principle of compromise and includes non-Christian groups, for " I am not proposing a destruction of the other great religions, but their inspiration to join and help the Christian church in fighting . . . the abuses of industrialism." Thus the goal is not supernatural, but quite natural. Evangelicals are welcomed in " the church " because " they believed in baptism and the Lord's supper and these sacraments were neither sacerdotal nor sacrificial, but deeply emotional and recreating." Imagine the plight of any minister Mr. Taft might obtain for his Episcopal church who still cherished a belief in the validity of his orders and a love for the liturgical beauty of his Prayer Book.

Thus " the church " Mr. Taft is " for " resembles a cozy country club,

" emotional and recreating," where one will feel good and meet nice people who will help in solving the problems of labor and local government at home and attacks on democracy abroad, all the while avoiding a definite stand on anything, ready to compromise, and wearing a specious mask of democracy by loudly proclaiming its undying respect for the individual conscience, right or wrong.

The Encyclopedia of Psychology. Edited by P. L. HARRIMAN. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. Pp. 905. $10.

To compile an encyclopedia is admittedly a difficult task that none can perform to the satisfaction of all readers. Choice and arrangement of articles are open to all sorts of objections; even careful editing cannot avoid altogether overlapping, repetitions, and contradictions. Nonetheless, however difficult for the editor the task be, he is expected to achieve some sort of harmony and consistency. These one sorely misses in this work. The editor has set himself a threefold goal, in itself a hazardous enterprise when the goals differ widely. Dr. Harriman wishes to " meet the requirements of the serious investigator " desirous of special information, to furnish to students supplementary data and explanations, and also to emphasize some of the trends of contemporary psychology.

The book can hardly be said to have accomplished these aims. The choice of topics is questionable. The articles, save one, deal with problems, as concept formation, motivation, intelligence tests; the exception is entitled " G. C. Jung." Why not also " Freud " or " James? " Further, there are articles which have nothing to do with psychology as such; they discuss, for example, questions of organization, personnel, teacher (fifteen pages reporting mainly on efficiency selection). Too much space is given to the purely anatomical and physiological. Eye and ear are thus minutely described; yet there is no treatment of the central nervous system while the autonomic system is detailed. There is an article on colors, but none on sounds. The apprehension of space and time is not mentioned. Instinct is not considered (although there are many pages on the white rat in psychology); nor is the unconscious, adjustment, and several others, all important notions of modern psychology.

A final criticism could be directed at the bibliographies, a feature which should enhance the value of an encyclopedia. The present work displays no uniform policy; some bibliographies are missing entirely, the others of unequal length, some appended, some in footnotes. A few of the articles are, of course, excellent and highly informative. Too many are incomplete, and some rather more difficult and technical than a student will find useful. The general impression is one of dissatisfaction; it may be true that such an encyclopedia is needed, but this one will not fill the gap.

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